Resource-Efficient Communication in the Presence of Adversaries by Young, Maxwell





presented to the University of Waterloo
in fulfillment of the




Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2011
c© Maxwell Young 2011
I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true
copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my
examiners.




This dissertation presents algorithms for achieving communication in the
presence of adversarial attacks in large, decentralized, resource-constrained
networks. We consider abstract single-hop communication settings where a
set of senders S wishes to directly communicate with a set of receivers R.
These results are then extended to provide resource-efficient, multi-hop com-
munication in wireless sensor networks (WSNs), where energy is critically
scarce, and peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, where bandwidth and computa-
tional power are limited. Our algorithms are provably correct in the face
of attacks by a computationally bounded adversary who seeks to disrupt
communication between correct participants.
The first major result in this dissertation addresses a general scenario
involving single-hop communication in a time-slotted network where a single
sender in S wishes to transmit a message m to a single receiver inR. The two
players share a communication channel; however, there exists an adversary
who aims to prevent the transmission of m by periodically blocking this
channel. There are costs to send, receive or block m on the channel, and we
ask: How much do the two players need to spend relative to the adversary
in order to guarantee transmission of the message?
This problem abstracts many types of conflict in information networks,
and the associated costs represent an expenditure of network resources. We
show that it is significantly more costly for the adversary to block m than for
the two players to achieve communication. Specifically, if the cost to send,
receive and block m in a slot are fixed constants, and the adversary spends a
total of B slots to try to block the message, then both the sender and receiver
must be active in only O(Bϕ−1 + 1) = O(B.62 + 1) slots in expectation to
transmit m, where ϕ = (1 +
√
5)/2 is the golden ratio. Surprisingly, this
result holds even if (1) the value of B is unknown to either player; (2) the
adversary knows the algorithms of both players, but not their random bits;
and (3) the adversary is able to launch attacks using total knowledge of past
actions of both players. Finally, these results are applied to two concrete
problems. First, we consider jamming attacks in WSNs and address the fun-
damental task of propagating m from a single device to all others in a WSN
in the presence of faults; this is the problem of reliable broadcast. Second,
we examine how our algorithms can mitigate application-level distributed
denial-of-service attacks in wired client-server scenarios.
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The second major result deals with a single-hop communication problem
where now S consists of multiple senders and there is still a single receiver
who wishes to obtain a message m. However, many of the senders (strictly
less than half) can be faulty, failing to send m or sending incorrect messages.
While the majority of the senders possess m, rather than listening to all of
S and majority filtering on the received data, we desire an algorithm that
allows the single receiver to decide on m in a more efficient manner. To
investigate this scenario, we define and devise algorithms for a new data
streaming problem called the Bad Santa problem which models the selection
dilemma faced by the receiver.
With our results for the Bad Santa problem, we consider the problem of
energy-efficient reliable broadcast. All previous results on reliable broadcast
require devices to spend significant time in the energy-expensive receiving
state which is a critical problem in WSNs where devices are typically battery
powered. In a popular WSN model, we give a reliable broadcast protocol
that achieves optimal fault tolerance (i.e., tolerates the maximum number of
faults in this WSN model) and improves over previous results by achieving
an expected quadratic decrease in the cost to each device. For the case where
the number of faults is within a (1− ε)-factor of the optimal fault tolerance,
for any constant ε > 0, we give a reliable broadcast protocol that improves
further by achieving an expected (roughly) exponential decrease in the cost
to each device.
The third and final major result of this dissertation addresses single-hop
communication where S and R both consist of multiple peers that need to
communicate in an attack-resistant P2P network. There are several analyt-
ical results on P2P networks that can tolerate an adversary who controls a
large number of peers and uses them to disrupt network functionality. Unfor-
tunately, in such systems, operations such as data retrieval and message send-
ing incur significant communication costs. Here, we employ cryptographic
techniques to define two protocols both of which are more efficient than ex-
isting solutions. For a network of n peers, our first protocol is deterministic
with O(log2 n) message complexity and our second protocol is randomized
with expected O(log n) message complexity; both improve over all previous
results. The hidden constants and setup costs for our protocols are small and
no trusted third party is required. Finally, we present an analysis showing
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Fault tolerance is a critical issue in large-scale ad-hoc networks. Typically,
such networks are characterized by a symmetric relationship between partic-
ipating devices and the lack of any central authority. Network functionality
is achieved in a decentralized fashion, with autonomous devices cooperating
to execute tasks such as data collection, storage, and retrieval. Here, we
focus on networks where the amount of resources available to each device is
assumed to be both roughly equivalent and limited with respect to the sys-
tem size. A large number of devices may be present; for example, large-scale
systems are in existence today such as the Azureus BitTorrent network [49]
and the KAD network [146] both of which see more than one million users
on a daily basis. Due to the sheer size of such systems, even basic operations
are complicated by the potential for faulty behaviour amongst devices.
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) and peer-to-peer (P2P) networks are
two examples of systems that capture the aspects described above. In WSNs,
the devices themselves are often referred to as motes or nodes. Each node
is equipped with a wireless radio and communication is often performed
by broadcasting or, in the case where messages may pass through several
nodes, multicasting. These networks are employed for a variety of purposes
such as flood warning systems, habitat monitoring and the study of animal
migrationary patterns [3,163]. Such applications require that nodes transmit
and retrieve data robustly. Due to the limited radius of broadcast, routing
needs to be performed using multiple hops between intermediate nodes; this
is one example of a critical decentralized task that must be performed in a
fault-tolerant fashion.
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P2P networks share common traits with WSNs. Peers (or nodes) act
autonomously with limited resources to provide network functionality. How-
ever, in contrast to multicasting, communication between peers often occurs
as a point-to-point transmission between locations in the overlay.1 The past
decade has witnessed the advent of large-scale real-world P2P applications
such as Gnutella, Kazaa, BitTorrent, and many others. While a significant
amount of P2P traffic is known to involve illegal file sharing of copyrighted
material [115], the P2P paradigm provides a mechanism for achieving less
prosaic goals such as internet telephony [16] and data privacy [58]. Regard-
less of the application, data storage and retrieval are foundational operations
for P2P services and it is important to that such functionality be preserved
in the presence of faults.
The overarching theme of this thesis is the development of algorithms
that guarantee two properties: (1) low communication overhead and (2)
basic network functionality even in the face of extremely challenging attacks.
Unsurprisingly, there is often a trade-off between these two properties and
achieving a satisfactory balance is the focus of this thesis.
1.1 Motivating Attack Resistance
The fail-stop model addresses situations where component failures can occur.
These failures can also model malicious attacks where system components are
selectively disabled. However, a critical feature of fail-stop faults is that the
affected peers are assumed to have have crashed; consequently, faulty peers
exhibit unresponsive behaviour which can be detected by correct peers.
In contrast, this thesis is concerned with a more general class of faults
where peers that suffer a Byzantine fault do not necessarily crash but are con-
trolled by an adversary. Such faulty peers are termed Byzantine and they can
be used in concert to launch attacks engineered by an adversary who wishes
to disrupt network functionality. This class of faults, while subsuming the
fail-stop model, also captures malicious behaviour. Clearly, Byzantine faults
can have a significant impact on network performance since peers do not
simply disappear, but rather may persist in the system and derail crucial
1A notable exception is P2P streaming where several peers may download content from
a host simultaneously.
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operations. The problem of handling such faults is non-trivial. Many algo-
rithms, such as those for achieving leader election or broadcast (see [62] for
Byzantine fault-tolerant solutions to these problems), that function in the
presence of more benign failures cease to provide any guarantees under this
more challenging fault model.
The research community is well aware of attacks on P2P systems [142,
153]. In terms of fail-stop faults, there is a vast literature on distributed
hash tables (DHTs) that can tolerate random peer deletions [71, 81, 127,
134, 148, 172]. While these results may find application in certain scenarios,
they fail to account for Byzantine attacks which may manifest as spamming,
denial-of-service attacks (DoS), free-riding and tampering with reputation.
Additionally, Byzantine faults model complex, but unintentional, failures
that can occur due to the complexity of the system such as environmental
factors or software errors that are not adequately modeled by the fail-stop
model. In the context of more challenging attack scenarios, a P2P system is
said to be robust if it guarantees functionality in the presence of Byzantine
faults. In this area, there are many results describing robust DHTs [12–14,
31, 52, 53, 112, 135, 137, 169]. Despite the different constructions, a critical
aspect of robust DHTs is secure routing between peers in the presence of
Byzantine faults. However, since peers have limited resources, both in terms
of bandwidth and computation, the security of the system must be balanced
against the imperative of scalable communication.
In the area of WSNs, there exist several survey papers that address secu-
rity issues [6, 29, 34, 84, 108, 154, 159]. In addition to traditional network se-
curity challenges, the shared communication medium of WSNs renders them
vulnerable to a variety of malicious attacks [154]. A Byzantine adversary may
engage in any number of activities aimed at disrupting communication such
as rerouting (blackholing), message injection, wormholes, replay attacks, and
others (see [34, 84] and references therein). This challenging state of affairs
is further compounded by the strict energy constraints placed on the net-
work devices themselves which are typically battery powered. Consequently,
many of the standard cryptographic techniques for thwarting such attacks
in the wired domain cannot be employed in WSNs. Moreover, cryptogra-
phy is ineffective against an attacker that simply jams the communication
medium in order to disrupt all communications within range. Finally, for
many potential applications, WSNs will be deployed in hard-to-reach areas
or along dangerous terrain (see [3, 163] and references therein), and once a
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device has exhausted its energy supply, it is permanently inactive. Therefore,
maximizing the lifetime of a device is a critical goal. Unfortunately, this goal
is often at odds with the redundancy needed to overcome communication
interference caused by an attacker.
1.2 Single-Hop Communication and Resource
Efficiency
As discussed above, resource contraints are a critical feature of adversarial
fault tolerance. The problem of achieving resource-efficient communication
is a unifying theme throughout this thesis and we deal primarily with three
abstract single-hop communication settings where a set of senders S wishes to
directly communicate with a set of receivers R in a resource-efficient manner.
We summarize these three scenarios below.
1.2.1 A Single Sender to a Single Receiver
The first single-hop communication scenario addressed is one where S and
R each consist of a single player. The two players share a communication
channel; however, there exists an adversary who aims to prevent the trans-
mission of m by periodically blocking this channel. There are costs to send,
receive or block m on the channel, and we ask: How much do the two players
need to spend relative to the adversary in order to guarantee transmission of
the message?
This problem abstracts many types of conflict in information networks,
and the associated costs represent an expenditure of energy and network re-
sources. For example, a particularly effective attack in WSNs is one where an
adversary uses its nodes to disrupt the shared communication medium. This
can occur when the attacker transmits concurrently with another (possibly
legitimate) transmission such that communication is disrupted within the
area of interference; this is a message collision. An adversary that launches
such attacks, commonly referred to as a jamming adversary, embodies one
or more Byzantine devices that attempt to interfere with communications by
intentionally causing message collisions or simply flooding the channel with
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useless information. Attempts by correct nodes to communicate in the pres-
ence of a jamming adversary may quickly expend their energy supply. On
the other hand, a node participating in a jamming attack is also subject to
energy constraints.
In this work, we approach the problem of jamming attacks from the per-
spective of relative energy expenditure between a correct node and the ad-
versary. In particular, we aim to design algorithms that are efficient in the
sense that (1) the expected amount of energy required by a correct node
to overcome a jamming attack is less than (2) the energy expended by the
adversary in pursuing a jamming strategy.
Another application of this problem setting is that of distributed denial-
of-service (DDoS) attacks in the client-server model. Typically, a number of
compromised clients, known collectively as a botnet, are employed to over-
whelm a server with requests. These botnets have become commercialized
with operators (also referred to as botmasters) renting out time to individuals
for the purposes of launching attacks [54,96]. In this setting, we seek a com-
munication protocol for defending a server by requiring a botmaster to incur
higher monetary costs in order to achieve the same level of denial-of-service
it would otherwise achieve against an undefended server.
1.2.2 Multiple Senders and a Single Receiver
The second single-hop communication scenario we examine is one where S
consists of multiple senders who possess information m required by a single
receiver in R. However, many of the senders (strictly less than half) can be
faulty, failing to send m or sending incorrect messages. While the majority of
the senders are correct, rather than listening to all of S and majority filtering
on the received data, we desire an algorithm that allows the single receiver
to decide on m in a more efficient manner. This single-hop scenario finds
application in more general multi-hop cases where a message is propagating
outward from a source node via multiple single hops. At any given time, a
node which has not learned the message may sample its neighbours in order
to receive it. However, these neighbors may suffer fail-stop faults or, worse,
be controlled by an adversary who seeks to prevent the spread of the message.
This single-hop communication scenario finds application in the reliable
broadcast problem in WSNs where a single node wishes to broadcast a mes-
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sage to all other nodes in a multi-hop network. All previous results on reliable
broadcast require nodes to spend significant time listening for transmissions.
Surprisingly, the energy cost for listening is roughly the same as transmit-
ting; both actions dominate the operating costs of a WSN device. Therefore,
excessive listening is a critical problem in WSNs because devices are typically
battery powered and, once the onboard power supply is depleted, it may be
infeasible to replace it. To address this problem, we investigate how reliable
broadcast can be accomplished in a more energy-efficient manner by having
nodes reduce the amount of time spent in the listening state.
1.2.3 Multiple Senders to Multiple Receivers
The third single-hop communication scenario addressed in this dissertatation
involves S and R both consisting of multiple nodes. Here, a node in S must
cooperate with the other members of S to transmit information to nodes
in R; however, both sets may contain many nodes (again, strictly less than
half) that are faulty. Cost is measured in the number of messages sent and
received in order to obtain the necessary data from S.
This generic situation arises in attack-resistant structured P2P networks
where routing is typically accomplished by forwarding data along a search
path consisting of peers. At each “hop” along this path, a small amount of
locally available routing information is used to forward the data closer to the
intended destination. The use of a small (typically logarithmic in the size of
the network) amount of routing information at each peer is the core concept
behind DHTs. However, routing is compromised if any peer along the search
path is Byzantine. For instance, the search information may be corrupted or
rerouted to an incorrect location.
A popular approach for dealing with such disruption in DHTs is to have
groups of peers act in concert to overwhelm Byzantine actions. For example,
if we consider a single hop, then each member may transmit the message
m to the destination peer p. If the group possesses a majority of correct
peers, then p can simply take the message in the majority to be correct.
This idea generalizes to multiple hops and provides secure routing through
the redundancy provided by using groups rather than individual peers. We
use the terminology robust communication to describe the problem of com-
municating between such groups of peers. Of course, the redundancy of
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this approach comes at a price. Specifically, the communication overhead
is greatly increased as many more messages need to be transmitted along
the search path. In this thesis, we address the problem of achieving robust
communication while reducing the message complexity.
1.2.4 Algorithmic Approaches and Commonalities
While the problems addressed in this thesis span both the wired and wireless
network domains, the algorithmic approaches for achieving resource efficient
communication share several features in common and we discuss these below.
Throughout the remainder of this thesis, we will often refer to peers or sensor
network devices more generically as nodes; the network domain will always
be clear from the context.
• Randomness to Foil Adversary: Despite behaving in a faulty manner,
it is often impossible to identify Byzantine nodes since such nodes may
behave correctly until there is an opportunity to derail a critical op-
eration. Furthermore, even after the faulty behaviour, identifying the
source of the problem can degenerate into an unresolvable situation
of fingerpointing. Therefore, algorithms for tolerating such adversarial
disruption must be oblivious; that is, they do not rely on having infor-
mation about whether any given node is Byzantine or correct. This is
a challenging situation and a natural algorithmic technique is to use
randomness to foil worst-case behaviour. While we defer the details
until later chapters, the results provided in this thesis make heavy use
of randomized algorithms to achieve guarantees while remaining obliv-
ious.
• Use of Majority Action: The number of Byzantine nodes in the system
is assumed to be substantial; typically the fraction of faulty nodes in the
system is a constant strictly less than 1/2. Since the correct nodes are in
the majority, it is possible to accomplish certain tasks. In a system with
n nodes, a naive protocol might utilize Ω(n) communication overhead to
effect an operation. For example, in a P2P system, rather than sending
along a single (and more vulnerable) search path, a correct node pmight
send a message m to node q by asking all other nodes to transmit m
to q. Node q can then filter on all incoming communications and take
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the message in the majority to be correct. Of course, such an approach
does not scale to large systems and achieving scalability requires a
more sophisticated approach. Nonetheless, this example illustrates a
recurring technique employed throughout this thesis that allows correct
nodes to overcome adversarial disruption.
• Efficiency Through Cryptography: Despite the undeniable utility of
cryptographic techniques, they cannot provide a satisfactory solution
in many scenarios involving Byzantine faults. For example, cryptog-
raphy cannot prevent wireless jamming attacks. Attempting to root
out Byzantine behaviour through the use of public-key cryptography
may be unwieldy in the highly dynamic and distributed settings of P2P
networks. Nonetheless, there are ways in which cryptography can pro-
vide both asymptotic and practical improvements. In these cases, the
adversary is assumed to be computationally bounded in the sense that
certain computations (such as factoring) are assumed to be infeasible
within a reasonable amount of time. This is a realistic assumption in
many cases and, under this setting, we can develop algorithms that
obtain substantial efficiency improvements in terms of communication
complexity.
1.3 Summary of Main Contributions
In this thesis, we demonstrate algorithms that are provably correct and pro-
vide efficient communication between participants in the face of challenging
adversarial attacks. In the context of the single-hop communication scenarios
discussed in Section 1.2, we summarize the main contributions of this thesis
below.
1.3.1 DoS-Resistant Communication
We examine our first single-hop time-slotted scenario where one player at-
tempts to send a message m to another player over a communication channel.
Assume an adversary that blocks communication for B time slots where B is
unknown to either player and where cost is measured in terms of the number
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of slots spent accessing the channel. We give a protocol guaranteeing deliv-
ery of m while the ratio of either player’s expected cost to the adversary’s




is the golden ratio [102]. Our
result implies that to prevent communication of m, the adversary incurs an
asymptotically higher cost than the expected cost incurred by either correct
player. Surprisingly, our result holds even in the face of an adaptive adver-
sary who launches attacks using total knowledge of the past actions of all
players. Moreover, in networks with a sufficient amount of communication
traffic, we can tolerate a reactive adversary who may detect a transmission
in the current time slot and then decide to jam.
As mentioned in Section 1.2, WSNs are extremely vulnerable to jamming
attacks due to their shared communication medium and the constrained en-
ergy supply of the devices; such attacks constitute a type of denial-of-service
attack (DoS) [108, 121]. Our protocol applies directly to a single-hop WSN
where costs are measured in terms of energy expenditure for listening and
sending on the wireless medium. We extend our results to obtain reliable
broadcast protocols that, in comparison to previous work, offer improved re-
silience to jamming attacks. Finally, we apply a variant of our protocol to
the case of DDoS attacks in wired networks. In the client-server model, given
that the adversary uses an aggregate bandwidth of R to attack a server, the
correct clients need only possess an expected aggregate bandwidth of O(R0.5)
in order to avoid zero throughput. This is useful for applications where a crit-
ical update or warning must be disseminated, and delivery to even a handful
of clients is sufficient since they may then share it with others (via multicast,
peer-to-peer distribution, etc.).
1.3.2 Energy-Efficient Communication
In the context of our second single-hop scenario, we address the problem of
achieving reliable broadcast while minimizing energy consumption. To this
end, we introduce a new data streaming problem which we call the Bad Santa
problem described in detail in Section 4.1. Our results on this problem apply
to any situation where: 1) a node can listen to a set of n nodes, out of which
at least half are correct and know the correct message; and 2) each of these
n nodes sends according to some predetermined schedule. We show that in
order to receive the correct message with probability 1, it is necessary and
sufficient for the listening node to listen to a Θ(
√
n) expected number of
9
time slots. Moreover, if we allow for repetitions of transmissions so that each
sending node sends the message O(log∗ n) times, then listening to O(log∗ n)
expected number of time slots suffices.
We then apply our result to a popular wireless sensor network grid model.
Each node is located on a point in a two dimensional grid, and whenever a
node sends a message m, all awake nodes within L∞ distance r receive m. It
is known that reliable broadcast is possible if and only if t < r
2
(2r+ 1) nodes
within any 2r + 1 by 2r + 1 square can suffer Byzantine faults. These nodes
are chosen and controlled by an adversary that knows everything except for
the random bits of each correct node. Letting n = r(2r + 1), we show how
to achieve reliable broadcast that tolerates the optimal number of faults and
requires each node to send and receive an expected O(n log2 |m|+
√
n|m|) bits
where |m| is the number of bits in m, and, after broadcasting a fingerprint of
m, each node is awake only an expected O(
√
n) time slots. Moreover, for t ≤
(1−ε)(r/2)(2r+1), for any constant ε > 0, we can achieve even better energy
savings. In particular, if we allow each node to send O(log∗ n) times, we
achieve reliable broadcast with each node sending O(n log2 |m|+ (log∗ n)|m|)
bits and receiving an expected O(n log2 |m| + (log∗ n)|m|) bits and, after
broadcasting a fingerprint of m, each node is awake for only an expected
O(log∗ n) time slots. Our results compare favorably with previous protocols
that required each node to send Θ(|m|) bits, receive Θ(n|m|) bits and be
awake for Θ(n) time slots.
1.3.3 Message-Efficient Communication
As previously mentioned, there are several analytical results on distributed
hash tables (DHTs) that can tolerate Byzantine faults. Unfortunately, in
such systems, operations such as data retrieval and message sending incur
significant communication costs. For example, a simple scheme used in many
Byzantine fault-tolerant DHT constructions of n nodes requires O(log3 n)
messages; this is likely impractical for real-world applications. The previous
best known message complexity is O(log2 n) in expectation; however, the cor-
responding protocol suffers from prohibitive costs owing to hidden constants
in the asymptotic notation and setup costs.
In the context of our third single-hop scenario, we focus on reducing these
communication costs against a computationally bounded adversary. We em-
ploy threshold cryptography and distributed key generation to define two
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protocols both of which are more efficient than previous solutions. In com-
parison, our first protocol is deterministic with O(log2 n) message complexity
and our second protocol is randomized with expected O(log n) message com-
plexity. Further, both the hidden constants and setup costs for our protocols
are improved and no trusted third party is required. Finally, we present an
analysis based on results from microbenchmarks conducted over PlanetLab.
This analysis shows that our protocols are practical for deployment under
significant levels of churn and adversarial behaviour.
1.4 Thesis Roadmap
The remainder of this document is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides
a comprehensive overview of related work, technical preliminaries, and pre-
vious results on the problems we address in this thesis. Chapter 3 describes
our theoretical contributions to the problem of achieving DoS-resistant com-
munication and illustrates how our results can be applied to concrete net-
working problems. Chapter 4 provides our algorithms for energy-efficient
reliable broadcast along with a discussion of related practical considerations.
Chapter 5 presents our theoretical results and empirical analysis regarding
the problem of message-efficient robust communication in DHTs. Chapter 6
provides concluding remarks and outlines potential future research.
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that the work presented in this the-
sis was done in collaboration with other researchers. The content presented
in Chapter 3, Chapter 4, and Chapter 5 appeared previously in [89], [87,88],
and [169], respectively. The results that are included in this document are
ones with which this author was heavily involved. However, for the sake
of completeness, those results which do not meet this criterion have been
included in an appendix at the end of this thesis. Specifically, included in
this appendix are two lemmas dealing with lower bounds for the Bad Santa




As discussed in Chapter 1, the results for the single-hop communication
problems can be extended to provide solutions to communication problems
involving multiple hops. One such problem that figures prominently in both
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 is that of reliable broadcast. In this chapter, we
provide a comprehensive overview of the previous results on this problem in
order to provide the necessary background for understanding our work. In
Chapter 5, we address the problem of tolerating adversarial attacks in struc-
tured peer-to-peer networks; specifically, in distributed hash tables (DHTs).
This is an area that has received significant attention in the literature and
we review several previous works in order to provide the context for our new
results.
2.1 An Overview of Reliable Broadcast
A fundamental problem in distributed systems is Byzantine Agreement. Since
its introduction by Pease et al. [117], this problem has received much atten-
tion. In Byzantine Agreement, there are a total of n devices in the system.
Of these n devices, t of them may deviate from protocol in an arbitrary fash-
ion; such devices are termed Byzantine or faulty. Furthermore, these devices
are assumed to be controlled by an adversary and, therefore, they may act
in concert to cause trouble for the network. The remaining n − t devices
that are not controlled by the adversary are assumed to obey protocol and
we call these devices correct. Note that while the devices corrupted by the
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adversary are fixed prior to the execution of any protocol (a static adver-
sary), the correct devices do not know which are faulty. A device pi can set
a value field to either 0 or 1 and must commit to a value in {0, 1} by the
end of the protocol. There exists a dealer holding an initial value v ∈ {0, 1}.
A protocol that achieves Byzantine Agreement is one which guarantees the
following two properties. First, all correct devices commit to the same value
in {0, 1}. Second, if the dealer is correct, then all correct devices commit to
v. Therefore, this is a question of secure broadcast. While these are basic
guarantees one would desire in such an adversarial setting, the problem of
achieving them is non-trivial due to the behaviour of the Byzantine devices.
In this thesis, we address the problem of Byzantine Agreement in WSNs.
In this domain, the problem has typically been labeled as reliable broadcast
in the literature and this is the terminology we use throughout. In this con-
text, we refer to nodes rather than devices. Here, our focus is on algorithms
for guaranteeing reliable broadcast while addressing the challenging energy
constraints placed on WSN devices.
2.1.1 Optimal Fault Tolerance in the Grid Model
We begin by describing the popular grid model of WSNs [19,21–23,87,88,90,
150]. In this model, each point in a two-dimensional grid corresponds to a
node. Let p(x, y) denote the node p at location (x, y) in the grid. Whenever
a node sends a message, all listening nodes within L∞ distance r receive the
message.1 We will use N(p) or N(x, y) to denote the set of nodes within
radius r of a node p(x, y); this is p’s broadcast neighbourhood. Within any
broadcast neighbourhood, at most t nodes may suffer a fault.
For reliable broadcast in the grid, the dealer (who is also referred to as
the source in the literature) is located at coordinates (0, 0) and all nodes
know this. There is a global broadcast schedule that assigns to each node p
a time slot in which p may broadcast. An example of a broadcast schedule is
given in [90]: in each round, each node in position (x, y) broadcasts in time
slot ((x mod (2r + 1))× (2r + 1) + (y mod (2r + 1))) mod (2r + 1)2. For
simplicity, messages are assumed to fit within a single slot
1The distance between two points (x1, y1) and (x2, y2) in the L∞ metric is max{|x1 −
x2|, |y1 − y2|}.
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Reliable Broadcast Protocol (Bhandari and Vaidya, 2005)
• Initially, the source s does a local broadcast of message m.
• Each node i ∈ N(s) commits to the first value it receives from s
and does a one-time broadcast of commit(i,m).
• The following protocol is executed by each node j (including those
nodes in the previous two steps):
– On receipt of a commit(i,m) message from a neighbor i,
node j records the message and broadcasts heard(j, i,m).
– On receipt of a heard(j′, i,m), node j records this message.
– Upon receiving commit or heard messages that 1) claim
v as the correct value and 2) are received along at least
t + 1 node disjoint paths that all lie within a single neigh-
bourhood, then node j commits to v and does a one-time
broadcast of commit(j,m).
Figure 2.1: The reliable broadcast protocol of Bhandari and Vaidya [22] for
tolerating Byzantine faults.
The work of Koo [90], and the subsequent work by Bhandari and Vaidya [22],
provides tight lower and upper bounds on the number of faults t. In particu-
lar, when faults are Byzantine, reliable broadcast is possible in the grid if and
only if t < (r/2)(2r+ 1). Figure 2.1 provides the pseudocode for the reliable
broadcast protocol of Bhandari and Vaidya [22] that achieves the maximum
(or optimal) fault tolerance.
Proving that this protocol is correct is non-trivial. Here, we summarize
the proof; however, the reader is referred to [22] for a complete analysis.
In the protocol itself, the message commit(i,m) signifies that node i has
committed to a message m, and the message heard(j, i,m) signifies that
node j has heard a message commit(i,m). We require the notion of a
perturbed neighbourhood PN(p) of p(a, b) as PN(p) = N(a+ 1, b) ∪N(a−
1, b) ∪ N(a, b + 1) ∪ N(a, b − 1). The proof in [22] works by showing that
for each node p in PN(a, b) − N(a, b), there exist 2t + 1 paths P1, ..., P2t+1

















Figure 2.2: An illustration of the sets Ap, Bp, and B
′
p where z = 0, r = 3
and a, b = 0. Node p is located at position (a − r + z, b + r + 1). A pair of
sister nodes, one in B′ and the other in B, are highlighted.
forms listed below:
• Pi = (q, p) which is a one hop path q → p or
• Pi = (q, q′, p) which is a two hop path q → q′ → p
where q, q′, p are distinct nodes and q, q′ lie in a single neighbourhood N(a, b+
r + 1), and q ∈ N(a, b) where, critically, nodes in N(a, b) have committed
to the correct message. The existence of these 2t + 1 paths, and the fact
that each broadcast neighbourhood has at most t < (r/2)(2r + 1) Byzan-
tine faults, is sufficient to prove that reliable broadcast is achieved by the
protocol. For simplicity, we can consider p ∈ N(a, b+ 1) since the analysis
is nearly identical for the cases where p ∈ N(a+ 1, b), p ∈ N(a− 1, b), and
p ∈ N(a, b− 1).
The node p lies in N(a, b+1)−N(a, b) and can be considered to have location
(a− r+ z, b+ r+ 1) where 0 ≤ z ≤ 2r. Now, summarizing the proof in [22],
we demonstrate that there exist r(2r + 1) node-disjoint paths P1, ..., Pr(2r+1)
all lying within the same neighbourhood:
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• One-Hop Paths: the set of nodes Ap = {q(x, y) | (a − r) ≤ x ≤
(a+ z) and (b+ 1) ≤ y ≤ (b+ r)} lie in N(a, b) and are neighbors of p.
Therefore, there are r(r+z+1) paths of the form q → p where q ∈ Ap.
• Two-Hop Paths: consider the sets Bp = {q(x, y) | (a+ z + 1) ≤ x ≤
(a+r) and (b+1) ≤ y ≤ (b+r)} and B′p = {q′(x′, y′) | (a+z+1−r) ≤
x′ ≤ a and (b+ r + 1) ≤ y′ ≤ (b+ 2r)}. The nodes in Bp lie in N(a, b)
while the nodes in B′p lie in N(p). Moreover, the set B
′
p is obtained
by shifting left by r units and up by r units. Therefore, there is a
one-to-one mapping between the nodes in Bp and the nodes in B
′
p. For
u ∈ Bp, we will call the corresponding node u′ ∈ B′p, the sister node of
u. Note that each node has at most two sister nodes; this can be seen
in Figure 4.2. Hence, there are r(r − z) paths of the form q → q′ → p.
Therefore, there are a total of r(r+z+1)+r(r−z) = r(2r+1) disjoint paths all
lying in a single neighbourhood N(a, b+ r+ 1). Figure 2.2 illustrates aspects
of the discussion above where a, b = 0. Now, note that the predecessor set
Gp = Ap ∪ B′p is the set of nodes to which p must listen in order to gather
information that will allow it to commit to the correct message.
In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, we extend our results for single-hop commu-
nication problems to achieve protocols for reliable broadcast. Our protocols
rely heavily on the results of Bhandari and Vaidya [22] discussed above. In
particular, we assume that each node p knows a predecessor set Gp of nodes
to which node p should listen for messages. As we have just reviewed, the
existence of Gp is shown by the constructive proofs in [22]. Our protocols
specify when each node p should listen to nodes in Gp and when each node p
should broadcast the message to which it has committed; the details of how
this is accomplished are discussed later.
2.1.2 Reliable Broadcast in General Topologies
Pelc and Peleg [119] examine a generalization of the t-locally bounded fault
model; that is, where each node contains at most t Byzantine nodes within
its neighbourhood. Specifically, they examine the broadcast protocol of
Koo [90], which the authors call the Certified Propagation Algorithm (CPA),
with the aim of establishing conditions for which it achieves reliable broadcast
under arbitrary graphs in contrast to the grid model. Again, CPA addresses
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Certified Propagation Algorithm (Koo [90] and Pelc and Peleg [119])
• The dealer d sends the message m to all of its neighbors and termi-
nates.
• For a correct node u ∈ N(d), upon receiving m from d it commits
to m, node u announces this committment of its neighbors and ter-
minates.
• If a node is not a neighbor of the source, then upon receiving t + 1
copies of m from t + 1 distinct neighbors, it commits to m, and
announces this committment to its neighbors and terminates.
Figure 2.3: Pseudocode for the Certified Propagation Algorithm (CPA).
the case where all nodes obey a global broadcast schedule (i.e. there is no
jamming adversary). The authors define X(p, d) to be the number of nodes
in p’s neighbourhood N(p) that are closer to d than p and then introduce
the parameter X(G) = min{X(p, d) | p, d ∈ V, (p, s) /∈ E}.
Using the parameter X(G), Pelc and Peleg [119] prove that, for any graph
G with dealer d such that t < X(G)/2, CPA achieves reliable broadcast; the
pseudocode is given in Figure 2.3. The intuition behind the correctness of
CPA is as follows. If CPA fails to achieve reliable broadcast, then there is
some node p that fails to commit on the correct message m; let p be the peer
closest to the dealer who has committed incorrectly. However, there are at
least 2t+ 1 nodes closer to d than p to which p can listen. At most t of these
nodes are faulty; therefore, p can listen to a set Γp of at least t + 1 nodes
that are correct. Since p has committed incorrectly, it follows that at least
one correct node in Γp has committed incorrectly, (otherwise, p would have
received t+ 1 correct messages). However, this contradicts the fact that p is
the first correct node to fail in this fashion; this contradiction completes the
argument.
We note that CPA does not necessarily tolerate the optimal number of
faults (see [168]). CPA is considered in Chapter 3 as an example that our
single-hop result can be incorporated into more general topologies. We note
that Ichimura and Shigeno [77] establish a different parameter for deriving
bounds on t; however, this is far more involved and the application of our
results to general topologies is convincingly shown using the CPA algorithm.
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2.2 Distributed Hash Tables and Robustness
In Chapter 5, we address the topic of adversarial fault tolerance in DHTs.
A distributed hash table (DHT) is a structured peer-to-peer network which
provides for scalable and distributed storage and retrieval of data items.
The literature contains many different proposals for DHTs (see e.g. [127,
148, 172]). Despite the distinctions between various DHTs, the standard
paradigm consists of a secure hash function h(·) which is used to map objects
to a keyspace. The objects being mapped by h(·) are peers and data items
and the keyspace is an abstract interval often scaled to be within [0, 1).
To provide an example, we give an overview of the Chord DHT [41,148].
For convenience, the “key space” of Chord is assumed to be scaled so it is
in the range [0, 1) and Chord can be viewed as a ring of unit circumference.
Here, the value 0 lies at the twelve o’clock position on the ring and the iden-
tifier space increases moving in a clockwise direction. All peers in Chord
have identifiers which are points on the ring. Chord provides one basic op-
eration: Lookup(·). For a location k on ring, Lookup(k) returns the peer, p,
whose location on the ring minimizes the clockwise distance between k and
p. Typically, k represents a key for a data item and Lookup(k) is the peer
responsible for storing that data item.
Chord implements the operation Lookup(·) in the following way. All peers
in the network are assumed to know some number M which is always greater
than the number of peers in the network. For a location p on the ring and
and integer i between 1 and logM − 1, let f(p, i) = p + 2i/M (modulo 1)
be a location on the ring. For each i between 1 and logM − 1, each peer
p maintains a link to the peer whose peer point is closest clockwise to the
point f(p, i); this is often referred to as a finger link. Peer p also keeps a link
to the peer closest clockwise from p stored as f(p, 0). When a peer p links
to a peer p′, the peer p simply stores the necessary information such as the
IP address and port of p′. For points p and k on the ring, let next(p, k) be
the point in the set {f(p, 0), f(p, 1), f(p, 2), . . . f(p, logM − 1)}, which has
closest clockwise distance to k. The number of unique peers that a peer p
links to is O(log n). Figure 2.4(a) illustrates next(p, i) links.
The Lookup(·) operation works as follows. Assume that peer p calls
Lookup(k) for a key k. If next(p, k) = p, then p already knows the successor





Figure 2.4: Illustration of the Chord DHT. (a) The next(p, i) links held by
peer p. (b) The path taken by a Lookup operation where k is held by the
peer q.
returning this peer. If next(p, k) = p′ where p′ 6= p, then p forwards the
search request to p′. This greedy procedure is repeated until the search ter-
minates in O(log n) hops. Figure 2.4(b) illustrates a query initiated by peer
p and terminating at peer q which is responsible for holding key k.
2.2.1 A Review of Robust DHTs
There is a large body of literature on tolerating adversarial faults in DHTs [12–
14, 52, 53, 75, 112]; such constructions are sometimes referred to as robust
DHTs. Almost all such results make use of quorums, which are sets of
Θ(log n) peers with the property that a minority of the peers in a quo-
rum have suffered Byzantine faults. Using quorums, it is possible to over-
come adversarial behaviour by having the members of a quorum use all-to-
all communication with the members of the next quorum for each hop in a
Lookup operation. If the Byzantine peers attempt to deviate from protocol,
this adversarial behaviour can be overwhelmed through majority action; that
is, at each hop, each correct peer majority filters on incoming messages. In
this way, even if the Byzantine peers corrupt or drop messages, the correct
peers in each quorum will still forward the query and, therefore, guarantee
the Lookup operation succeeds.
Figure 2.5 illustrates the general quorum structure; note that quorums









Figure 2.5: An illustration of how a Lookup operation involves forwarding
information from quorum to quorum. (a) Peer p issues a request to its
quorum Qp for an item with key k. This request is forwarded using all-to-
all communication between quorums until the key is found. (b) All-to-all
communication between quorums. Each peer listens to all the messages it
receives. Each peer then majority filters on these messages and takes the one
in the majority to be correct.
majority of corrupted peers in any quorum. This can happen if an adaptive
adversary has its peers join and leave the network until a favourable place-
ment is attained. For instance, the adversary may target a quorum in the
following manner. The adversary adds a corrupted peer p into the system
to see where it is placed. If p lands within the target quorum, the adversary
keeps the peer active in the system; otherwise, p leaves. Over a number of
join and leave events the adversary may accumulate a large number of peers
in the target quorum, eventually obtaining a majority.
The state of the art in protecting against such insider attacks is due
to results by Awerbuch and Scheideler [12, 13] which describe a DHT that
remains robust even if the number of join and leave events is polynomial
in the size of the network n. In [14], the authors extend this work to the
case where the attacker can even force correct nodes to leave the system
temporarily.
In [112], all-to-all communication is used to pass messages between quo-
rums. In both [13] and [14], communication between quorums is not specified
in detail, although all-to-all communication suffices. In such settings, com-
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munication between two quorums requires O(log2 n) messages. In this case,
a typical implementation of a Lookup operation requires O(log3 n) messages.
Work by Saia and Young [135] shows how such message passing can be ac-
complished more efficiently, asymptotically reducing the costs of employing
such quorums.
Despite the significant progress on using quorums to tolerate Byzantine
attacks, these results are still likely impractical for real-world deployment due
to the communication overhead they incur. In Chapter 5, we address this
issue by devising algorithms that further reduce the costs of communication.
Specifically, our algorithms achieve asymptotic improvements in the number
of messages required (the message complexity) for executing a Lookup oper-








Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks are an increasingly common threat to the
availability of large-scale networks. In the wireless domain, practitioners
have expressed concerns that important surveillance services will suffer DoS
attacks by the deliberate disruption of the communication medium [39] and
there is a large body of literature on various practical security concerns
(see [108, 121] and references therein). In the wired domain, the distributed
denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks in November of 2010 on Amazon, Visa, Mas-
tercard, and PayPal [18,103,151] demonstrated that even prominent compa-
nies are vulnerable over the Internet. Given this state of affairs, an interesting
question arises: Is it fundamentally “harder” or “easier” to communicate in
such large-scale networks than it is to block communication?
To analyze this question from an algorithmic perspective, we define the
following simple problem, which we call the 3-Player Scenario: Alice wishes
to guarantee transmission of a message m directly to Bob over a single com-
munication channel. However, there exists an adversary Carol who aims to
prevent communication by blocking transmissions over the channel. We con-
sider two cases: (Case 1) when Carol may spoof or even control Bob, which
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allows her to manipulate an unwitting Alice into incurring excessive send-
ing costs; and (Case 2) where Bob is both correct and unspoofable, and his
communications cannot be blocked. Here, “cost” corresponds to a network
resource, such as energy in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) or bandwidth
in wired networks.
In the 3-Player Scenario, we show that communication is fundamentally
cheaper than preventing communication. Specifically, we describe a protocol
that guarantees correct transmission of m, and given that Carol incurs a
cost of B, has the following properties. In Case 1, the expected cost to both
Alice and Bob is O(Bϕ−1 + 1) where ϕ is the golden ratio. In Case 2, the
expected cost to both Alice and Bob is O(B0.5+1). In both cases, Carol’s cost
asymptotically exceeds the expected cost of either correct player. Finally, we
note that these two cases differ significantly in terms of how the adversary
may interfere with communications; therefore, it is not possible to achieve a
middle ground between these two relative costs.
3.1.1 The 3-Player Scenario
The 3-Player Scenario represents our first single-hop communication scenario
as discussed in Chapter 1. We now describe the critical model parameters of
the 3-Player Scenario.
Las Vegas Property: Communication of m from Alice to (a correct) Bob
must be guaranteed with probability 1; that is, we require a Las Vegas pro-
tocol for solving the 3-Player Scenario. An obvious motivation for this Las
Vegas property is a critical application, such as an early warning detection
system or the dissemination of a crucial security update, where minimizing
the probability of failure is paramount. The Las Vegas property has addi-
tional merit in multi-hop WSNs where Monte Carlo algorithms may not be
able to achieve a sufficiently low probability of error; we expand on this in
Section 3.3.5.
Channel Utilization: Sending or listening on the communication channel
by Alice and Bob is measured in discrete units called slots. For example,
in WSNs, a slot may correspond to an actual time slot in a time division
multiple access (TDMA) type access control protocol. The cost for sending
or listening is S or L per slot, respectively. When Carol blocks a slot, she
disrupts the channel such that no communication is possible; blocking costs
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J per slot. If a slot contains traffic or is blocked, this is detectable by a player
who is listening at the receiving end of the channel, but not by the originator
of the transmission. For example, a transmission (blocked or otherwise) from
Bob to Alice is detectable only by Alice; likewise, a transmission (blocked
or otherwise) from Alice to Bob is detectable only by Bob. A player cannot
discern whether a blocked slot has disrupted a legitimate message; only the
disruption is detectable. For example, high-energy noise is detectable over
the wireless channel in WSNs, but a receiving device cannot tell if this results
from a message collision or a device deliberately disrupting the channel. We
let B be the total amount Carol will spend over the course of the algorithm;
this value is unknown to either Alice or Bob. Finally, we say that any player
is active in a slot if that player is sending, listening or blocking in that slot.
Correct and Faulty Players: If Alice is faulty, there is clearly no hope
of communicating m; therefore, Alice is assumed to be correct. Regarding
the correctness of Bob, in Case 1, Carol may spoof or control Bob; in Case
2, communications from Bob are always trustworthy. We emphasize that, in
Case 1, Alice is uncertain about whether to trust Bob since he may be faulty.
This uncertainty corresponds to scenarios where a trusted dealer attempts
to disseminate content to its neighbors, some of whom may be faulty and
attempt to consume resources by requesting numerous retransmissions. Case
2 corresponds to situations where communications sent by Bob are never
disrupted and can be trusted; here, the blocking of m being sent from Alice
to Bob is the only obstacle.
Types of Adversary: Carol has full knowledge of past actions by Alice
and Bob. This allows for adaptive attacks whereby Carol may alter her
behaviour based on observations she has collected over time. Furthermore,
under conditions discussed in Section 3.2.2, Carol can also be reactive: in
any slot, she may detect a transmission and then disrupt the communication,
however, we assume that she cannot detect when a player is listening. This
is pertinent to WSNs where the effectivess of a reactive adversary has been
shown experimentally.
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3.1.2 Solving the 3-Player Scenario: Fair and Favourable
Protocols
We analyze the cost of our algorithms as a function of B. In this way, we
obtain a notion of cost incurred by a player that is relative to the cost incurred
by Carol. In devising our algorithms, we seek to achieve two properties with
regards to relative cost.
First, our protocol should be fair ; that is, Alice and Bob should incur the
same worst case asymptotic cost relative to the adversary. When network
devices have similar resource constraints, such as in WSNs where devices
are typically battery powered, this is critical. Alternatively, in networks
where a collection of resource-scarce devices (i.e. client machines represented
by Alice) occupy one side of the communication channel and a single well-
provisioned device (i.e. a server represented by Bob) occupies the other side,
the aggregate cost to Alice’s side should be roughly equal to that of Bob.
Second, we desire favourable protocols; that is, for B sufficiently large,
Alice and Bob both incur asymptotically less expected cost than Carol. DoS
attacks are effective because a correct device is always forced to incur a higher
cost relative to an attacker. However, if the correct players incur asymptoti-
cally less cost than Carol, then Alice and Bob enjoy the advantage, and Carol
is faced with the problem of having her resources consumed disproportion-
ately in her attempt to prevent communication.
3.1.3 Our Main Contributions
Throughout, let ϕ = (1 +
√
5)/2 denote the golden ratio. We also draw at-
tention to the well-known relationship that Φ = ϕ−1 = 1/ϕ ≈ 0.62 where Φ
is known as the golden ratio conjugate. Our results can be presented using Φ
rather than ϕ; however, for readability, we utilize ϕ throughout. We assume
that S, L, and J are fixed constants. Our main analytical contributions are
listed below.
Theorem 1. Assume Carol is an adaptive adversary and that she is active
for B slots. There exists a fair and favourable algorithm for the 3-Player
Scenario with the following properties:
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• In Case 1, the expected cost to each correct player is O(Bϕ−1 + 1) =
O(B0.62 + 1). In Case 2, the expected cost to each correct player is
O(B0.5 + 1).
• If Bob is correct, then transmission of m is guaranteed and each correct
player terminates within O(Bϕ) slots in expectation.
In networks with sufficient traffic, Theorem 1 still holds when Carol is also
reactive (Section 3.2.2). We also prove that any protocol which achieves
o(B0.5) expected cost for Bob requires more than 2B slots to terminate (Sec-
tion 3.2.3); this lower bound has bearing on the worst-case ω(B) slots re-
quired by our protocol.
Our next Theorems 2 and 3 are applications of Case 1 of Theorem 1 to
WSNs. We consider a more general setting where Alice wishes to locally
(single-hop) broadcast to n neighboring receivers of which any number are
spoofed or controlled by Carol. Unfortunately, a naive solution of having
each receiver execute a separate instance of our 3-Player Scenario protocol
fails to be fair. Thus, we need a different algorithm to achieve the following
result.
Theorem 2. There exists a fair (up to small polylogarithmic factors in n)
and favourable algorithm for achieving local broadcast with the following prop-
erties:
• If Carol’s receivers are active for a total of B slots, then the expected
cost to Alice is O(Bϕ−1 lnn+lnϕ n) and the expected cost to any correct
receiver is O(Bϕ−1 + lnn).
• Transmission of m is guaranteed and all correct players terminate within
O((B + lnϕ−1 n)ϕ+1) slots (not in expectation). For B ≥ lnϕ−1 n, this
is within an O(Bϕ)-factor of the optimal latency.
Since the adversary may simply jam for the first B slots, it is impossible
to achieve communication in less than B + 1 slots; it is this value to which
we refer when speaking of the optimal latency. Reliable broadcast in multi-
hop WSNs deals with conveying m from one node to all other nodes in the
network. We make the standard assumptions that any node p can be heard
by the set of neighboring nodes in the topology, N(p) and that, for any p,
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at most t nodes in N(p) suffer a fault (t-bounded fault model) [21, 22, 90].
We analyze the grid model using the result of Bhandari and Vaidya [22], and
general graphs using the Certified Propagation Protocol (CPA) protocol of
Pelc and Peleg [119].
Theorem 3. For each correct node p, assume the t nodes in N(p) are Byzan-
tine and can be used by Carol to disrupt p’s communications for β ≤B0 time
slots where B0 is a known positive value. Then, using the local broadcast
protocol of Theorem 2, fair and favourable reliable broadcast is possible under
the following topologies:
• In the grid with the optimal fault tolerance t < (r/2)(2r + 1).
• In any graph, assuming that (a) t is appropriately bounded such that
CPA achieves reliable broadcast and (b) the topology and location of the
dealer is known to all nodes.
To the best of our knowledge, all previous reliable broadcast protocols require
correct nodes to spend more energy in communication attempts than that
spent by adversarial nodes. Our results are the first favourable protocols
and, importantly, the first to account for the significant cost of listening to
the wireless channel.
Finally, Theorem 4 is an application of Case 2 of Theorem 1 to a client-
server scenario where Carol represents malicious clients engaging in a DDoS
attack on a server.
Theorem 4. Assume Carol commits her DDoS attack using a bandwidth
R. Then, zero throughput is avoided if the expected aggregate bandwidth (up-
stream or downstream bits per second) of both the clients and the server is
G = O(R0.5), and the probability of a serviced request is G/(G+R).
Therefore, against a server defended by our protocol, Carol must incur addi-
tional monetary costs in order to procure the number of machines necessary
for sustaining the level of attack she would otherwise achieve.
3.1.4 Related Work
Jamming Attacks in WSNs: Several works addressing applied secu-
rity considerations demonstrate that devices in a WSN are vulnerable to
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adversarial jamming [8, 17, 99, 165] where the adversary deliberately dis-
rupts the communication medium. Defenses include spread spectrum tech-
niques (frequency or channel hopping), mapping with rerouting, and others
(see [101,113,162,164] and references therein).
There are a number of theoretical results on jamming adversaries; how-
ever, none explicitly accounts for listening costs and there is no notion of
favourability. Gilbert et al. [62] examine the duration for which communica-
tion between two players can be disrupted in a model with collision detec-
tion in a time-slotted network against an adversary who interferes with an
unknown number of transmissions. As we do here, the authors assume chan-
nel traffic is always detectable at the receiving end (i.e. silence cannot be
“forged”). Pelc and Peleg [120] examine an adversary that randomly corrupts
messages; we do not require the adversary to behave randomly. Awerbuch et
al. [11] give a jamming-resistant MAC protocol in a single-hop network with
an adaptive, but non-reactive, adversary. Richa et al. [130] significantly ex-
tend this work to multi-hop networks. Dolev et al. [46] address a variant of
the gossiping problem when multiple channels are jammed. Gilbert et al. [61]
derive bounds on the time required for information exchange when a reactive
adversary jams multiple channels. Meier et al. [104] examine the delay intro-
duced by a jamming adversary for the problem of node discovery, again in a
multi-channel setting. Dolev et al. [47] address secure communication using
multiple channels with a non-reactive adversary. Recently, Dolev et al. [45]
consider wireless synchronization in the presence of a jamming adversary.
We refer the reader to the survey by Young and Boutaba [168] for a more
in-depth review of this area.
Reliable Broadcast: Reliable broadcast has been extensively studied in
the grid model [19,21–23,87,88,90,150]. Listening costs are accounted for by
King et al. [87,88] but jamming adversaries are not considered; however, the
authors introduce the Bad Santa problem which we use to achieve a lower
bound result in Section 3.2.3. With a reactive jamming adversary, Bhand-
hari et al. [24] give a reliable broadcast protocol when the amount of jamming
is bounded and known a priori; however, correct nodes must expend consid-
erably more energy than the adversary. Progress towards fewer broadcasts
is made by Bertier et al. [20]; however, each node spends significant time
in the costly listening state. Alistarh et al. [4] assume collision detection
and achieve non-cryptographic authenticated reliable broadcast. They apply
their result to the grid model with a reactive jamming adversary; however,
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3-Player Scenario Protocol for round i ≥ 2
Send Phase: For each of the 2ci slots do
• Alice sends m with probability 2/2i.
• Bob listens with probability 2/2(c−1)i.
If Bob received the message, then Bob terminates.
Ack Phase: For each of the 2i slots do
• Bob sends a req message.
• Alice listens with probability 4/2i.
If Alice listened to a slot in the Ack Phase where no req message or
blocking was detected, she terminates.
Figure 3.1: Pseudocode for 3-Player Scenario Protocol.
in their algorithm, nodes incur considerable listening costs.
Application-Level DDoS Attacks: At the application layer, DDoS at-
tacks typically involve attackers masquerading as legitimate clients by send-
ing a large volume of proper requests with the aim of overwhelming the
computational resources of a server. This is in contrast to flooding attacks
which achieve disruption by depleting the bandwidth of the network; such
attacks typically require significant bandwidth and attackers are more eas-
ily identified due to the out-of-band traffic. Application-level DoS attacks
are common with recorded attacks on high-profile companies such as Ya-
hoo, Amazon, CNN, eBay, and many others [56]. Proposals for dealing with
DDoS attacks include over-provisioning [125], throttling techniques [63,107],
and currency schemes (see [10, 80, 152] and references therein). In currency
schemes, the server provides service only to a client who pays in some form
of currency. In [152], bandwidth is used as currency and, if the clients’ ag-
gregate bandwidth exceeds that of the attackers, then the clients capture
server resources. Our work is complementary by delineating bounds on the
expected bandwidth required to guarantee that the correct clients avoid zero
throughput.
3.2 The 3-Player Scenario Protocol
Figure 3.1 gives the pseudocode for our protocol called 3-Player Scenario
Protocol (3PSP). Each round i ≥ 2 consists of 2 phases and c is a constant
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to be determined later. We summarize a round i:
• Send Phase: This phase consists of 2ci slots. In each slot: Alice sends m
with probability 2
2i
for an expected total of 2(c−1)i+1 slots and Bob listens
with probability 2
2(c−1)i
for an expected total of 2i+1 slots.
• Ack Phase: This phase consists of 2i slots. If Bob has not received m, then
Bob sends a request for retransmission, req, for all 2i slots. Alice listens in
each slot with probability 4/2i (note that i ≥ 2 is required) for an expected
total 4 slots.
Termination Conditions: Termination conditions are important because
Carol cannot be allowed to keep the players active in perpetuity while simul-
taneously forcing them to incur a higher cost. Bob terminates the protocol
upon receiving m. Since Alice is not spoofed, as discussed in Section 3.1.1,
this termination condition suffices. Alice terminates if she listens to a slot
in the Ack Phase which is not blocked and does not contain req message;
since blocked slots are detectable by Alice (who is on the receiving end of
a req message) while listening (Section 3.1.1), this condition suffices. That
is, Alice continues into the next round if and only if (1) Alice listens to zero
slots or (2) all slots listened to by Alice in the Ack Phase contain a blocked
slot or req. We highlight the two situations where this condition is met:
• Send Failure: Bob is correct and has not received m.
• Ack Failure: Bob is faulty and sends reqs, or Bob is correct and termi-
nated and Carol either spoofs reqs or blocks slots in order to trick Alice into
thinking a valid req was indeed sent and/or blocked.
Ack Failures and Cases 1 & 2: Note that an “acknowledgement” occurs
via silence in at least one slot in the Ack Phase. We say an Ack Failure
occurs when Carol blocks for all slots in the Ack Phase.
In Case 1, an Ack Failure corresponds to a critical attack that can be
employed in Ack Phase after the delivery of m. Carol can avoid the listening
costs in the Send Phase, and then drain Alice’s energy by making it appear
as if Bob repeatedly did not receive m and is requesting a retransmission in
the Ack Phase. This attack affects Alice only. Note that if Bob is actually
correct, the attack is only effective once m is received since, if a correct Bob
has not received m, a req will be issued anyway and the attack accomplishes
nothing.
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In Case 2, no blocking occurs in the Ack Phase and, therefore, no Ack
Failure can occur. In fact, in Case 2, the Ack Phase can be shortened to a
single slot where Bob sends his req and Alice listens; however, this does not
change our cost analysis and our current presentation is more general.
3.2.1 Analysis of the 3-Party Scenario Protocol
For a given round, we say it is a send-blocking round if Carol blocks at least
half of the slots in the Send Phase; otherwise, it is a non-send-blocking round.
Similarly, a ack-blocking round is a round where Carol blocks or spoofs req
messages from Bob in at least half the slots in the Ack Phase; otherwise, it is
non-ack-blocking. Throughout, assume ceilings on the number of active slots
of a player if it is not an integer.
Bounds on c: Clearly, c > 1 or Bob’s listening probability in the Send Phase
is nonsensical. For Case 1, note that if c ≥ 2, then the expected cost to Alice
is at least as much as the expected cost to a potentially faulty/spoofed Bob.
If Bob happens to be faulty/spoofed, then the cost to him for an Ack Failure
is less than the expected cost to Alice since a faulty/spoofed Bob will simply
not listen in the Send Phase; as discussed above, we must avoid this since
it admits a draining attack against Alice. Therefore, we have 1 < c < 2.
For Case 2, since Bob is guaranteed to be correct, the acceptable range is
1 < c ≤ 2.
Lemma 1. Consider a non-send-blocking round of 3-Player Scenario
Protocol. The probability that a correct Bob does not receive the message
from Alice is less than e−2.
Proof. Let s = 2ci be the number of slots in the Send Phase. Let pA be the
probability that Alice sends in a particular slot. Let pB be the probability
that Bob listens in a particular slot. Let Xj = 1 if the message is not
delivered from Alice to Bob in the jth slot. Then Pr[ m is not delivered
in the Send Phase]=Pr[X1X2 · · ·Xs = 1]=Pr[Xs = 1 | X1X2 · · ·Xs−1 =
1] ·
∏s−1
i=1 Pr[Xi = 1]. Let qj = 1 if Carol does not block in slot j; otherwise,
let qj = 0. The value of qj can be selected arbitrarily by Carol. Then
Pr[Xi = 1 | X1X2 · · ·Xi−1 = 1] = 1 − pApBqj and substituting for each




j=1(1 − pApBqj) ≤ e
−pApB
∑s
j=1 qj < e−2 since pApB
∑s
j=1 qj >
(2/2i)(2/2(c−1)i)(s/2) = (2/2i)(2/2(c−1)i)(2ci/2) = 2 since the round is not
send-blocking and so Carol blocks less than s/2 slots.
Note that Lemma 1 handles adaptive (but not reactive) adversaries. A
simple but critical feature of tolerating adaptive adversaries is that the prob-
ability that a player is active in one slot is independent from the probability
that the player is active in another slot. Therefore, knowing that a player was
active for k slots in the past conveys no information about future activity.
Believing otherwise is the trap of the well-known“Gambler’s Fallacy” [149].
For reactive adversaries, we need only modify Lemma 1 as we do later.
Lemma 2. Assume that Bob is correct and there are no send-blocking rounds
and no ack-blocking rounds. Then, the expected cost of each player is O(S +
L) = O(1).




(2 · 2(c−1)i · S + 4 · L) ≤
∑∞
i=2(e




(e2 · 4 · L ·
∑∞
i=2 e
−2i) = O(S + L) = O(1). Similarly, the expected cost to
Bob is at most
∑∞
i=2 e
−2(i−2) · (2i+1 · L + 2i · S) ≤
∑∞
i=2(e
5−i · L + e4−i · S)
= O(S + L) = O(1) since S and L are constants.
Now consider when attacks may occur in the Ack Phase:
Lemma 3. Assume that Bob has received m by round i and that round i
is non-ack-blocking. Then the probability that Alice retransmits m in round
i+ 1 is less than e−2.
Proof. Let s = 2i be the number of slots in the Ack Phase and let p = 4/2i
be the probability that Alice listens in a slot. For slot j, define Xj such
that Xj = 1 if Alice does not terminate. Then Pr[ Alice retransmits m in
round i + 1] = Pr[X1X2 · · ·Xs = 1]. Let qj = 1 if Carol does not block in
slot j; otherwise, let qj = 0. The qj values are determined arbitrarily by
Carol. Since Alice terminates if and only if she listens and does not detect
any activity, then Pr[Xj = 1] = (1−pqj). Therefore, Pr[X1X2 · · ·Xs = 1] ≤
e−p
∑s
j=1 qj < e−2.
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Lemma 4. Assume there is at least one send-blocking round. Then, the




Proof. We consider Case 1 and Case 2 with regards to Bob, discussed in
Section 3.1.1. Let i ≥ 2 be the last round which is send-blocking. Let j ≥ i
be the last round which is ack-blocking; if no such ack-blocking round exists,
then assume j = 0. In Case 1, the total cost to Carol is B = Ω(2ci·J+2j ·J) =
Ω(2ci + 2j) since J is a constant. In Case 2, only send-blocking occurs and
so B = Ω(2ci · J).
Alice: We first calculate the expected cost to Alice prior to successfully
transmitting m. In round i, Carol blocks the channel for at least 2ci/2 slots.




−2(k−1) ·(2·2(c−1)(i+k) ·S+4·L) = O(2(c−1)i ·S+L) =
O(2(c−1)i) by the bounds on c and given that S and L are constants; note,
this is the total cost to Alice for Case 2.
Now, using Lemma 3, we calculate the expected cost to Alice after de-
livery; this addresses ack-blocking rounds possible only in Case 1. By as-
sumption, the last ack-blocking round occurs in round j and therefore Alice’s
expected cost is O(2(c−1)j ·S+4 ·L)+
∑∞
k=1 e
−2(k−1) ·(2 ·2(c−1)(j+k) ·S+4 ·L) =
O(2(c−1)j ·S+L) by the bounds on c. Therefore, the total expected cost to Al-
ice is O(2(c−1)i ·S+2(c−1)j ·S+L) = O(2(c−1)i+2(c−1)j). Since B = Ω(2ci+2j),
this cost as a function of B is O(B(c−1)/c +B(c−1)).
Bob: Finally, assume Bob is correct. Using Lemma 1, Bob’s expected cost
prior to receiving m is O(2i+1 ·L+2i ·S)+
∑∞
k=1 e
−2(k−1) ·(2·2i+k ·L+2i+k ·S) =
O(2i · L + 2i · S) = O(2i) since S and L are constants. Thus, the expected
cost for Bob as a function of B is O(B1/c).
We now give the proof for Theorem 1 stated in Section 3.1.3:
Proof of Theorem 1: In Case 1, Lemma 4 tells us that the expected cost to
Alice and Bob in terms of B is O(B(c−1)/c+B(c−1)) and O(B1/c), respectively.
Therefore, the exponents of interest which control the cost to each player are
(c−1)/c, c−1, and 1/c. The value of c that should be chosen must minimize
max{(c−1)/c, c−1, 1/c} since we are interested in fair protocols. Given that
1 < c < 2, we have 1/c > (c− 1)/c. Therefore, we solve for c in c− 1 = 1/c,
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this gives c = (1 +
√
5)/2 which is the golden ratio. By Lemma 2 and the
above argument, the expected cost to each player is O(Bϕ−1 + 1). In Case 2,
Lemma 4 tells us that Alice’s expected cost in terms of B is O(B(c−1)/c) the
exponents of interest are simply (c − 1)/c and 1/c; minimizing them yields
c = 2. Therefore, the cost to each player is O(B1/2 + 1).
Finally, define latency to be the number of slots that occur prior to ter-
mination by both correct players. Consider how many non-send-blocking
or non-ack-blocking rounds either player may endure before terminating
successfully; let X denote the random variable for this number of rounds.
Then, E[X] ≤ 1 · (1 − e−2) + 2 · e−2(1 − e−2) + 3 · e−4(1 − e−2) + ... =∑∞
i=1 ie
2(1−i)(1 − e−2) = (1 − e−2)e2
∑∞
i=1 i(e
−2)i by Lemmas 1 or 3. There-
fore, E[X] ≤ 1/(1 − e−2) = O(1) which translates into O(1) time slots
consumed by non-send or non-ack-blocking rounds. Now consider the send-
or ack-blocking rounds; note that Carol is limited to at most lg (2B) +O(1)
such rounds which translates to O(Bϕ) time slots. Therefore, regardless of
how Carol blocks, the expected number of time slots prior to successful ter-
mination is O(Bϕ).
3.2.2 Tolerating a Reactive Adversary
Consider a reactive adversary Carol who can detect channel activity without
cost, and then block the channel; this ability is possible in WSNs (see Sec-
tion 3.3.1). In our 3-Player Scenario, Carol can now detect that m is being
sent in the Send Phase and block it without fail. To address this powerful
adversary, we consider the case where critical data, m, and more often, non-
critical data m′, is sent over the channel by other participants in addition
to Alice and Bob. Carol can detect the traffic; however, she cannot discern
whether it is m or m′ without listening to a portion of the communication
(such as packet header information).
In a slot where channel activity is detected, even if Carol listens for a
portion of the message, she incurs a substantial cost. Therefore, the cost
to Carol is proportional to the number of messages to which she listens.
Importantly, in the presence of m′, Carol’s ability to detect traffic for free is
unhelpful since m′ provides “camouflage” for m. Certainly Carol may block
all active slots to prevent transmission of m; however, this is no different
than blocking all slots in our original 3-Player Scenario.
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As an extreme example, assume that all slots in the Send Phase are used
either by Alice to send m (as per our protocol) or Dave, whose transmis-
sions of m′ do not interest Carol, and the probability that a slot is used by
Dave is higher. Then detecting channel activity does not help Carol decide
on whether to block; all slots are used. Regardless of how she decides to
act, Carol can do no better than picking slots independent of whether she
detects channel activity. In other words, channel activity is no longer useful
in informing Carol’s decisions about whether to block.
But assuming all slots are active is problematic: (1) How is this guar-
anteed or coordinated? (2) Doesn’t this much background traffic interfere
with Bob’s ability to receive from Alice? Instead, assume that other network
traffic occurs such that Carol will always detect traffic on at least a constant
fraction of slots in the Send Phase. Note that this does not help her block
transmissions by Alice since she does not know the total amount of traffic
that she will detect. Now, not all slots will necessarily be active. Upon de-
tecting traffic, can Carol listen to a portion of the message to discover if it
is m or m′ and then decide on whether to block? Yes, but this is roughly as
expensive as simply blocking outright. So again, detecting channel activity
does not inform Carol’s decisions. This is the idea behind our analysis.
This corresponds to situations where communication occurs steadily be-
tween many participants or via several distributed applications, and Carol
wishes to target only a critical few. If m and m′ are sent over the channel
in the same slot, the two messages collide and Bob receives neither. Define
a slot as active if either m or m′ is sent in that slot. For this result only,
redefine a send-blocking round as one where Carol listens or blocks for at
least a 1/3-fraction of the active slots; otherwise, it is a non-send-blocking
round. We provide a result analagous to Lemma 1.
Lemma 5. Let Carol be an adaptive and reactive adversary. Then, in a non-
send-blocking round of the 3-Player Scenario Protocol, the probability
that Bob does not receive m from Alice is at most e−2.
Proof. Let x = 2ci be the number of slots in the Send Phase. Consider
the set of slots used by all participants other than Alice. We assume these
participants pick their slots at random to send, so that for any slot the
probability is 2/3 that the slot is chosen by at least one of them. Since we
assume these messages m′ are sent independently at random, then Chernoff
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bounds imply that, with high probability (i.e., 1 − 1/xc′ for constants c′, ε
and sufficiently large x) the number of slots y during which m′ is sent is
greater than (2x/3)(1 − ε) where x is the total number of slots in a phase.
In the same way, assume the number of slots in which Alice sends is at least
a = (1 − δ)xpA = (1 − δ)2(c−1)i+1 with probability 1 − 1/xc
′′
for a constant
δ, c′′ and sufficiently large x. The number of active slots sent by Alice or
other participants is clearly at least y.
By definition of a non-send-blocking round, Carol listens to or blocks less
than x/3 (active) slots. As Carol has no information about the source of a
message sent in an active slot until she listens to it, her choice is independent
of the source of the message. Given a slot that Alice sends on, there is at
least a 1− (x/3)/y chance it will not be listened to or blocked by Carol. The
probability that this slot will not be used by another participant is 1/3 and
the probability that Bob will listen to the slot is pB. Hence the probability of
a successful transmission from Alice to Bob on a slot which Alice sends on is at
least p = (1−x/(3y))(1/3)pB = (1−1/(2(1−ε)))(1/3)pB ≥ (1/3−(1+δ)/6)pB
for sufficiently large x (that reduces the size of δ) when y > (1 − ε)(2x/3).
Therefore, we can write p ≥ (1/12)pB. The probability that all messages
that Alice sends fail to be delivered is at most (1 − pB/12)a + 2/xc
′′
where
the last term is the probability of the bad event that y or a is small and
c′′ > 0 is a constant. Redefine pB = 24/((1− δ)2(c−1)i) where the value 24 is
there to simply off-set the additive 2/xc
′′
term. Note that this constant factor
increase in the listening probability does not change our asymptotic results
and our analysis in Section 3.2.1 proceeds almost identically. Therefore, we
then have (1− pB/12)a + 2/xc
′′ ≤ e−2.
The 3-Player Scenario Protocol can be modified so that the initial
value of i is large enough to render the error arising from the use of Cher-
noff bounds sufficiently small; we omit these details. Also, the required level
of channel traffic detected by Carol is flexible and different values can be
accomodated if the players’ probabilities for sending and listening are modi-
fied appropriately in the 3-Player Scenario Protocol; our results hold
asymptotically. Finally, we emphasize that Lemma 3 does not require mod-
ification. Carol cannot decide to block only when Alice is listening since
detecting when a node is listening is impossible. Alternately, Carol cannot
silence a req through (reactive) blocking since this is still interpreted as a
retransmission request. Using Lemma 5, Theorem 1 follows as before.
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Finally, we note that the conclusion of our argument aligns with claims
put forth in empirical results on reactive jamming in WSNs; that is, such
behaviour does not necessarily result in a more energy-efficient attack because
the adversary must still be listening to the channel for broadcasts prior to
committing itself to their disruption [165].
3.2.3 On Latency and Lower Bounds
In Chapter 1, we mentioned the Bad Santa problem which is described as fol-
lows. A child is presented with K boxes, one after another. When presented
with each box, the child must immediately decide whether or not to open it.
If the child does not open a box, it can never be revisited. Half the boxes
have presents in them, but the decision as to which boxes have presents is
made by an adversarial Santa who wants the child to open as many empty
boxes as possible. The goal is for the child to obtain a present with probabil-
ity 1, while opening the smallest expected number of boxes. In [87, 88], the
authors prove a lower bound of Ω(K0.5) on the expected number of opened
boxes.
Theorem 5. Any algorithm that solves the 3-Player Scenario with o(B0.5)
cost to Bob must have a latency exceeding 2B.
Proof. A lower bound for the 3-Player Scenario is complicated by the possi-
bility that the strategies of Alice and Bob may adapt over time; for example,
they may change depending on how Carol blocks. To address this, we assume
a more powerful Bob. Specifically, assume that communication of m occurs
if Bob is able to find an unblocked time slot in which to listen or to send.
Furthermore, assume Bob can tell when he has found such a slot once he
listens or sends in that slot. Therefore, such a Bob is at least as powerful as
the Bob in the 3-Player Scenario.
Now, if Carol has a budget of size B, we ask: Does Bob have a strategy
with o(B0.5) expected active slots such that, with probability 1, he finds at
least one unblocked slot within 2B slots? Assume that such a strategy exists
and consider the Bad Santa problem on 2B boxes. Using Bob’s strategy,
the child is guaranteed to obtain a present with probability 1 while opening
o(B0.5) boxes in expectation. However, this contradicts the Ω(B0.5) lower
bound result in [87] and the result follows.
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This result illustrates a relationship between the Bad Santa problem and the
3-Player Scenario, and it provides some insight into why our protocol has a
worst-case latency of ω(B) slots.
3.3 Application 1: Jamming Resistance in
Wireless Sensor Networks
The shared wireless medium of sensor networks renders them vulnerable to
jamming attacks [154]. A jamming attack occurs when an attacker transmits
noise at high energy, possibly concurrently with a (legitimate) transmission,
such that communication is disrupted within the area of interference. Con-
sequently, this behaviour threatens the availability of sensor networks [162].
3.3.1 Rationale for the 3-Player Scenario Involving WSN
Devices
Wireless network cards offer states such as sleep, receive (or listen) and trans-
mit (or send). While the sleep state requires negligible power, the cost of
the send and listen states are roughly equivalent and dominate the operating
cost of a device. For example, the send and listen costs for the popular Telos
motes are 38mW and 35mW, respectively (note S ≈ L) and the sleep state
cost is 15µW [124]; therefore, the cost of the send/listen state is more than a
factor of 2000 greater and the sleep state cost is negligible. Disruption may
not require jamming an entire slot so we set J < S and assume a small m
such that J and S are within a constant factor of each other; larger mes-
sages can be sent piecewise. In our protocols, we account for both send and
receive costs. Throughout, when a node is not active, we assume it is in the
energy-efficient sleep state.
Slots: There is a single channel and a time division multiple access (TDMA)-
like medium access control (MAC) protocol; that is, a time-slotted network.
For example, the well-known LEACH [72] protocol is TDMA-based. For
simplicity, a global broadcast schedule is assumed; however, this is likely
avoidable if nodes maintain multiple schedules as with S-MAC [167]. Even
then, global scheduling has been demonstrated by experimental work in [97]
and secure synchronization has been shown [55].
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A blocked slot occurs when Carol jams. Clear channel assessment (CCA),
which subsumes carrier sensing, is a common feature on devices for detecting
such events [126] and practical under the IEEE 802.11 standard [44]. Col-
lisions are only detectable by the receiver [162]. When a collision occurs, a
correct node discards any received data. We assume that the absence of chan-
nel activity cannot be forged by the adversary; this aligns with the empirical
work by Niculescu [114] who shows that channel interference increases lin-
early with the combined rate of the sources. Finally, we also note that several
theoretical models feature collision detection (see [4, 11,24,62,130]).
On Reactive Adversaries: CCA is performed via the radio chip using the
received signal strength indicator (RSSI) [145]. If the RSSI value is below a
clear channel threshold, then the channel is assumed to be clear [15]. Such
detection consumes on the order of 10−6 W which is three orders of magnitude
smaller than the send/listen costs; therefore, Carol can detect activity (but
not message content) at essentially zero cost. Listening to even a small
portion of a message costs on the order of milliwatts and our argument from
Section 3.2.2 now applies.
Cryptographic Authentication: We assume that messages can be au-
thenticated. Therefore, Carol cannot spoof Alice; however, Bob’s req can
essentially be spoofed by an Ack-Failure (as discussed in Section 3.2) which,
along with jamming, makes the problem non-trivial. Several results show
how light-weight cryptographic authentication can be implemented in sensor
networks [83, 94, 100, 154, 161]; therefore, it is important to consider its im-
pact as we do here. However, the adversary may capture a limited number of
players (such as Bob); these players are said to suffer a Byzantine fault and
are controlled by the adversary [154, 162]. Given this attack, we emphasize
that, while we assume a shared key to achieve authentication, attempts to
share a secret send/listen schedule between Alice and Bob allows Carol to
manipulate players in ways that are problematic. This is discussed further in
Section 3.3.3.
3.3.2 Local Broadcast and Guaranteed Latency
Our protocol Local Broadcast handles the general single-hop broadcast
situation where Alice sends m to a set of n neighboring receivers within her
transmission range. At first glance, this seems achievable by having each
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Local Broadcast(m,Alice, RAlice) for round i ≥ lg(4 lnn)
Probabilistic Send Phase: For each of the 2ϕi slots do
• Alice sends m with probability 3 lnn
2i
.
• Each receiver that has not terminated listens with probability 2
2(ϕ−1)i
.
Deterministic Send Phase: For each of the 2(ϕ−1)i+1 slots do
• Alice sends m.
• Each receiver that has not terminated listens.
Any receiver that receives m terminates the protocol.
Probabilistic Ack Phase: For each of the 2i slots do
• Each receiver that has not terminated sends a req message.
• Alice listens with probability 4 lnn
2i
.
Deterministic Ack Phase: For each of the 2(ϕ−1)i+1 slots do
• Each reciever that has not received m sends a req message.
• Alice listens.
If Alice listened in either a Probabilistic Ack Phase or a Deterministic Ack
Phase and detected no req message or collision then she terminates the
algorithm.
Figure 3.2: Pseudocode for Local Broadcast.
receiver execute an instance of 3PSP with Alice. However, the expected
active time for Alice is an Ω(n)-factor larger than any correct receiver; thus,
this is unfair. Furthermore, this protocol has poor latency. Here, we give
a fast protocol that is both fair and favourable up to small polylogarithmic
factors.
Our pseudocode is given in Figure 3.2 which is valid for n ≥ 2. The
probabilities for sending and listening are modified and there are two more
phases (the Deterministic Send and Deterministic Ack Phases) where players
act deterministically. Note that req messages can collide in the Probabilistic
Ack Phase and will certainly collide in the Deterministic Ack Phase. This
is correct as such a collision is due to either jamming or multiple receivers
(correct or faulty) requesting a retransmission; this is fine and Alice will
resend. Local Broadcast takes in as arguments the messagem, the sender
(Alice) and the set of receivers RAlice. If the adversary jams, then none of
the correct receivers receive m in that slot. We now prove the properties of
Local Broadcast.
Lemma 6. Consider a non-send-blocking round. The probability that at least
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one correct receiver does not receive the message from Alice is less than 1/n2.
Proof. Let s be the number of slots in the Probabilistic Send Phase of round i.
Let pA = 3 lnn/2
i be the probability that Alice transmits in a particular slot.
Let pb = 2/2
(ϕ−1)i be the probability that a particular correct receiver b listens
in a particular slot. Let Xj = 1 if the message is not transmitted from Alice
to receiver b in the jth slot. Then Pr[ m is not successfully transmitted to
the b during the Probabilistic Send Phase]=Pr[X1X2 · · ·Xs = 1]=Pr[Xs =
1 | X1X2 · · ·Xs−1 = 1] · Pr[X1X2 · · ·Xs−1 = 1]. Let qj = 1 if the adversary
does not jam given X1X2 · · ·Xi−1; otherwise, let qj = 0. The value of qj can
be selected arbitrarily by the adversary. Then Pr[Xi = 1 | X1 · · ·Xi−1 =
1] = 1 − pApbqi = 1 − (6 lnn/2ϕi)qj. Then we have Pr[X1X2 · · ·Xs = 1] =
(1 − pApbq1) · · · (1 − pApbqs) ≤
∏s
j=1(1 − pApbqj) ≤ e
−pApb
∑s
j=1 qj < 1/n3
since pApb
∑
qj > (6 lnn/2
ϕi) · (2ϕi/2) = 3 lnn given that this is a non-send-
blocking round. Taking a union bound, the probability that at least one
correct receiver has not received m is less than n−2.
A notable difference between Lemma 6 and the previous Lemma 1 is that
here we want to bound the probability that any correct node has not received
m. This requires a union bound which necessitates the O(log n) factor in our
new analysis. A slightly tighter analysis may be possible; however, it should
not change things asymptotically. We also note Lemma 6 can be modified to
handle a reactive adversary in the same way as done for 3-Player Scenario
Protocol; we omit the details.
Lemma 7. Assume that by round i all correct receivers have heard the mes-
sage m. Assume that round i is non-ack-blocking. Then the probability that
Alice retransmits the message in round i+ 1 is less than 1/n2.
Proof. This is computed similarly to the proof of Lemma 6. Let s be the
number of slots in the Probabilistic Ack Phase and let p = 4/2i be the
probability that Alice listens in a slot. For slot j, define Xj such that Xj = 1
if Alice does not terminate. Then Pr[ Alice retransmits m in round i +
1] = Pr[X1X2 · · ·Xs = 1]. Let qj = 1 if the adversary does not jam given
X1X2 · · ·Xi−1; otherwise, let qj = 0. The qj values are determined arbitrarily
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by the adversary who controls the faulty receivers. Since Alice terminates
if and only if it listens and does not detect any activity, then Pr[Xj =
1] = (1 − pqj). Therefore, Pr[X1X2 · · ·Xs = 1] ≤ e−p
∑s
j=1 qj < n−2 since
p
∑s
j=1 qj > (4 lnn/2
i)(2i/2) = 2 lnn given that this is a non-ack-blocking
round.
Lemma 8. Assume all receivers are correct and there are no send-blocking
or ack-blocking rounds. Then the expected cost to Alice is O(lnϕ n) and the
expected cost to any correct receiver is O(lnn).
Proof. Let d = lg(4 lnn) and n ≥ 3. Using Lemma 6, the expected cost to
Alice is at most:
∞∑
i=d
n−2(i−d) · (2(ϕ−1)i · 3 lnn+ 2(ϕ−1)i+1 + 4 + 2(ϕ−1)i+1)









= O(lnϕ n) by the geometric series.
Similarly, using Lemma 7, the expected cost to each receiver is at most:
∞∑
i=d









= O(lnn) by the geometric series.
Lemma 9. Assume there is at least one send-blocking round. The expected
cost to Alice is O(Bϕ−1 lnn + lnϕ n) and the expected cost to any correct
receiver is O(Bϕ−1 + lnn).
Proof. Let i ≥ dlg(4 lnn)e be the last round which is send-blocking and let j
be the last round which is ack-blocking, j ≥ i; if no such ack-blocking round
exists, then j = 0. Then the cost to the adversary is B = Ω(2ϕi + 2j).
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Alice: Using Lemma 7, the expected cost to Alice prior to successfully termi-
nating is O(2(ϕ−1)i lnn)+
∑∞
k=1 n
−2(k−1) ·O(2(ϕ−1)(j+k) lnn) = O(2(ϕ−1)i lnn+
2(ϕ−1)j lnn). Therefore, in terms of B, the cost to Alice is O(Bϕ−1 lnn) and
by Lemma 8, Alice’s total expected cost is O(Bϕ−1 lnn+ lnϕ n).
Correct Receivers: In the worst case, all rounds up to i have been send-
blocking, in which case the expected cost to each correct receiver up to the
end of round i+1 is O(2i). Therefore, in terms of B, and using Lemma 8, the
cost to each correct receiver is O(Bϕ−1 + lnn) noting that 1/ϕ = ϕ− 1.
Lemma 10. Alice and all correct receivers terminate Local Broadcast in
25 · (B + 2ϕ−1 lnϕ−1 n)ϕ+1 time slots.
Proof. The deterministic phases play a key role in establishing the bound on
latency. If the adversary is not active for all slots in the deterministic Send
Phase, then all correct receivers obtain m. Once all correct receivers termi-
nate, the adversary must be active in all slots of the deterministic Ack Phase
in order to prevent Alice from terminating. Therefore, prior to successful
termination of all correct players (including Alice), the adversary is active
for at least 2(ϕ−1)i+1 slots per round i in Epochs 2 and 4. For d = lg(4 lnn),
we seek the number of rounds ρ such that
∑ρ
i=d 2
(ϕ−1)i+1 ≥ B which yields
that ρ ≥ ϕ lg(B + 2ϕ−1 lnϕ−1 n) rounds suffices to exhaust the adversary (we
are not being exact). Each round i has at most 4 · 2ϕ·i+1 slots so ρ rounds
equal at most 25 · (B + 2ϕ−1 lnϕ−1 n)ϕ+1 slots.
The value n is the number of devices within the broadcast range of Alice.
Throughout, we have assumed that n is known a priori. There has been work
done on node discovery in the presence of jamming (see Meier et al. [104])
and we assume that similar techniques can be used to obtain the value n.
For a determined adversary, we expect B > n; that is, for an adversary
intent on preventing communication, the number of time slots jammed will
likely exceed the number of neighbors. Therefore, B  lnϕ+1 n. In this case
(actually for B ≥ lnϕ−1 n), the latency is O(Bϕ+1) and, noting that Carol
can prevent transmission for at least B slots, this is within an O(Bϕ)-factor
of the optimal latency. By this and Lemmas 8, 9, and 10, Theorem 2 now
follows.
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3.3.3 Why a Shared Schedule is Problematic
In our WSN application, we assume that messages from Alice can be authen-
ticated using light-weight cryptographic techniques. Given this, we consider:
might Alice and Bob (or even more players) also share a secret schedule?
This would reduce the costs in Theorem 1 due to the Send Phase where
neither player knows if the other is active with any certainty.
Unfortunately, such a schedule becomes known to the adversary if a player
suffers a Byzantine fault and this causes problems in more general scenarios.
For instance, consider the simple extension of Alice and two receivers. In our
local broadcast problem, which is a key subroutine for our reliable broadcast
protocol, Alice broadcasts to its two neighboring receivers concurrently in
order to be fair. Therefore, both receivers must know when Alice transmits in
the Send Phase. By corrupting one receiver, this schedule becomes known to
the adversary who can then block transmissions by Alice perfectly and easily
prevent the other receiver from receiving m. Clearly, this attack extends
to the case where there are n receivers and Alice wants to achieve a local
broadcast.
Other problems arise in a multi-hop scenario. For example, in our reliable
broadcast protocol, each node listens to many different senders. A faulty
receiver can interfere with many more senders by acting in the same manner
as above for each of these senders. Therefore, by purposely avoiding a pre-set
shared schedule, our use of randomness allows us to foil such attempts by
the adversary.
3.3.4 Jamming-Resistant Reliable Broadcast: Mitigat-
ing the Listening Cost Disadvantage
Reliable broadcast has been extensively studied in the multi-hop grid model
[21–23, 88, 90], particularly with a jamming adversary [4, 20, 24]. Reliable
broadcast is possible when t Byzantine nodes can each jam at most nc trans-
missions [24]. Unfortunately, the protocol of [24], and the improvement
by [20], requires that correct nodes possess more energy than the Byzantine
nodes. In particular, while the sending costs are improved in [20], both [20,24]
allow the adversary to force a correct node to listen for Ω(t · nc) slots where
nc is the number of times each node can cause a message collision (listening
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costs in [4] are similar). In contrast, each Byzantine node is active for nc
slots. This Ω(t)-factor advantage affords the adversary a DDoS attack since
these previous protocols are consistently unfavourable.
Reliable Broadcast in the Grid
We reiterate the grid model: each node p(x, y) is situated at (x, y) in a grid.
The dealer d (who is correct) is located at (0, 0) and seeks to propagate m to
all correct nodes in the network. When a node p sends a message, all listening
nodes within L∞ distance r (i.e. the (2r+1)×(2r+1) square centered about
p) receive the message; this neighborhood is denoted by N(p). Analogous
results hold for the Euclidean metric (see [22]). There are t < (r/2)(2r + 1)
Byzantine nodes in any neighborhood. Unlike the single-hop case, here the
amount of jamming in a neighborhood is upper bounded by B0 and known.
This is required in [20,24] and a similar assumption is made in [11,130]. B0
represents the number of times a Byzantine node can deviate from the global
schedule within some time frame in a neighborhood before being identified
and subjected to defensive techniques (see [162]). Not exceeding B0 in each
time frame allows the adversary to attack throughout the lifetime of the
network and we pessimistically assume that B0 is large so that the adversary
may inflict sustained attacks.
There is a global broadcast schedule (obeyed by the correct nodes) that
assigns each node a slot for broadcasting; the ordering is always the same
but the actual specification is unimportant (see [90] for an example). A cycle
is defined as on full pass through a global broadcast schedule —we call these
transmit slots —plus an additional n slots that we call response slots; we
expand on this later.
Overview of the Protocol: The pseudocode is in Figure 3.3. Our proto-
col synchronizes the timing of nodes for sending and listening. While this
synchronization is not mathematically challenging, a full description yields
an unreadable protocol. For ease of exposition, our treatment addresses each
node q in C = {q(x, y)| − r ≤ x ≤ r ∧ y ≥ 0}; that is, a corridor of width
2r + 1 moving up from d. Traversing the x-coordinates is nearly identical
and the grid can be covered piecewise by these two types of corridors.
For each node p, define Ap = {q(u, v) | (a−r) ≤ u ≤ (a+z) and (b+1) ≤
v ≤ (b+r)}, Bp = {q(u, v) | (a+z+1) ≤ u ≤ (a+r) and (b+1) ≤ v ≤ (b+r)}
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DoS-Resistant Reliable Broadcast
1: Starting in cycle 1, and ending no later than cycle D = 25 · (B0 +
2ϕ−1 lnϕ−1 n)ϕ+1, node d executes Local Broadcast(m, d,Rd) and
each node i ∈ Rd commits to the first value it receives from d.
As in [22], p(x, y) commits to m when, through Steps 4 and 5, it
receives t + 1 commit(q,m) or heard(q2, q1,m) from node-disjoint
paths all lying within a single (2r + 1) × (2r + 1) area; our analysis
shows this occurs in cycle 2yD− 1. The following step is executed by
each node p:
2: Starting in cycle 2yD, and ending no later than cycle (2y + 1)D − 1,
node p(x, y) performs Local Broadcast(commit(p,m), p, Rp).
The following steps are executed by each node excluding those nodes
in N(d):
3: for i = 0 to r − 1 do
4: Starting in cycle 2(y − r + i)D, and ending no later than cycle
2(y − r + i)D + D − 1, node p(x, y) listens for commit messages
by executing Local Broadcast(commit(q,m), q(x′, y′), Rq) with
each node in row y′ = y − r + i in C and where p ∈ Rq.
5: Starting in cycle 2(y− r+ i)D+D, and ending no later than cycle
2(y− r+ i)D+ 2D− 1, node p(x, y) listens for heard messages by
executing Local Broadcast(heard(q2, q1,m), q2, Rq2) with each
node q2 ∈ B′p in row y + i and where p ∈ Rq2 .
6: Starting in cycle 2(y− r)D+D, and ending no later than cycle 2(y−
r)D + 2D− 1, node q2 sends a heard message by executing Local
Broadcast(heard(q2, q1,m), q2, Rq2) where q1, q2 are sister nodes.
Figure 3.3: Pseudocode for DoS-Resistant Reliable Broadcast.
and B′p = {q′(u′, v′) | (a+z+1−r) ≤ u′ ≤ (a) and (b+r+1) ≤ v′ ≤ (b+2r)}
for 0 ≤ z ≤ r. The set B′p is obtained from Bp by shifting left by r units and
up by r units; under this 1-to-1 translation, q1 ∈ Bp and q2 ∈ B′p are sister
nodes. The reader is referred to [22] or [88] for a more in-depth discussion of
these sets.
While a full presentation is somewhat tedious, the main idea is that
where a node would have broadcasted a message to a group of nodes in
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the protocol of Bhandari and Vaidya [22], we now use Local Broad-
cast to communicate a message to that group of nodes. In terms of the
messages themselves, node q issues a commit(q,m) message if q has com-
mitted to m. Node q2 sends heard(q2, q1,m) if q2 has received a message
commit(q1,m). As in [22], p commits to m when it receives t + 1 com-
mit(q,m) or heard(q2, q1,m) from node-disjoint paths all lying within a
single (2r + 1)× (2r + 1) area.
We now discuss how to move from slots in Local Broadcast to slots
in a cycle. In general, the transmit slots in a cycle are used by a node p to
transmit a heard or commit message via Local Broadcast to a receiving
set of nodes Rp, while the response slots in a cycle are used by nodes in Rp
to send back req messages to p. Therefore, there are up to n transmit slots
needed. For simplicity, we do not go into detail about how these are set up;
we simply assume that nodes in Rp know which response slot to use.
In our p in our pseudocode, Rp = N(p)∩C and p executes Local Broad-
cast(m, p,Rp) in the context of the global broadcast schedule. By this,
we mean that a slot in the Probabilistic Sending Phase of Local Broad-
cast corresponds to p’s transmit slot in some cycle, the next slot in that
same Probabilistic Sending Phase corresponds to p’s transmit slot in the next
cycle, and so on. The same thing happens with the Deterministic Sending
Phase. In both cases, the response slots are unused. Then in the Probabilis-
tic Ack Phase and Deterministic Ack Phase, the responses are used by each
Rp set in the same fasion, where p now listens. By using a response slot,
the nodes in Rp send back to p simultaneously as in Local Broadcast.
Note that in the Probabilistic and Deterministic Ack phases, the transmit
slots are now unused. Therefore, in each cycle, only the transmit slots or
response slots, but not both, are used. For Local Broadcast running
in at most D slots, executing Local Broadcast in the context of the
global broadcast schedule requires at most D cycles. In Figure 3.3, we have
D = 25 · (B0 + 2ϕ−1 lnϕ−1 n)ϕ+1 in concordance with Lemma 10.
We include the detailed proof of completeness for Theorem 3 by showing
that each correct node eventually commits to the correct value m sent by the
dealer (the cost analysis is provided later). The following Lemma 11 proves
the correctness of our protocol in the grid; we emphasize that our argument
follows that of [22].
Lemma 11. Assume for each node p, t < (r/2)(2r + 1) nodes in N(p) are
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Byzantine and used by Carol to disrupt p’s communications for β ≤B0 time
slots. Let C = {Nodes q at (x, y)| − r ≤ x ≤ r ∧ y ≥ 0} be a corri-
dor of nodes in this network. Then, DoS-Resistant Reliable Broad-
cast achieves reliable broadcast in C.
Proof. In [22], it is shown that each node p(x, y) can obtain m by majority
filtering on messages from 2t+1 node-disjoint paths contained within a single
(2r + 1)× (2r + 1) area since at least t+ 1 will be m. Our correctness proof
is similar; however, we argue along a corridor and show that nodes in the yth
row can commit to m by slot 2yD − 1.
Base Case: Each node in N(d) commits to the correct message m immedi-
ately upon hearing it directly from the dealer by cycle D. Therefore, clearly,
every node p(x, y) ∈ N(d) commits by cycle 2yD − 1.
Induction Hypothesis: Let −r ≤ a ≤ r. If each correct node p′(x′, y′) ∈
N(a, b) commits to m by cycle 2y′D − 1, then each correct node p(x, y) ∈
N(a, b+ 1)−N(a, b) commits to m in cycle 2yD − 1.
Induction Step: We now show 2t+ 1 connectedness within a single neighbor-
hood and we argue simultaneously about the time required for p to hear mes-
sages along these disjoint paths. The node p(x, y) lies in N(a, b+1)−N(a, b)
and can be considered to have location (a− r+ z, b+ r+ 1) where 0 ≤ z ≤ r
(the case for r + 1 ≤ z ≤ 2r follows by symmetry). We demonstrate that
there exist r(2r + 1) node-disjoint paths P1, ..., Pr(2r+1) all lying within the
same neighborhood and that the synchronization prescribed by our protocol
is correct:
One-Hop Paths: the set of nodes Ap = {q(u, v) | (a − r) ≤ u ≤ (a +
z) and (b+ 1) ≤ v ≤ (b+ r)} lie in N(a, b) and neighbor p. Therefore, there
are r(r + z + 1) paths of the form q → p where q ∈ Ap.
By their position relative to p(x, y), each correct node q(u, v) ∈ Ap is
such that v = y − r + c for some fixed c ∈ {0, ..., r − 1}. Therefore, by the
induction hypothesis, q commits to m by cycle 2(y − r + c)D − 1. By the
protocol, q(u, v) sends commit messages using Local Broadcast in cycle
2vD = 2(y−r+c)D until cycle 2(v+1)D−1 = (2(y−r+c)+1)D−1 at the
latest. By the protocol, p(x, y) listens for commit messages from q starting in
cycle 2(y−r+c)D until v (2(y−r+c)+1)D−1 at the latest; note that p listens
to many executions of Local Broadcast containing heard messages, but
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we focus on this particular one from q. Therefore, p and q are synchronized
in the execution of Local Broadcast and p will receive q’s message by
cycle (2(y−r+ c)+1)D−1 = (2(b+ c+1)+1)D−1 at the latest. Since this
occurs for all nodes in Ap, node p has received all commit messages from Ap
by cycle (2(y−1)+1)D−1 = (2(b+r)+1)D−1 ≤ 2(b+r+1)D−1 = 2yD−1.
Two-Hop Paths: consider the sets Bp = {q(u, v) | (a + z + 1) ≤ u ≤
(a + r) and (b + 1) ≤ v ≤ (b + r)} and B′p = {q′(u′, v′) | (a + z + 1 − r) ≤
u′ ≤ (a) and (b+ r+ 1) ≤ v′ ≤ (b+ 2r)}. The set B′p is obtained by shifting
left by r units and up by r units. Recall that there is a one-to-one mapping
between the nodes in Bp and the nodes in B
′
p; these are sister nodes. There
are r(r − z) paths of the form q → q′ → p where q and q′ are sister nodes.
These sets, and the notion of sister nodes, were illustrated in Chapter 1, but
we depict them again here in Figure 3.4.
Consider a correct node q(u, v) ∈ Bp and its sister node q′(u′, v′) ∈ B′p
where v′ = v+ r by definition. Again, given the location of q(u, v) relative to
p(x, y), we have v = y−r+c for some fixed c ∈ {0, ..., r−1}. By the induction
hypothesis, q commits to m by cycle 2vD − 1. Then by DoS-Resistant
Reliable Broadcast, q sends a commit message using Local Broad-
cast in cycle 2vD = 2(y − r + c)D until cycle 2(v + 1)D − 1 = (2(y − r +
c) + 1)D − 1 at the latest. Again, this is the particular execution of Lo-
cal Broadcast between q and q′; q performs others. By DoS-Resistant
Reliable Broadcast, q′(u′, v′) receives commit messages from q using
Local Broadcast starting in cycle 2(v′− r+ c)D = 2vD = 2(y− r+ c)D
and ending no later than cycle 2(v′ − r + c + 1)D − 1 = 2(v + 1)D − 1 =
(2(y − r + c) + 1)D − 1.
By the above, each node q′(u′, v′) ∈ B′p is able to start sending a heard
message using Local Broadcast in cycle 2(v′ − r)D + D and ending no
later than cycle 2(v′ − r)D + 2D − 1. Starting in cycle 2(y − r + c)D + D,
node p(x, y) uses Local Broadcast to listen for a heard message from
q′(u′, v′) where v′ = y+ c. Therefore, p is listening to q′ starting in 2(y− r+
c)D +D = 2(v′ − r)D +D and ending no later than 2(v′ − r)D + 2D− 1; p
and q′ are synchronized. Therefore, p receives all heard messages by cycle
2(v′ − r)D + 2D − 1 when v′ = y + r − 1 (the node at the top row of B′p);
that is, by cycle 2(y − 1)D + 2D − 1 = 2yD − 1.
Therefore, a total of r(r + z + 1) + r(r − z) = r(2r + 1) node-disjoint paths































Figure 3.4: Depiction of the sets Ap, Bp, B
′
p and sister nodes for a particular
node p in the grid. Here a, b, z = 0 and r = 3 so the corridor C has width
2r + 1 = 7.
r + 1). For an adversary corrupting t < (r/2)(2r + 1) nodes, a correct
node can majority filter to obtain m. Furthermore, we have shown that any
p(x, y) ∈ N(a, b + 1) executes Local Broadcast r(2r + 1) = O(r2) =
O(t) times in order to receives all commit and heard messages by cycle
2yD − 1. Therefore, p can commit to the correct message by cycle 2yD − 1;
this concludes the induction.
Finally, we reiterate that proving reliable broadcast in a corridor is sufficient
as the entire grid (with the exception of the boundary of width less than r
in the case of a finite grid) can be covered piecewise by such corridors.
3.3.5 Reliable Broadcast in General Topologies
We examine the grid model previously because it features in previous liter-
ature on jamming-resistant reliable broadcast [4, 20, 24]. In this section, we
present our results for reliable broadcast on an arbitrary graph G = (V,E).
Recall that Pelc and Peleg [119] examine a generalization of the t-locally
bounded fault model; that is, where each node contains at most t Byzantine
nodes within its neighborhood. Specifically, they examine the broadcast pro-
tocol of Koo [90], which the authors call the Certified Propagation Algorithm
(CPA), with the aim of establishing conditions for which it achieves reliable
broadcast under arbitrary graphs in contrast to the grid model. CPA does









































































































































































Listen to COMMIT in row 4: [8D, 9D−1]
Listen to COMMIT in row 4: [8D, 9D−1]
Listen to COMMIT in row 4: [8D, 9D−1]
Listen to HEARD in row 4: [3D, 4D−1]
Listen to HEARD in row 5: [5D, 6D−1]
Listen to HEARD in row 6: [7D, 8D−1]
Listen to COMMIT in row 1: [2D, 3D−1]
Listen to COMMIT in row 2: [4D, 5D−1]
Listen to COMMIT in row 3: [6D, 7D−1]
Send COMMIT: [2D, 3D−1]
Send COMMIT: [4D, 5D−1]
Send COMMIT: [6D, 7D−1]
Send HEARD: [5D, 6D−1]
Listen to COMMIT in row 2: [4D, 5D−1]
Send HEARD: [3D, 4D−1]
Listen to COMMIT in row 1: [2D, 3D−1]
Listen to COMMIT in row 3: [6D, 7D−1]
Send HEARD: [7D, 8D−1]
Send COMMIT: [8D, 9D−1]
Node p
Figure 3.5: An example of some steps of the protocol for r = 3. The node
in row 4 highlighted with the horizontal lines in the B′p listens to a commit
message from its sister node in Bp by partaking in Local Broadcast as a
receiver from cycle 2D to cycle 3D − 1. Then, in cycle 3D to cycle 4D − 1,
that node uses Local Broadcast to send a heard message to p who is
listening in this execution of Local Broadcast from cycle 3D to cycle
4D − 1. The listening for p for each row is described on the left; note the
synchronization. We also illustrate that those nodes above p will be listening
for p’s commit message using Local Broadcast at the appropriate time.
the optimal number of faults t = (r/2)(2r+1)−1 in the grid as we do above.
However, we address CPA because its generality is powerful.
Again, CPA requires that all nodes obey a global broadcast schedule (i.e.
there is no jamming adversary). Pelc and Peleg [119] define X(p, d) to be the
number of nodes in p’s neighborhood N(p) that are closer to d than p and
then introduce the parameter X(G) = min{X(p, d) | p, d ∈ V, (p, s) /∈ E}.
To reiterate, one of their main results is that, for any graph G with dealer d
such that t < X(G)/2, CPA achieves reliable broadcast. For our purposes,
define for each node p the set of nodes X(p) to be those X(p, d) nodes closer
to the dealer than p. Clearly, it is possible to identify X(p) in polynomial
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Certified Propagation Algorithm (Koo [90] and Pelc and Peleg [119])
• The dealer d sends the message to all of its neighbors and terminates.
• For a correct node u ∈ N(d), upon receiving m from d it commits
to m, node u announces this committment of its neighbors and ter-
minates.
• If a node is not a neighbor of the source, then upon receiving t + 1
copies of m from t + 1 distinct neighbors, it commits to m, and
announces this committment to its neighbors and terminates.
Figure 3.6: Pseudocode for the Certified Propagation Algorithm (CPA).
time and so we observe:
Observation 1. If the topology of G and the location of d is known to all
nodes, then each node p can calculate X(p).
A Favourable Protocol in General Topologies
The pseudocode for CPA is given in Figure 3.6. Note that, unless a node
is sending in the slot allotted to it by the global broadcast schedule, or it
has terminated, it is perpetually listening. We aim to remove this wasteful
listening by synchronizing the sending and listening of nodes.
In the context of CPA, we call a single iteration of the global broadcast
schedule a broadcast round (we use cycles again later on when we modify
CPA). Throughout, assume that time is measured from when the dealer first
broadcasts m in broadcast round 0. Under CPA, regardless of the worst-case
delay imposed by the adversary, there is a broadcast round where p must
have received at least t + 1 messages from distinct correct nodes in X(p)
allowing p to commit to m; denote this broadcast round by sp. Note, that in
any execution of reliable broadcast, p may actually be able to commit before
broadcast round sp, but sp is the maximum broadcast round in which p is
guaranteed to have all the information it needs to commit to m regardless of
how the adversarial nodes behave.
Since a correct node u ∈ N(d) accepts what it hears from the dealer d
immediately, and d’s broadcast round is 0, su = 1. For nodes not in N(d),
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the situation is slightly more complicated. In the grid, for node p(x, y), we
were able to compute sp explicitly (in terms of cycles) as 2yD − 1 in the
corridor C (see proof of Lemma 11). Here, unlike with the grid, we cannot
specify sp explicitly for any graph G because it is dependent on the topology;
however, by the correctness of CPA, every node eventually commits and so
sp must exist for each node p. In fact, our protocol based on CPA is simpler
than that in the grid because the protocol of Bhandari and Vaidya [22] uses
heard messages (which makes the synchronization tedious), while CPA uses
only commit messages.
For a fixed G whose topology is known to all nodes (including knowledge
of where the dealer d is situated), each node p can calculate sp. This is
done by simulating the propagation of m using CPA. In this simulation,
each node p has the maximum t = X(G)/2 − 1 Byzantine nodes in X(p)
and these Byzantine nodes send their faulty messages prior to the t + 1
correct responses in order delay propagation of m for as long as possible. By
assuming that every X(p) has the maximum number of Byzantine nodes, the
actual placement of the Byzantine nodes in G does not affect the worst-case
broadcast time sp. In tracing this propagation, any node can calculate sp for
any node p.
Now, consider the following minor modifications to CPA: (1) each correct
node p only listens to q ∈ X(p) in broadcast round sq + 1, and (2) each
correct node p only sends its commit message in broadcast round sp + 1. In
all other slots, a node p is sleeping. This is a minor modification of CPA;
call it CPA0. These modifications synchronize the sending/listening and
allow nodes to otherwise sleep instead of perpetually listening as in CPA.
The pseudocode for CPA0 is given in Figure 3.7. While it is fairly clear
that this modification does not affect correctness, we state it formally for
completeness.
Lemma 12. If CPA achieves reliable broadcast, then CPA0 achieves reliable
broadcast.
Proof. For every node p, assume X(p) has the maximum t = X(G)/2 − 1
Byzantine nodes and that these Byzantine nodes all send their messages to
p ahead of the correct nodes in X(p) according to the broadcast schedule.
Pelc and Peleg [119] showed that CPA is correct in this situation (their
result is independent of any particular ordering of sending in the broadcast
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CPA0
• In broadcast round 0, the dealer d sends the message to all of its
neighbors and terminates.
• For a correct node u ∈ N(d), u listens in broadcast round 0 and
accepts m as correct, announces this committment to its neighbors
in broadcast round 1, and terminates.
• If a node p is not a neighbor of the source, then p listens to each
neighbor q ∈ X(p) in broadcast round sq + 1; otherwise, p sleeps.
Upon receiving t + 1 copies of m from t + 1 distinct neighbors in
X(p), it accepts m as correct, announces this committment to its
neighbors in broadcast round sp + 1, and terminates.
Figure 3.7: Pseudocode for CPA0.
schedule; that is, CPA remains correct if Byzantine nodes always send first).
Therefore, in this case, each correct node p would receive a committment
from q ∈ X(p) in broadcast round sq + 1 and node p would announce its
committment in round sp + 1. This is exactly what happens in CPA0 with
nodes sleeping otherwise. Therefore, if CPA achieves reliable broadcast, then
so does CPA0.
Define a cycle as done before in the grid. In Figure 3.8, we provide pseu-
docode for a fair and favourable reliable broadcast algorithm FCPA that
tolerates the jamming adversary described in Theorem 3.
Lemma 13. Assume CPA achieves reliable broadcast on a graph G. Then
FCPA guarantees reliable broadcast on G.
Proof. Using FCPA, we claim that every correct node p can commit by cycle
sp ·D. To prove this, assume the opposite: that some node p does not commit
to the correct value by cycle sp ·D. Then, there is some correct node q ∈ X(p)
that: (1) could not commit to a message by time slot sq ·D (and could not
send p a committment message), or (2) committed to a wrong message (and
sent that wrong message to p). Note that the time for any node p′ to send its
commit message to a node p′′ is at most D cycles by Lemma 10. Therefore,
if q cannot commit (or commits to the wrong value) by sq · D in FCPA,
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FCPA
• The dealer d sends the message to all of its neighbors using Local
Broadcast(m, d, N(d)) and terminates after at most D = 25 ·
(B0 + 2
ϕ−1 lnϕ−1 n)ϕ+1 cycles.
• If node u ∈ N(d), then upon receiving m from d via Local Broad-
cast(m, d, N(d)), it accepts m as correct, announces this committ-
ment to its neighbors in cycle D, and terminates.
• If a node p is not a neighbor of the source, then p listens to each
neighbor q ∈ X(p) via Local Broadcast(m, q, N(q)) starting in
cycle sq ·D+ 1 and ending by (sq + 1) ·D; otherwise, p sleeps. Upon
receiving t+1 copies of m in this fashion from t+1 distinct neighbors
in X(p), it accepts m as correct, announces this committment to its
neighbors using Local Broadcast(m, p, N(p)) in broadcast cycle
sp ·D + 1, and terminates by cycle (sp + 1) ·D.
Figure 3.8: Pseudocode for FCPA.
then q cannot commit by cycle sq in CPA0; therefore, CPA0 fails to achieve
reliable broadcast. However, if CPA0 fails to achieve reliable broadcast, then
by the contrapositive of Lemma 12, this contradicts the assumption that
CPA achieves reliable broadcast.
Finally, the following analysis proves favourability, both for the grid and
for general topologies:
Theorem 3 —Cost Analysis: In both of our protocols, each correct node
p partakes in an execution of Local Broadcast O(t) times as a sender and
receiver; let k denote the total number of such executions. For the ith such
execution, let τi be the number of slots for which the adversary is active for
i = 1, ..., k. Denote the adversary’s total active time by β =
∑k
i=1 τi ≤ B0.
Consider two cases:
Case I: Assume the adversary is active for a total of β =
∑k
i=1 τi = O(t ln
ϕ+1 t)
slots over all k executions of Local Broadcast involving p. For each exe-
cution, p incurs O(τϕ−1i ln t+ln
ϕ t) cost in expectation by Theorem 2. There-




i ) ln t +
t lnϕ t) = O((
∑k
i τi) ln t+ t ln
ϕ t) = O(β ln t+ t lnϕ t)) = O(t lnϕ+2 t).
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Case II: Otherwise, β =
∑k
i=1 τi = ω(t ln
ϕ+1 t). By Jensen’s inequality for
























i ) ln t)+O(t ln
ϕ t) = O(t2−ϕ(
∑k
i=1 τi)
ϕ−1 ln t) +O(t lnϕ t) =
O(t(2−ϕ)βϕ−1 ln t + t lnϕ t) = o(β). Therefore, p’s expected cost is less than
that of the adversary.
Substituting t = O(r2) into the above analysis yields the favourability result
in the grid and, together, gives our result for the grid model in Theorem 3.
The Las Vegas Guarantee in Multi-Hop WSNs
In addition to the rationale given in Section 3.1.1, the Las Vegas property
is also valuable in multi-hop sensor networks for the following reason. Let n
be the number of devices within transmitting distance of a device, and let N
be the total number of devices in the network. Monte Carlo protocols that
succeed with high probability in n are possible. However, typically, n  N
and messages will traverse a chain of multiple hops; consider Ω(N) hops.
Consider a failure probability for a single hop that is small, but non-zero,
such as Θ(n−c) for some constant c > 0, or even Θ(2−n), then communica-
tion fails along the chain with constant probability. Alternatively, we might
achieve protocols that succeed with high probability in N . However, in large
networks, N may not be known a priori. Furthermore, achieving a high
probability guarantee in N typically involves Ω(logN) operations which, for
large N , may be too costly. Therefore, by devising Las Vegas protocols, we
avoid assumptions that are problematic given that n N .
We note that transmission over the wireless medium is subject to error
due to radio-irregularity and gray-zone effects. Does this reduce the utility
of our Las Vegas guarantee? In many cases, we argue that it does not. Un-
der fair weather conditions, the percentage of successfully received packets
is nearly 100% up to a distance threshold exceeding 25 meters in the case of
the MICA2DOT mote [7]. Other experimental studies have shown that com-
munication is reliable so long as the signal-to-interference-plus-noise-ratio ex-
ceeds a threshold value [143,144]; therefore, using a transmission power above
this threshold yields reliable communication. Other experimental studies on
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the packet reception rate, which closely approximates the probability of suc-
cessfully receiving a packet between two neighbouring nodes, is perfect up to
a fixed distance [173]. Therefore, for an appropriate transmission power in
dense sensor networks, communication over the wireless medium should not
undermine our Las Vegas guarantee.
3.4 Application 2: Application-Level DDoS
Attacks
Typically in application-level DDoS attacks, a number of compromised clients,
known collectively as a botnet, are employed to overwhelm a server with re-
quests. These botnets have become commercialized with operators (“bot-
masters”) renting out time to individuals for the purposes of launching at-
tacks [54,96].
We assume a model of botnet attacks similar to that described by Wal-
fish et al. [152]. In this model, a request is cheap for a client to issue,
expensive for the server to service, and all requests incur the same computa-
tional cost (heterogeneous requests can likely be handled as in [152]). There
is a high-capacity communication channel and the crucial bottleneck is the
server’s inability to process a heavy request load.
The client rate is g requests per second. The aggregate botnet rate is R
requests per second and this is assumed to be both relatively constant and
the botnet’s maximum possible rate. If the server is overloaded, it randomly
drops excess requests. In this case, the good clients only receive a fraction
g/(g+R) of the server’s resources; it is assumed that R g so that g/(g+R)
is very small.
Walfish et al. [152] propose a protocol Speak-Up for resisting DDoS
attacks by having clients increase their sending rate such that their aggregate
bandwidth G is on the same order as that of R. Since botnet machines are
assumed to have already “maxed-out” their available bandwidth in attacking,
Speak-Up greatly increases the chance that the server processes a legitimate
request since G/(G+R) g/(g+R). A crucial component of Speak-Up is
a front-end to the server called the “thinner” which controls which requests
are seen by the server and asks a client to retry her request if it was previously
dropped.
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DoS-Resistant Client-Server Communication for round i ≥ 2
Send Phase: For each of the 22i slots do
• The client sends her request with probability 2/2i.
• The server (via the thinner) admits listens with probability 2/2i.
Ack Phase:
• The server sends back the requested data.
• The client listens.
If the client receives her data, she terminates; otherwise, the thinner tells
her to retry in the next round.
Figure 3.9: Pseudocode for the application of Case 2 of our 3-Player Sce-
nario to the client-server scenario.
3.4.1 Our Protocol
We employ Case 2 of our 3-Player Scenario Protocol to achieve a
Speak-Up-like algorithm with provable guarantees. Bandwidth (upstream
and downstream rates in bits per second) is our measure of cost and, as
such, our results should be interpreted as quantifying the expected upstream
bandwidth required by the client and the expected downstream bandwidth
with which the server should be provisioned. Using bandwidth as a form of
currency has been previously employed by the research community [69, 140,
152]. Our pseudocode is given in Figure 3.9.
Note that the Ack Phase is simplified due to the fact that attacks do
not occur in this phase for Case 2 of the 3-Player Scenario Proto-
col. Like [152], our protocol is suitable for applications where there is no
pre-defined clientele (so the server cannot traffic filter) and the clientele can
be non-human (so “proof-of-humanity” tests cannot be relied upon solely).
Unlike the wireless domain, we do not address reactive adversaries. Deter-
mining when a player is sending over the wire in order to control when its
traffic arrives at the targeted player seems beyond the capability of a realistic
attacker.
The client plays the role of Alice where the message is a request; the
server plays the role of Bob. This application falls into Case 2 of Theorem 1:
a DDoS attack targets the server while communications from the server to
the clients are not disrupted. The client and server are assumed to be syn-
chronized such that they always agree on the current round and a maximum
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round number is set a priori. Such synchronization is certainly possible over
Internet-connected machines and the maximum round value should be set
to account for the level of DDoS resistance the participants wish to have;
for most attacks, R is in the low hundreds of Mbits/second [139]. We now
provide an overview of our protocol.
Send Phase: Each Send Phase occurs over a uniform and fixed duration
∆; for simplicity, we set ∆ = 1 second, and the slot length changes in each
round appropriately. The client sends in each slot with probability 2/2i with
an expected 2i+1 upstream bits per second. The server listens in each slot
with probability 2/2i for an expected 2i+1 downstream bits per second. If the
received traffic substantially exceeds 2i+1, requests are dropped; probabilistic
listening and traffic measurement on the server side can be performed by the
thinner [152].
Note that in each round, the client increases her sending rate in the Send
Phase to “speak up”. Any correct client that reaches its bandwidth limit
remains at this limit for the duration of the protocol. When the maximum
round number is reached, the clients maintain their sending rate until the
thinner informs them that the attack has ended. For the purposes of analysis,
a blocked slot occurs when Carol overwhelms the server with requests and
the client’s request is dropped in that slot. Define a send-blocked phase as
one where Carol blocks at least 22i/2 slots; therefore, Carol uses an upstream
bandwidth of at least 22i/2 bits per second. As in [152], if the thinner drops
a request, it immediately asks the client to retry in the next round.
Ack Phase: The server does not increase its sending rate per round (only
the client speaks up) since there are no attacks in the Ack Phase for Case 2.
This simplifies the Ack Phase as mentioned in Section 3.2 in our discussion
of Ack Failures; the server simply returns the requested data to the client at
some reasonable rate.
We assume upstream and downstream bandwidth are capped; this is true of
residential Internet packages, as well as hosted services. In the case of resi-
dential service, upstream bandwidth is scarcer than downstream bandwidth,
while servers are generally well-provisioned for both; this can be reflected in
our cost constants. By Case 2 of Theorem 1 we have:
Corollary 1. If Carol uses bandwidth R to attack, then the client’s request
is serviced, and the expected bandwidth (upstream and downstream) used by
the client and the server is O(R0.5).
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Bob can represent multiple good clients. We assume the same synchroniza-
tion with the server; however, clients joining at different times are informed
by the thinner of the current round. In order to be guaranteed some of the
server’s resources, the clients’ expected aggregate bandwidth is G = Ω(R0.5).
Therefore, our result quantifies the minimum expected aggregate upstream
bandwidth for clients and the expected downstream bandwidth for the server
required to ensure that total censorship is averted; in contrast, Speak-Up
cannot make such a guarantee. This is useful for applications where a critical
update or warning must be disseminated, and delivery to even a handful of
clients is sufficient since they may then share it with others (via multicast,
peer-to-peer distribution, etc.).
As with Speak-Up, the probability of legitimate request being serviced
is still G/(G + R). In addition to admitting an analysis, our iterative ap-
proach of geometrically increasing the aggregrate bandwidth should mitigate
attempts by Carol at launching short duration DDoS attacks in order to
provoke a steep and disruptive traffic increase from correct clients. Our pro-
tocol is fair as described in Section 3.1.2 —the aggregate requirements of the
bandwidth constrained clients is asymptotically equal to that of the well-
provisioned server. Restating our result above in the context of multiple
clients yields Theorem 4.
Finally, in order to achieve the same level of denial of service against a
server that is defended by our protocol, Carol must procure a much larger
botnet in order to obtain the necessary bandwidth; however, this comes at
a cost. For example, one study found the cost of a single bot to be between
$2 and $25 [54]. Therefore, since Carol’s bandwidth requirements increase




Reducing Listening Costs for
Reliable Broadcast in Wireless
Sensor Networks
Energy is one of the most critical resources in wireless sensor networks.
The wireless radios on sensor network devices offer a number of different
modes typically with states such as off, sleeping, idle, receiving and send-
ing [158]. Remarkably, the cost of the idle, receiving, and sending states are
roughly equivalent, and these costs are an order of magnitude larger than the
cost of the sleep state. The difference in energy consumption between the
idle/send/receive states and the sleep state differs depending on the type of
card and the communication standard being employed. For example, using
the IEEE 802.11 standard with a 11 Mbps card, the ratios between energy
consumption of the idle/send/receive states and the sleep state are all more
than 12 [50]. In [76], with a different setup employing TinyOS and a TR1000
transceiver, the measured ratios are over 1000. Therefore, the amount of
time spent in the sleep state is strongly indicative of the energy efficiency
of a given algorithm [156]. Here, we consider a node to be either asleep or
awake (listening and/or sending). Our goal is to design an algorithm that
allows a single node to broadcast a message so that eventually all non-faulty
nodes learn the correct message; this is the problem of reliable broadcast.
Almost all previous work on the reliable broadcast problem ignores energy
efficiency, assuming the nodes are spending a substantial amount of time lis-
tening. Here, we do not address the issue of relative energy costs as we did
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in Chapter 3. Instead, we focus on designing algorithms for reliable broad-
cast that reduce the absolute energy costs to correct nodes, particularly with
regards to the cost of listening. Our approach depends upon the analysis of
a new data streaming problem that we call the Bad Santa problem.
4.1 The Bad Santa Problem
We restate the Bad Santa problem here along with another variant that we
consider in this chapter. A child is presented with n boxes, one after another.
When given each box, the child must immediately decide whether or not to
open it. If the child decides not to open a box, he is never allowed to revisit
it. At least half the boxes have presents in them, but the decision as to which
boxes have presents is made by an adversarial Santa who wants the child to
open as many empty boxes as possible. The child wants to find a present,
while opening the smallest expected number of boxes.
More formally, an adversary sends a stream of n bits of which at least
half are 1. The adversary sets the bits of the stream prior to sending the
first bit. The algorithm may query any bit as it passes, but once a bit passes
without being queried, it is lost. The algorithm is correct if it always finds
a 1. The adversary knows the (randomized) algorithm ahead of time but
not its random bits. The cost of an algorithm on an input is the number of
expected queries executed until it finds a 1. The goal is to design a correct
algorithm with minimum expected cost over the worst case input. At first
glance, it may appear that randomly sampling O(log n) presents trivially
solves the single stream Bad Santa problem. However, this strategy has a
(small) probability of failure, which is unacceptable and we elaborate on this
later in Section 4.2.1.
We are interested in two variants of this problem. The first is the single
stream case described above. The second is the multi-stream case where
there are multiple n-bit streams that the algorithm queries consecutively.
Each stream has a constant fraction of 1 bits, but the values (1s and 0s) may
be distributed differently in each stream; note that, in the multi-stream case,
the fraction of 1 bits can be less than 1/2. A correct algorithm must find one
1 bit in one of the streams. The cost is the expected number of queries over
the worst case set of such streams.
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4.1.1 The Grid Model of Sensor Networks
We demonstrate the applicability of the Bad Santa problem on the grid
network model. We make some additional remarks regarding the flexibility
of the grid model later on in Section 4.4.8.
Faults
Every node in the grid may suffer faults, but as in [21, 22, 24, 90] we assume
that no more than t nodes in any 2r+ 1 by 2r+ 1 square are faulty and that
no node can spoof another node’s identity. We consider the cases where these
faults are either all fail-stop: the t nodes are all deleted from the network;
or Byzantine: the t nodes are taken over by an adversary and deviate from
our protocol arbitrarily; although, Byzantine nodes must also abide by the
schedule as in [21, 22, 90]. Note that tolerating a known bounded number of
deviations from the schedule is possible (see [24]) and that our results can
likely be made resilent in the same fashion. We assume that all of the nodes
that suffer faults are chosen by a single adversary who controls these nodes to
coordinate attacks on the network. This adversary knows everything except
for the random bits of the non-faulty nodes.
Schedule of Transmissions
We assume there is a distinguished node s known as the source (we use
this term rather than dealer throughout) that holds an initial message m.
We assume without loss of generality that the source node has coordinates
(0, 0) on the grid, i.e. all nodes know the source. We discuss relaxing this
assumption in Section 4.2.3. All known protocols designed for the reliable
broadcast grid model proceed in steps where the source of the message sends
to its neighbors, which in turn send to their neighbors, until all nodes receive
the message. The predecessor set Gp of a correct node p is a particular set
of nodes such that if p listens to all nodes in Gp and majority filters on
the received messages, p will obtain the correct message; we give a precise
definition of Gp in Section 4.4.5. Again, following the literature, we assume
that each node has a predecessor set of n = r(2r+1) nodes assigned to distinct
time slots and that the entire schedule repeats every (2r+1)2 time slots. We
call each schedule repetition a round. An example of a broadcast schedule
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is given in [90]: In each round, each node in position (x, y) broadcasts in
time slot ((x mod (2r+ 1))× (2r+ 1) + (y mod (2r+ 1))) mod (2r+ 1)2.
For our purposes, it suffices to assume each round has O(n) time slots and
each node within L∞ distance r of some node p is assigned to a distinct time
slot. If t < n/2 then each node has a predecessor set of which strictly less
than half of the nodes are faulty, or it can listen directly to the source which
we assume is correct [21, 22]. For simplicity, we assume the source initially
broadcasts the message size and, thereafter, time slots are long enough to
send the entire message.1 The cost of listening to a message is proportional
to the message length.
4.2 The Bad Santa Problem and
Reliable Broadcast
The Bad Santa problem is an abstraction of the second single-hop communi-
cation scenario described in Chapter 1 where a set of multiple senders possess
information m required by a single receiver. However, many of the senders
(strictly less than half) can be faulty, failing to send m or sending incorrect
data. While the majority of the senders are correct, rather than listening to
all of S and majority filtering on the received data, we desire an algorithm
that allows the single receiver to decide on m in a more efficient manner. We
now sketch the methods for applying the solutions of the Bad Santa problem
to the problem of reliable broadcast.
Our goal is to reduce the expected listening time and the expected bit
complexity required for a node to learn the message from its n predecessors.
We can use the algorithm for the single stream Bad Santa problem to do so
provided that: (1) at least half of the predecessors have the correct message
and, in the case of Byzantine faults, the listening node can determine if a
message is correct; (2) the listening node knows the location of the source
node and time of broadcast (to determine when to start the Bad Santa proto-
col and to which set of n nodes to possibly listen). In this case, the message
1An alternative is that the source node preprocesses the message by dividing it into
pieces that each fit into a time slot. However, both the broadcasting of the message size
and the details of how the message might be formatted for sending are outside the scope
of this work.
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can be transmitted safely from one set of predecessors to another, with each
node using the Bad Santa protocol to decide which of its predecessors to
listen to and thereby learn the message.
We can reduce listening time further by using the multi-stream Bad Santa
protocol. Here the fraction of faulty predecessors can exceed 1/2 and we show
that multiple streams are required if we wish to obtain savings. If we use
k + 1 streams, then there are k + 1 rounds of sending before the message is
passed from one set of nodes to another; each node sends k + 1 times and
the latency increases by a factor of k + 1 over the single round case.
4.2.1 Utility of Las Vegas Algorithms
Why do we insist on allowing no error in the Bad Santa problem? Why not
just use random sampling? We reiterate our argument from Section 3.1.1.
Random sampling has a probability of error that depends on n, which is on
the order of the number of nodes in the transmission radius; we stress that
n depends on r and is not the total number of nodes in the network. If the
network’s total size is much larger than n, then even if the failure probability
for a single listener is exponentially small in n, the probability that some
node in the network fails to learn the message will still be quite large. For
example, if the total network size is exponential in n and the probability
of failure for a single listener is small, but non-zero, say Θ(2−n), then with
constant probability, reliable broadcast will fail.
4.2.2 Byzantine Faults: Known Start Time and Source
To satisfy condition (1) when the faults are Byzantine, our protocol has
two stages. In the first stage, the source uses a secure (cryptographic) hash
function (for more on such hash functions see [147], Chapter 4) to generate a
fingerprint of size (log2 |m|)2 where |m| is the message length2, and broadcasts
this fingerprint to all the other nodes in the network using a previously
known energy-inefficient method in [22]. In the second stage, the source
broadcasts the full message with each node using a Bad Santa protocol.
Each node compares the hash value of each full message received against the
2We make the random oracle assumption about the hash function used to generate the
fingerprint of m.
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true fingerprint to determine if it agrees and is thus presumably correct. If
the adversary is unable to discover a false message whose hash matches the
fingerprint, then the only message which matches the fingerprint is the correct
message. Each node can determine if the message it receives is correct. Thus,
at each stage, all non-faulty nodes transmit the correct message and condition
(1) is satisfied. This introduces a possibility of error into the transmission
which depends on the relative size of the fingerprint to the message and the
resources of the adversary. In this model, the set of faulty nodes can differ
from one stream to the next as chosen by the adversary; however, for a given
stream, the adversary must decide whether a node is corrupt prior to its
selection or non-selection by a protocol.
4.2.3 Byzantine Faults: Unknown Start Time and Source(s)
We also deal with the case where the start time of the message is not known
in advance, or the location of the source is not known. Moreover, our protocol
allows any node to send a message i.e. become a source node. We note that
this is also possible under the original protocols of [21, 22, 90]; however, we
explicitly deal with this case and show how to accomplish an energy savings
if t < n
16+ε
for any constant ε > 0. More specifically, we require that no more
than a 1/2− ε fraction of the nodes are faulty in any r/2 by r/2 square. In
this model, the adversary is adaptive in the sense that it can decide which
nodes to take over based on which nodes have previously committed to the
correct message.
4.3 Our Contributions
Our five main results are summarized in the theorems below. For ease of ex-
position, we have aggregated the notation we most commonly use throughout
this chapter in Table 4.1. Finally, throughout, let lg n denote the logarithm
base 2 and let log(k) n denote log · · · log︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
n.
Theorem 6. For the single-stream Bad Santa problem, the optimal expected





r Radius of broadcast for all nodes.
t
Number of Byzantine peers in a (2r + 1) × (2r + 1) square of
the sensor network.
p(x, y) A node p located at coordinate (x, y) in the grid network model.
N(p) or
N(x, y) Set of nodes within the broadcast radius of node p(x, y).
n
In the context of the Bad Santa Problem, n is the number of
boxes in a stream. In the context of a sensor network, n is the
size of predecessor set where n = r(2r + 1).
k
Number of streams used in the problem definition of the Bad
Santa Problem.
s Source node (or dealer) in the problem of reliable broadcast.
m
Message sent by the source node in the problem of reliable
broadcast.
|m| Number of bits in the message m.
f A secure hash function.
f(m) Fingerprint resulting from applying the hash function f to m.
Table 4.1: Summary of frequently used notation in Chapter 4.
Theorem 7. For the k-stream Bad Santa problem, the optimal expected
number of queries is O(log(k)(n) + k) and Ω(log(2k) n). In particular, for
k = Θ(log∗ n), we can ensure the expected number of queries is O(log∗ n).
The next two theorems about energy-efficient broadcast are established by
algorithms based on solutions to the Bad Santa problem. We again repeat
that n = r(2r + 1) and so n depends on the broadcast radius; it is not the
total number of nodes in the network. The algorithms apply to a grid of
finite or infinite size. In the former case, we achieve the standard result that
all nodes, except those on the boundary of width r, commit to the correct
message. In the latter case, for Byzantine faults, our result translates into a
finite portion of the grid obtaining the correct message and this is dependent
on the computational power of the adversary. Theorem 8 essentially follows
directly from Theorems 6 and 7. Theorem 9 requires a fingerprint of the
message to first be broadcast through the network.
Theorem 8. Assume we have a network where at most t < r
2
(2r + 1) nodes
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suffer fail-stop faults in any square of size 2r+ 1 by 2r+ 1 and that the start
time and source of a message are known. Then there exists an algorithm for
reliable broadcast which has the following properties:
• Each node is awake for O(
√
n) time slots in expectation.
• Each node broadcasts O(
√
n|m|) bits and receives |m| bits.
In the next theorem, we use the notion of computational steps in the context
of the adversary. By this, we mean the number of times the adversary can
create an input x′, apply a secure hash function f to x′ and check for a match
between the output fingerprint f(x′) and some other fingerprint for which the
adversary is attempting to generate a collision.
Theorem 9. Assume we have a network where at most t < r
2
(2r + 1) of
the nodes suffer Byzantine faults in any square of size 2r + 1 by 2r + 1 and
that the start time and source of a message are known. Further assume that
the number of computational steps available to the adversary is bounded by
s. Then there exists an algorithm for guaranteeing reliable broadcast with a
probability of failure O(s/|m|lg |m|). In an initial stage, the algorithm requires
a fingerprint of size lg2 |m| to be initially broadcast to the network. However,
in the second stage, when the message m itself is broadcast, the algorithm has
the following properties:
• Each node is awake for O(
√
n) time slots in expectation,
Over both stages, the algorithm has the following costs:
• Each node broadcasts O(n log2 |m| +
√
n|m|) bits and receives an ex-
pected O(n log2 |m|+
√
n|m|) bits.
We also present results on increased energy savings for values of t within
an arbitrary constant factor of optimal. In particular, we consider the case
where t ≤ (1−ε) r
2
(2r+1) for any constant ε > 0 where we have the following
results:
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Theorem 10. Assume we have a network where, for any constant ε > 0, at
most t ≤ (1 − ε) r
2
(2r + 1) nodes suffer fail-stop faults in any square of size
2r + 1 by 2r + 1 and that the start time and source of a message are known.
Then there exists an algorithm which guarantees reliable broadcast and which
has the following properties:
• For any k between 1 and ln∗ n, the algorithm requires each node to be
awake for an expected O(log(k) n) time slots.
• Each node broadcasts O(k|m|) bits and receives |m| bits.
Therefore, the above algorithm requires each node to broadcast O(k) times
which translates into a higher latency given that nodes must adhere to a
broadcast schedule; however, nodes save more energy in expectation.
Theorem 11. Assume we have a network where, for any constant ε > 0,
at most t ≤ (1 − ε) r
2
(2r + 1) of the nodes suffer Byzantine faults in any
square of size 2r + 1 by 2r + 1 and that the start time and source of a
message are known. Further assume that the number of computational steps
available to the adversary is bounded by s. Then there exists an algorithm
which guarantees reliable broadcast with a probability of failure O(s/|m|lg |m|).
In an initial stage, the algorithm requires all nodes to be awake for every slot
during which a fingerprint of size lg2 |m| is initially broadcast to the network.
However, in the second stage, when the message m itself is broadcast, the
algorithm has the following properties:
• For any k between 1 and ln∗ n, requires all nodes to be awake an expected
O(log(k) n) time slots.
Over both stages, the algorithm has the following costs:
• For any k between 1 and ln∗ n, each node broadcasts O(n log2 |m|+k|m|)
bits and receives an expected O(n log2 |m|+ (log(k) n)|m|) bits.
Finally, we deal with the case where the start time and the source of the
message is unknown. In this situation, if t < n
16+ε
, we have the following
result:
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Theorem 12. If the start time and source of a message are unknown, there
is a protocol for reliable broadcast in which each node (1) sends O(|m|) bits
per round, (2) is awake an amortized constant number of time slots per round
and (3) receives an amortized O(|m|) bits per round.
For this last result given in Theorem 12, all nodes may receive the message;
that is, those nodes on the boundary are not excluded as with our previous
results.
To contrast our results with previous work, we note that under the pre-
vious algorithms for reliable broadcast [21, 22], each node 1) is awake for
(2t + 1) = Θ(n) time slots, 2) broadcasts Θ(|m|) bits; 3) receives Θ(|m|)
bits in the fail-stop model; and 4) can be forced by the adversary to receive
Θ(n|m|) bits in the Byzantine fault model. Therefore, in both fault models,
our algorithms are saving substantially on the amount of time a node must
be awake for listening to the full message. For the fail-stop case, we are
trading a small factor increase in traffic for these savings . Moreover, in the
Byzantine case, we greatly reduce the total bit complexity.
Finally, note that |m| need not be large to make the probability of finding
a message with the same fingerprint very small. For example, if |m| = 1 KB,
the probability of a collision is already 2−100 ≈ 10−33.
4.4 Related Work
The reliable broadcast problem over the sensor network model described
above has been extensively studied in [21–24, 90]. In [90], Koo showed that
reliable broadcast with Byzantine faults is impossible if t ≥ r
2
(2r + 1) in
the L∞ norm. In [21, 22], Bhandari and Vaidya presented a clever algo-
rithm that achieved reliable broadcast tolerating Byzantine faults for any
t < r
2
(2r+ 1); our Theorem 9 appies to this scenario. There the authors also
achieve t < r(2r + 1) for the fail-stop fault model whereas our result applies
only when t < r
2
(2r + 1) or when t ≤ (1 − ε)(r/2)(2r + 1) for any constant
ε > 0. Therefore, we are a constant factor from the optimal tolerance in
the fail-stop model. Koo et al., in [24], described an algorithm that achieves
reliable broadcast even when the faulty nodes can spoof addresses of hon-
est nodes or cause collisions; this is a more challenging fault model than is
addressed in our work or in any other previous work. All prior algorithms
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proposed for the reliable broadcast problem require each node in the network
to be awake for a constant fraction of the time slots and thus are not energy
efficient. Our algorithm from Theorem 9 makes use of the algorithm from [22]
to broadcast a fingerprint of the message. Finally, under different models of
a sensor network, the problems of consensus [35, 62], reliable broadcast un-
der the fail-stop fault model [91] and reliable broadcast under adversarial
faults [119] have been studied. Work in [57] deals with broadcast protocols
in a time-slotted network where the number of times a node can transmit is
constrained; this is called “k-shot broadcasting”. The authors focus on es-
tablishing bounds on the number of rounds each node must transmit in order
to achieve broadcast; hence, there is a focus on the tradeoff between energy
(i.e. the number of shots needed) and latency of the broadcast. However,
despite this similarity, the network model used in [57] does not incorporate
adversarial behaviour and captures more general topologies; consequently,
the techniques and results differ significantly from our work.
Data streaming problems have been popular in the last several years [73,
110]. Generally, past work in this area focuses on computing statistics on
the data using a small number of passes over the data stream. In [73], the
authors treat their data stream as a directed multi-graph and examine the
space requirements of computing certain properties regarding node degree
and connectedness. Munro and Paterson [109] consider the problem of se-
lection and sorting with a limited number of passes over one-way read-only
memory. Guha and McGregor [66, 67] examine the problem of computing
statistics over data streams where the data objects are ordered either ran-
domly or arbitrarily. Alon, Matias and Szegedy [5] examine the space com-
plexity of approximating the frequency of moments with a single pass over
a data stream. In all of these cases, and others [37, 43], the models dif-
fer substantially from our proposed data streaming problem. Rather than
computing statistics or selection problems, we are concerned with the guar-
anteed discovery of a particular value, and under our model, expected query
complexity takes priority over space complexity.
4.4.1 Single-Stream Variant of the Bad Santa Problem
We now consider the single-stream Bad Santa problem. A naive algorithm
is to query n/2 + 1 bits uniformly at random. The expected cost for this
algorithm is Θ(n) since the adversary will place the 1’s at the end of the
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stream. The following is an improved algorithm.
Single Stream Selection Strategy
1: Perform
√
n queries uniformly at random from the first half of the
stream. Stop immediately upon finding a 1.
2: If no 1 has been found, starting with the first bit in the second half of
the stream, query each consecutive bit until a 1 is obtained.
Lemma 14. The expected cost of the above strategy is O(
√
n).
Proof. Assume that there are i
√





]. This implies that there are then (n/2) − i
√
n 1s in the second
half of the stream. By querying
√
n slots uniformly at random in the first
half of the stream, the probability that the algorithm fails to obtain a 1 in


















































. Plugging this into
the expected cost function gives an expected cost of O(
√
n).
The following lemma was shown in [87] and, for completeness, the proof is
included in the appendix of this thesis.
Lemma 15. Ω(
√
n) expected queries are necessary in the single stream case.
Theorem 1 follows immediately.
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4.4.2 Multi-Stream Variant of the Bad Santa Problem
We define a (α, β)-strategy to be an algorithm which occurs over no more
than α streams, each with at least a (possibly different) set of at least Θ(n)
values of 1, and which incurs expected cost (number of queries) at most β. To
be explicit, for multiple streams, we can handle the case where the fraction
of boxes that contain a 1, denoted by δ, can be less than 1/2. The previous
section demonstrated a (1, O(
√
n))-strategy. We now consider the following
protocol over (k + 1) streams for k ≥ 1.
Multi-Stream Selection Strategy
1: for (i = k to 1) do
2: Perform 1
δ
ln(i)(n) queries uniformly at random over the entire
stream. Stop if a 1 is obtained.
3: If no value of 1 has been found, then open each of the n boxes in order
in the final stream until a 1 is located.
Lemma 16. For any constant δ > 0, the above protocol is a (k+1, O(log(k)(n)+
k))-strategy.
Proof. Correctness is clear because in the worst case, we open all boxes in
the final stream. The expected cost is:





















+ e− lnn ·O(n)
= O(log(k)(n) + k)
Lemma 17. If there are ln∗ (n) + 1 streams and δ is a constant, then the
multi-stream algorithm provides a (O(log∗ n), O(log∗ n))-strategy.
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Proof. By the definition of the iterated logarithm:
ln∗ n =
{
0 for n ≤ 1
1 + ln∗(lnn) for n > 1
if k = ln∗ n, we can plug this value into the last line of the proof of Lemma 16
which contains two terms inside the big-O notation. By the definition of ln∗ n,
the first term is O(ln(ln
∗ n) n) = O(1), and the second is O(ln∗ n), for a total
expected cost of O(ln∗ n).
4.4.3 Lower Bound for Multiple Streams
The following lemma is proved in [87] and is included in the appendix for
completeness:
Lemma 18. Ω(log(i+2) n) expected queries are required for a randomized al-
gorithm that errs with probability less than λ = (ln(i) n)−ε on one stream of
length n. In particular, when i = 0, Ω(log log n) expected queries are required
for a randomized algorithm with error less than 1/nε, for any constant ε > 0.
Using Lemma 18, we now achieve the following lower bound:
Lemma 19. For k > 0, Ω(ln(2k) n) expected queries are necessary to find a
1 from k + 1 streams with probability 1.
Proof. We use induction on the number of streams:
Base Case: Let k = 1. Either the algorithm finds a 1 in the first pass or
the second pass. From Lemma 18, for any constant ε any algorithm that
fails to find a 1 in the first pass with probability ≤ n−ε has expected cost
Ω(log log n). If the algorithm fails to find a 1 in the first pass with probability
at least n−ε then the expected cost to the algorithm is at least the probability
it fails in the first pass times the expected cost of always finding a 1 in the
second and final pass, which is n−ε ·Ω(
√
n). Choosing ε < 1/2, the expected
cost is Ω(log log n).
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Inductive Hypothesis: For k > 1, Ω(ln(2k) n) expected queries are necessary
to find a 1 from k + 1 streams with probability 1.
Inductive Step: Now assume the hypothesis is true for up to k > 1 streams.
Assume we have k+1 streams. Any randomized algorithm either fails to find
a 1 in the first stream with probability less than (1/ ln(2k−2) n)ε, in which case
by Lemma 5, the expected cost of the algorithm when it processes the first
stream is Ω(ln(2k) n) or the probability that it fails in the first pass is at least
(1/ ln(2k−2) n)ε. In that case, the expected cost deriving from queries of the
second stream is at least (1/ ln(2k−2) n)ε ·Ω(ln(2k−2) n) where the second factor
of this expression is the expected number of queries needed to find a 1 in k
streams, as given by the induction hypothesis. The minimum expected cost
of any randomized algorithm is the minimum of these two possibilities, which
is Ω(ln(2k) n).
Theorem 7 then follows immediately from Lemmas 3, 4, 5 and 6.
4.4.4 An Extension to Adaptive Adversaries
In this section, we take a slight detour and consider a variation of the Bad
Santa problem where the adversary does not necessarily need to make all of
its decisions ahead of time; we call this an adaptive adversary. Prior to the
child’s current selection, the Bad Santa may reorder the boxes based on the
previous actions of the child. Consider the following protocol for the single
stream variant of the Bad Santa Problem with an adaptive adversary:
Single Stream Adaptive Bad Santa Algorithm
1: for (i = 1 to n/2) do
2: Open box i with probability 2/
√
n. Stop immediately if a toy is
obtained.
3: Otherwise, open each box consecutively until a toy is obtained.
This algorithm differs from that in [87] in that we no longer insist on opening
precisely
√
n boxes in the first half of the stream. Instead, each box in the




Lemma 20. In the presence of an adaptive adversary, the Single Stream
Adaptive Bad Santa Algorithm for δ = 1/2 guarantees the child
obtains a toy with O(
√
n) cost in expectation.
Proof. Let X be the number of boxes the child opens in the first half of the
stream. For j = 1, ..., n/2, let the variable qj = 1 if the j
th box contains a

























j=1 qj is the number of empty boxes in the second half of the
stream (there are n/2−
∑n/2
j=1 qj full boxes in the second half of the stream;
therefore, there are n/2− (n/2−
∑n/2
j=1 qj) empty boxes in the second half).
Let q =
∑n/2
j=1 qj. Setting the derivative (with respect to q) to zero allows
us to find the maximum at
√
n/2. Plugging this back into our equation for
expected cost yields O(
√
n).
We can also handle k + 1 streams:
k + 1 Streams Adaptive Bad Santa Algorithm
1: for stream (i = k to 1) do
2: for (j = 1 to n) do
3: Open box j with probability ln
(i) n
δn
. Stop immediately if a toy is
obtained.
4: If no toy has been obtained, open all boxes in the final stream until a
toy is obtained.
Lemma 21. In the presence of an adaptive adversary, the k + 1 Streams
Adaptive Bad Santa Algorithm for any constant δ > 0 and k ≥ 1
streams guarantees the child obtains a toy with O(log(k) n + k) queries in
expectation.
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Proof. For the ith stream and s = 1, ..., n, let qi,s = 1 if the s
th box in the
stream is empty; otherwise, qi,s = 1 to indicate that the box contains a toy.
Each qi,s value is decided arbitrarily by the adversary, but independently of
the child’s choice regarding whether to open the sth box. We calculate the



























































+ e− lnn · n as
∑n
s=1 qi,s = δn
= O(ln(k) n+ k)
The same lower bounds apply to the Adaptive Bad Santa problem. Through-
out the remainder of this chapter, the use of a Bad Santa algorithm is used as
a subroutine for our reliable broadcast protocols. In this context, an empty
box corresponds to a faulty node. By using our Adaptive Bad Santa algo-
rithms, we can tolerate an adversary that selects the locations of its faulty
nodes on the fly (but still, independently of the choices by correct nodes).
Throughout, for ease of exposition, we do not specify the use of our adaptive
variants; however, these could be used if desired.
Error Tolerance in the Bad Santa Protocols and in Reliable Broad-
cast Protocols: Before describing our reliable broadcast protocols, we first
address a possible point of confusion: Previous work under the Byzantine
fault model assumed t < n/2 whereas in this work we are allowing t ≤ n/2
in our algorithms for the single-stream Bad Santa problem. This should not
be construed as contradicting the lower bound proved in [90]. In order to
perform reliable broadcast t < n/2 must indeed hold true and, as we shall
see in Section 4.4.5, this needs to be the case for Stage 1 of our protocol
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in order to propagate the fingerprint. However, in Stage 2, the set Gp can
hold t ≤ n/2 faulty nodes due to our results on the single-stream Bad Santa
problem.
Reliable Broadcast Along a Corridor: The presentation of our protocols
is limited to demonstrating reliable broadcast along a corridor of width 2r+1
moving along the positive y-coordinates. That is, we show reliable broadcast
for a node p(x, y) where −r ≤ x ≤ r and y ≥ 0. This greatly simplifies
the description of our results. Furthermore, it is easy to see that reliable
broadcast is possible along other corridors traversing the x-coordinates or
negative y-coordinates using a synchronization of sending and listening sim-
ilar to what we describe. The grid can be covered piece-wise with such
rectilinear corridors in a number of ways; for example, a spiral suffices (see
Figure 4.1). Alternatively, corridors can be appended in many other ways in
order to achieve propagation of a message depending on scenario in question.
In any event, proving reliable broadcast for this corridor is sufficient to prove
reliable broadcast for the grid in general.
4.4.5 Energy-Efficient Reliable Broadcast with Opti-
mal Tolerance
We describe our reliable broadcast protocol that tolerates fail-stop faults; the
proof is deferred until the end of Section 4.4.5 since it is subsumed by the
proof for the Byzantine case. The pseudocode below shows how broadcast can
be achieved along a corridor of width 2r+1, where −r ≤ x ≤ r, moving along
the positive y-coordinates. As mentioned earlier, restricting the movement in
this way greatly simplifies our presentation without sacrificing completeness.
Protocol for Fail-Stop Faults
We assume that the nodes in the network know the time slot when the
source node will broadcast a message. We will let tstart denote the time slot
at which the source sends out a message m. The source node located at (0,0)
broadcasts m at time slot tstart and all correct nodes in N(0, 0) are assumed
to receive m from the source and commit internally. Nodes in N(0, 0) then
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broadcast that they have committed to m for the next 2r consecutive rounds
during their respective allotted time slots.
In the context of our discussion from Section 2.1, we now describe how
each node p(x, y), for −r ≤ x ≤ r and y ≥ r + 1, listens for and sends
messages and, finally, how it broadcasts its committal. Let tq denote the
time slot when q is scheduled to broadcast in round tstart+ 2(y− r). Using tq
values, each node p creates an ordered set Sp ⊂ Gp where the elements of Sp
are chosen according to the (1, O(
√
n)) strategy for the Bad Santa problem.
Node p then awakens from the energy-efficient sleep mode and listens (in
order) to nodes in Sp in round tstart + 2(y − r). If at any point, p receives
a message, it commits to this message internally. During the course of the
protocol, node p also facilitates the passage of messages along the two-hop
paths. While node p has not committed internally, p listens to each sister
node u(x′′, y′′) in round tstart + 2(y
′′ − r) + 1. If p receives a message, then
p does the following: (1) commits internally to this message and (2) during
its assigned slots p broadcasts m for 2r consecutive rounds starting at round
tstart+2(y
′′−r)+2. Finally, in terms of sending, if at any time a node p(x, y)
has committed internally to a message in round tstart + 2(y − r) (i.e. used
the Bad Santa protocol to commit), p waits until round tstart + 2(y − r) + 1
and then broadcasts its message for 2r consecutive rounds during its assigned
time slots. Again, note that in the following pseudocode, each node p(x, y)
is such that −r ≤ x ≤ r and y ≥ 0.
Finally, we note that our protocol works not only in the case of fail-stop
faults, but for slightly more general failure models where a non-malicious
faulty sender might send messages that easily recognizable as being incorrect.
In such a “fail-safe system”, this kind of value failure is still tolerable by our
protocol.
Protocol for Byzantine Faults
Our protocol for the Byzantine fault model runs in two stages. In the first
stage, the source propagates a fingerprint f(m) of the message m it wants
to broadcast. This fingerprint is assumed to be of size at least lg2 |m| bits.
Propagation of f(m) is again done using the algorithm in [22]. The second
stage is very similar to the previous protocol for the fail-stop faults. In the
second stage, the source broadcasts the message m at time slot tstart and all
correct nodes inN(0, 0) are assumed to receivem from the source and commit
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internally. Each node q(x′, y′) ∈ N(0, 0) then broadcasts its commitment to
m over the next 2r consecutive rounds. A node p listens to messages from a
set Gp just as in the protocol for fail-stop model. The difference occurs when,
at any point a message m′ is received. Node p then checks f(m′) against the
fingerprint fmaj to which it committed in the first stage. If they match, p
commits to m′ internally and executes the broadcast instructions mentioned
previously.
We assume that the network alternates between the first stage, where
nodes are constantly awake, and the second stage, where nodes are achieving
significant energy savings. For instance, it is plausible that internal software
could synchronize periodic change-overs between these two stages in much
the same way that sensor network alternate periodically between sleep and
fully active states to conserve energy in practice. These details are outside
the scope of our work and we do not discuss them further.
Finally, note that a faulty node might broadcast an incorrect message
m′ such that |m′| > |m| where m is the correct message. To avoid com-
plications, we assume that nodes in the network know the size of m and,
therefore, can stop listening after receiving |m| bits. For instance, this could
be implemented by having the source broadcast the message size in the first
stage or having a predefined upper limit on messages size. The details of
such solutions would be dictated by context and we omit further discussion
of this issue.
We now establish the following preliminary lemma which we will need for
our protocols. For a source located at (x, y), label the set of nodes in the
corridor as Scor = Sx,cor ∪ Sy,cor where Sx,cor = {q(x′, y′) | (r + 1 ≤ x′ ≤ x) ∧
(y−r ≤ y′ ≤ y+r)} and Sy,cor = {q(x′, y′) | (−r ≤ x′ ≤ r)∧(0 ≤ y′ ≤ y+2r)}.
The coordinate (x, y) will always be clear from the context; indeed, in the
context of our proofs, we only deal with the location of the source with x = 0
and y = 0. Figure 4.2(a) illustrates a corridor for r = 3. Finally, recall that




n)) Reliable Broadcast for the Fail-Stop Fault Model
1. At time slot tstart, the source d(0, 0) does a one-time local broadcast
of m and each node in N(d) commits internally to m.
2. All nodes in N(0, 0) broadcast their commitment to m for the next
consecutive 2r rounds.
The following portion of the protocol is followed by all nodes
not in N(0, 0):
3. If node p(x, y) has committed internally to a message in round tstart+
2(y− r) (i.e. in Step 5), then p waits until round tstart + 2(y− r) + 1
and then broadcasts its message for 2r consecutive rounds during its
assigned time slots.
4. While node p(x, y) has not committed internally to a message, node
p listens to each sister node u(x′′, y′′) in round tstart + 2(y
′′ − r) + 1.
If p receives the message m from u, then p does the following: (1)
commits internally m and (2) during its assigned slots p broadcasts
m for 2r consecutive rounds starting at round tstart + 2(y
′′ − r) + 2.
5. While node p(x, y) has not committed internally to a message, p
does the following. For a node q ∈ Gp, let tq denote the time slot
when q is scheduled to broadcast in round tstart + 2(y− r). Using tq
values, node p creates an ordered set Sp ⊂ Gp where the elements of
Sp are chosen according to the (1,
√
n) Bad Santa strategy. Then p
does the following:
• Node p(x, y) listens to q ∈ Sp in round tstart+2(y−r). If at any
point p receives a message m, then p commits to m internally,
breaks the for-loop and proceeds to Step 3.
The following Lemma 22 is useful for our Byzantine-tolerant protocols.
In particular, it provides an analysis of the previous protocol in [22] with
the minor modification that a node waits for the (at most) two messages


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4.1: The source is denoted by the shaded node which has location
(0, 0). (A) Movement in the positive y direction establishing a (2r + 1) ×
(2r + 1) square of committed nodes above N(0, 0); this is the corridor we
explicitly address in the proofs of correctness for our protocols. (B) Spiraling
out from N(0, 0), movement in the negative x direction and then the negative
y direction. (C) Further depiction of the spiral expansion of committed nodes
along a corridor of width 2r + 1.
result to address the necessary delay between Stage 1, where a fingerprint is
propagated, and Stage 2 of our protocol, when the full message is sent. Note
that in Lemma 22, we deal with arbitrary x and y values.
Lemma 22. Assume a broadcast schedule where no collisions occur and each
node can broadcast once every round as discussed in Section 4.1.1. Consider
a source, d(0, 0), that broadcasts a fingerprint f(m) at time slot t0 under
either the fail-stop or Byzantine fault models where t < r
2
(2r + 1). Then by
using the protocol of [22], node p(x, y) is able to commit to f(m) by round
t0 + 2(|x|+ |y|).
Proof. We are essentially following the argument for correctness given in [22]
and discussed in Section 2.1; however, we are restricting our view to those
nodes in Scor. That is, nodes in Scor will only accept messages from other
nodes in Scor and they will ignore all messages they receive from nodes outside
the corridor. Clearly, this can only result in a slowdown in the propagation of
the broadcast value; moreover, the rectilinear shape of the corridor can only
slow down the rate of propagation in comparison to the original propagation
described in [22]. An argument identical to that in [22] can be used to show
that each correct node q(x′, y′) ∈ Scor will commit to the correct fingerprint
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by receiving messages along at least 2t + 1 node disjoint paths of the form
(ui, q) and (ui, u
′
i, q) as shown in Figure 4.2(a). While we do not repeat the
entire argument here, Figure 4.2(b) illustrates the set Gp for each node p in
a row of the corridor along increasing y-values. That is, the regions Ap, Bp
and B′p are illustrated for each position in the context of the proof discussed
in Section 2.1.
We now consider the time required until p(x, y) can commit to f(m) re-
gardless of which nodes in the corridor fail; p does so by listening to the nodes
in Gp. Without loss of generality, assume that x, y are positive coordinates
and that the broadcast first moves along nodes in Sy,cor (moving up) and
then along nodes in Sx,cor (moving right). At t0, the source broadcasts f(m)
and all nodes in N(0, 0) commit to f(m). Consider a node q(a, r + 1) where
−r ≤ a ≤ r. It takes at most one round for q to receive messages along paths
of the form (ui, q) from region A. Concurrently, in this one round, nodes ui
can transmit messages to nodes u′i along paths of the form (ui, u
′
i, q) (region
B to B′) where the heard messages from the (at most) two sister nodes are
appended in a single message. At most an additional round is required to
send from nodes ui to q. Therefore, at most two rounds are required before q
can commit. Note that this holds for all nodes with coordinates (a, r+ 1) for
−r ≤ a ≤ r; this entire row can commit after at most two rounds. It follows
that all nodes up to and including row y in Sy,cor are committed to f(m)
after t0 + 2(y+ r) rounds; the remaining r rows in Sy,cor do not commit. An
identical argument shows that all nodes in Sx,cor are committed to f(m) after
t0 +2(x−r) rounds. Therefore, p commits after at most t0 +2(x+y) rounds;




n)) Reliable Broadcast for the Byzantine Fault Model
Stage 1:
1. At time t0, the source uses the reliable broadcast protocol of [22] to
broadcast the fingerprint f(m) to all nodes in the grid.
Stage 2:
2. At time slot tstart, the source d(0, 0) does a one-time local broadcast
of m and each node in N(d) commits internally to m.
3. All nodes in N(0, 0) broadcast their committal to m for the next
consecutive 2r rounds.
The following portion of the protocol is followed by all nodes not in
N(0, 0):
4. If node p(x, y) has committed internally to a message in round tstart+
2(y− r) (i.e. in Step 6), p waits until round tstart + 2(y− r) + 1 and
then broadcasts its message for 2r consecutive rounds during its
assigned time slots.
5. While node p(x, y) has not committed internally to a message, node
p listens to each sister node u(x′′, y′′) in round tstart+2(y
′′−r)+1. If
the message mu that p receives from u equals the majority fingerprint
value, fmaj, then p does the following: (1) commits internally mu
and (2) during its assigned slots p broadcasts mu for 2r consecutive
rounds starting at round tstart + 2(y
′′ − r) + 2.
6. While node p(x, y) has not committed internally to a message, p
does the following. For a node q ∈ Gp, let tq denote the time slot
when q is scheduled to broadcast in round tstart + 2(y− r). Using tq
values, node p creates an ordered set Sp ⊂ Gp where the elements of
Sp are chosen according to the (1,
√
n) Bad Santa strategy. Then p
does the following:
• Node p(x, y) listens to q ∈ Sp in round tstart + 2(y − r). In
listening to each q, p will obtain a value mq (or nothing, if q
is Byzantine and sends nothing). If at any point f(mq) equals
the fmaj value of p, then p commits to mq internally, breaks the
for-loop and proceeds to Step 4.
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The next lemma proves that, if we assume that the adversary cannot cause
a collision with fmaj, then each node can commit to the correct message
using our protocol. In particular, it establishes that the second stage of our
protocol achieves the 2t + 1 connectedness necessary for reliable broadcast.
The lemma also establishes that the broadcasting and receiving actions by
each node are correct. Finally, the resource costs per node for Stage 2 follow
immediately. Note that this stops short of proving Theorem 9 since the
issue of fingerprints has not yet been addressed. While we include it for
completeness, we stress that the 2t+1 connectedness component of the proof
is essentially an adaptation of the proof found in [22] which was reviewed in
the beginning of Section 2.1. Again, the proof focuses on movement along
the positive y-coordinates along a corridor of width 2r+1 where −r ≤ x ≤ r.
Figure 4.3 illustrates how our protocol proceeds when r = 3.
Lemma 23. Assume a broadcast schedule where no collisions occur and each
node can broadcast once every round as discussed in Section 4.1.1. Further-
more, assume each node already possesses fmaj prior to receiving any other
messages and that if a message m received by a correct node p corresponds to
the fingerprint fmaj propagated in the first step, then m is the correct mes-
sage. Under these assumptions, the (1, O(
√
n)) Reliable Broadcast for the
Byzantine Fault Model protocol has the following properties:
• Each node p(x, y) where −r ≤ x ≤ r (except those on the boundary of
width r if the grid is finite) commits to the correct message m by round
max{2(y − r), 0}.
• Each node is awake for O(
√
n) time slots in expectation. Each node
sends and receives O(
√
n|m|) bits in expectation.
Proof. For simplicity, we normalize such that tstart is round 0. Our proof is
by induction and throughout we assume that each node has an x-coordinate
such that −r ≤ x ≤ r:
Base Case: Each node in N(0, 0) commits to the correct message m im-
mediately upon hearing it directly from the dealer. Therefore, each node














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4.2: Let p be a node that is not at the boundary of width r in the
grid. (a) A depiction of a corridor for r = 3. Together the nodes in region E
and F constitute Sy,cor while the nodes in G constitute Sx,cor. Node disjoint
paths of the form (ui, q) originate from nodes ui in region A. As discussed
in [21, 22], node disjoint paths of the form (ui, u
′
i, q) originate from nodes ui
in region B and traverse through nodes u′i in B
′ to reach node q. (b) The
regions A, B and B′ are illustrated for each node along a row of Sy,cor. The
value for z is given for each position in the context of the proof reviewed in
Section 2.1.
Induction Hypothesis: For simplicity, we will assume as before that p ∈
N(a, b+ 1) where −r ≤ a ≤ r; the other cases for proving the statement for
p ∈ (a, b) follow by symmetry. In this context, the induction hypothesis is as
follows: if each p′(x′, y′) ∈ N(a, b) has committed to m by round 2(y′ − r),
then each correct node p(x, y) ∈ N(a, b + 1) − N(a, b) is able to commit to
m by round 2(y − r).
Induction Step: As we reviewed before in the beginning of Section 2.1 of
Chapter 2, we show 2t + 1 connectedness in a single neighborhood. We will
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argue simultaneously about the time required for p to hear messages along
these disjoint paths. The node p(x, y) lies in N(a, b + 1) − N(a, b) and can
be considered to have location (a − r + z, b + r + 1) where 0 ≤ z ≤ r (the
case for r + 1 ≤ z ≤ 2r follows by symmetry). We demonstrate that there
exist r(2r + 1) node-disjoint paths P1, ..., Pr(2r+1) all lying within the same
neighborhood and that the synchronization prescribed by our protocol is
correct:
• One-Hop Paths: the set of nodes Ap = {q(x, y) | (a − r) ≤ x ≤
(a+ z) and (b+ 1) ≤ y ≤ (b+ r)} lie in N(a, b) and are neighbors of p.
Therefore, there are r(r+z+1) paths of the form q → p where q ∈ Ap.
By their position relative to p(x, y), each correct node q(x′, y′) ∈ Ap is
such that y − r ≤ y′ ≤ y − 1. Therefore, by the induction hypothesis,
a correct node q ∈ Ap commits in round 2(y − 2r) at the earliest and
2(y − r − 1) at the latest. Consequently, a correct node in Ap starts
broadcasting its committals in round 2(y − 2r) + 1 at the earliest and
2(y−r−1)+1 at the latest. In the former case, recall that broadcasting
occurs for 2r rounds, which means that q is broadcasting from round
2(y− 2r) + 1 to 2(y− r), inclusive, at the earliest. In the latter case, q
is broadcasting from 2(y − r− 1) + 1 to 2(y − 1), inclusive. Therefore,
all correct nodes in Ap are broadcasting a committal message in round
2(y− r) and so p(x, y) can receive a message from each correct node in
Ap in this round.
• Two-Hop Paths: consider the sets Bp = {q(x, y) | (a+ z + 1) ≤ x ≤
(a+ r) and (b+ 1) ≤ y ≤ (b+ r)} and B′p = {q′(x, y) | (a+ z+ 1− r) ≤
x ≤ (a) and (b+ r+ 1) ≤ y ≤ (b+ 2r)}. The nodes in Bp lie in N(a, b)
while the nodes in B′p lie in N(p). Moreover, the set B
′
p is obtained by
shifting left by r units and up by r units. Recall that there is a one-to-
one mapping between the nodes in Bp and the nodes in B
′
p; these are
sister nodes. There are r(r − z) paths of the form q → q′ → p.
Consider a correct node q(x′, y′) ∈ Bp and its sister node q′(x′′, y′′) ∈
B′p. Again, given the location of q(x
′, y′) relative to p(x, y), by the
induction hypothesis, the earliest q ∈ N(a, b) has committed is 2(y −
2r) and the latest is 2(y − r − 1). Therefore, by protocol, q starts
broadcasting its committal 2r times starting in round 2(y − 2r) + 1
at the earliest and 2(y − r − 1) + 1 at the latest. The sister node
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of q, q′ ∈ B′p, listens to q in the first round that q broadcasts. If
q′ receives a correct m, then q′ broadcasts this 2r times; therefore,
this starts in round 2(y − 2r) + 2 = 2(y − 2r + 1) at the earliest and
2(y− r− 1) + 2 = 2(y− r) at the latest. In the former case, recall that
q′ broadcasts for 2r consecutive rounds and therefore is broadcasting
until round 2(y− r+ 1)− 1 > 2(y− r). Therefore, all correct nodes in
B′p with a message to broadcast are doing so in round 2(y − r) and so
p(x, y) can hear a message from any such q′ ∈ B′p in this round.
Therefore, there are a total of r(r + z + 1) + r(r − z) = r(2r + 1) node-
disjoint paths from N(a, b) to PN(a, b), all lying in in a single neighborhood
N(a, b + r + 1). By our argument above, each correct node p(x, y) receives
the one-hop and two-hop messages over these paths by round 2(y − r). We
note that (1) more than half of these paths will provide the correct message
and (2) the sampling follows the Bad Santa protocol which is a Las Vegas
algorithm. Therefore, we are guaranteed that p will obtain a message m that
corresponds to fmaj. Finally, by our initial assumption regarding the inability
of the adversary to forge a collision, this means that m is the correct message.
We now analyze the resource bounds for our protocol. Consider the situa-
tions where p must deal with (either broadcasting or receiving) a message:
(1) p receives messages in order to commit, (2) p broadcasts it has com-
mitted, and (3) p facilitates two-hop messages. We consider each case. To
address (1), note that p uses the Bad Santa protocol; while in the stream-
ing problem, we attempt to obtain a 1 at unit cost per query, here node
p is attempting to select a correct node at the cost of listening to |m| bits
per selection.3 This method of sampling from Gp means p receives O(
√
n)
messages in expectation. To address (2), note that p broadcasts that it has
committed 2r = O(
√
n) times. To address (3), we consider p ∈ PN(a, b+ 1)
as before, and note that p belongs to many B′q sets for different nodes q; how-
ever, regardless of which B′q set, p only ever has two sister nodes. Therefore,
considering broadcast along the x and y coordinates, the number of sister
nodes is O(1); the number of broadcasts due to two-hop paths is thus O(r).
In conclusion (not counting the fingerprint, since we are dealing only with
3Selecting a random node is necessary; if not, the adversary might have faulty nodes
send correct fingerprints in the first round and, if p selects nodes from Gp in a deterministic















































































































































































Listen [6] Send [2,8]
Send [2,8]Listen [6]
Listen [1] Send [2,8]
& Listen[6] Send[7,12]
(B)
Figure 4.3: A depiction of the (1, O(
√
n)) Reliable Broadcast for the Byzan-
tine Fault Model protocol for r = 3. Times for broadcasting and receiving
are denoted by [a, b] which denotes rounds a through b inclusive. (A) Shows
how a node p in row 4 can commit by listening to nodes in Gp = Ap ∪ B′p;
we focus on nodes on the left-most edge. Note the node in row 4 marked
with horizontal lines. This node acts as part of B′p while also committing as
other nodes in row 4 do; later, it will act as a node in B′i and Aj for other
nodes i and j by sending in rounds [3, 8]. Note that this node is sending from
round 2 to 8 (inclusive) but we separate this into [2, 8] and [3, 8] to make the
different roles explicit. (B) and (C) Depictions of the timing of broadcasting
and receiving as nodes in rows 5 and 6 commit, respectively.
the second stage of our protocol) each node is awake for O(
√
n) time slots in
expectation, sends O(
√




With Lemma 22 and Lemma 23 in hand, we can now give the proof for
Theorem 4:
Proof. We begin by proving correctness and we start with Stage 1. Stage 1
of the protocol is no different than the broadcast presented in [22] where the
value being transmitted is a fingerprint. Consequently, every correct node
will be able to derive a majority fingerprint fmaj.
We now analyze Stage 2. Lemma 23 assumes that (1) we have an appropriate
schedule, (2) each node has fmaj prior to receiving any other messages, and
(3) if m corresponds to fmaj then m is correct. We go about addressing these
three criteria:
• First, we can assume the schedule of [90] which satisfies the properties
required by Lemma 23.
• Second, consider all nodes in a square of size 3(2r+1)×3(2r+1) centered
about (0, 0); the node at the top-right has position (3r+ 1, 3r+ 1). By
selecting tstart at least 2(6r+ 2) rounds after the time of sending of the
fingerprint, t0 (that is tstart ≥ t0+2(6r+2)), then Lemma 22 guarantees
that by time tstart, all nodes in a square of size 3(2r + 1) × 3(2r + 1)
centered about (0, 0) will have committed to the fingerprint. If we
assume, as mentioned earlier prior to presenting the pseudocode, that
the message expands via a spiral corridor of width 2r+ 1 from N(0, 0),
then this guarantees that the propagation of the fingerprint will always
be sufficiently far ahead of the propagation of the full message to allow
nodes to first commit to the fingerprint. Note that if m is propagated
in a different fashion (i.e. not a spiral) then the timing offset would
need to be adjusted accordingly.
• Third, by assumption, f is a secure hash function and the size of the
fingerprint is lg2 |m|. Therefore, given f(x), the probability that the
adversary obtains a value x′ 6= x such that f(x′) = f(x) is 2− lg2 |m| =
|m|− lg |m|. It will take the adversary superpolynomial time in |m| to
forge such an x′ and so fmaj will correspond to the correct value m.
Recall that s is the number of computational steps afforded to the ad-
versary; i.e. the number of times the adversary can create an input
x′, apply f to x′ and check for a match between the output fingerprint
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f(x′) and fmaj. Therefore, given that p receives a message from a cor-
rect node in Gp that when hashed matches the fingerprint to which p
committed, with error O(s/|m|lg |m|), this message is the correct mes-
sage sent by the source where s is the number of computational steps
available to the adversary.
Finally, we analyze resource costs. Lemma 23 confirms the amount of awake
time specified by Theorem 9 after the sending of the fingerprint. Regard-
ing the bit complexity over both Stages 1 and 2, we need to consider the
additional cost due to sending the fingerprint. Each node p broadcasts
and receives O(r2) = O(n) fingerprints, for a total of O(n log2 |m|) bits




The above proof essentially subsumes the proof for Theorem 3; however, we
include it here for completeness:
Proof. The proof of correctness for the fail-stop model differs in two places
from the proof of Theorem 4. For criteria (2), there is no need for a fin-
gerprint. For criteria (3), since messages are never corrupted, only lost if
a fault occurs, p is guaranteed that the message it receives from a correct
q ∈ Gp is correct. Finally, for the fail-stop model, the resource costs are easy
to analyze. The awake times due to listening follow directly from the fact
that each node broadcasts O(
√
n) times and uses the Bad Santa problem for
listening; therefore, a total of O(
√
n) time slots in expectation. In terms of
bit complexity, each node p broadcasts |m| for r rounds times and listens to
m once. Therefore, p broadcasts O(
√
n|m|) bits and receives |m| bits.
It may seem that, with some modifications to the protocol, we can employ
a multi-stream Bad Santa strategy to achieve further expected savings. We
now explain why this is not the case. Note that such a change would require
each node to send O(r · k · |m|) bits while reducing the expected listening
cost to O(k · |m|). However, since the costs for sending and receiving are of
the same magnitude, we do not achieve an overall asymptotic savings when
we consider the addition of these two communication costs. That is, the
O(r · k · |m|+ k · |m|) expected cost we would obtain with the multi-stream
Bad Santa strategy is no better (asymptotically) than the O(r|m|) expected
cost we already achieve with the single-stream Bad Santa strategy.
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The impediment here is that, in order to tolerate the optimal number of
faults, the propagation of m must proceed incrementally row-by-row up the
corridor; this necessitates the r factor that appears in our analysis. We will
see in the next section that, if we incur a small decrease in the number of
faults we can tolerate, we can achieve further energy savings.
Finally, we comment on the difference in running time between our al-
gorithms for the fail-stop and Byzantine fault models. Clearly, the need to
propagate a fingerprint in the Byzantine case incurs additional time. How-
ever, as we have seen, the dealer need wait only 2(6r+2) rounds after sending
the fingerprint before broadcasting the full message.
4.4.6 Energy-Efficient Reliable Broadcast with Near-
Optimal Fault Tolerance
When t ≤ (1−ε) r
2
(2r+1) for any constant ε > 0, we show how to achieve even
larger energy savings by employing the (k + 1, O(log(k) (n/2) + k)) strategy
to the Bad Santa problem for k ≥ 1. As we will show, a correct node may
listen to at least (r/2)(2r + 1) messages, of which a (1− ε)-fraction may be
faulty; therefore, we are now allowing more than a 1/2 fraction of paths to
deliver faulty messages. We point out that, in actuality, our results hold for
t ≤ (1−ε)(1+r+r2) which is larger than (1−ε)(r/2)(2r+1) by an amount of
(1− ε)(1 + r/2). However, asymptotically, this difference is negligible and we
phrase the result in this manner to illustrate that we are within an arbitrary
constant fraction of the optimal tolerance.
In this case, we present a Byzantine fault-tolerant reliable broadcast pro-
tocol.The protocol is very similar to our (1, O(
√
n)) Reliable Broadcast for
the Byzantine Fault Model presented in Section 4.4.5 where here we use the
(k+ 1, O(log(k) (n) + k)) strategy; however, there are important distinctions.
In particular, the sets Ap, B
′
p and Bp are defined in a slightly different manner
in the correctness proof for our protocol later on. Furthermore, each node
broadcasts for O(k) (rather than r) consecutive rounds and the synchroniza-
tion of broadcasting and receiving is altered. Essentially, r rows of a corridor
are committing every k+ 2 rounds; this is different from the previous proto-
cols where each row committed in a different round. The pseudocode is given
below and, again, deals with movement along the positive y-coordinates.
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(k + 1, O(log(k) (n) + k)) Reliable Broadcast for the Byzantine
Fault Model
Stage 1:
1. At time slot t0, the source uses the reliable broadcast protocol of [22]
to broadcast the fingerprint f(m) to all nodes in the grid.
Stage 2:
2. At time slot tstart, the source d(0, 0) does a one-time local broadcast
of m and each node in N(d) commits internally to m.
3. All nodes in N(0, 0) broadcast their committal to m for the next
consecutive k + 2 rounds.
The following is followed by all nodes not in N(0, 0):
4. If node p(x, y) has committed internally to a message via listening
to a set Sp,i for i = 0, ..., k (i.e. Step 6), node p uses its allotted time
slot to broadcast this fact for k+ 2 consecutive rounds; that is, from













5. While node p(x, y) has not committed to a message, node p listens





+ 1. If the message
mu that p receives from u equals the fmaj value, then p does the
following: (1) commits internally mu and (2) during its assigned














6. While node p(x, y) has not committed internally to a message, p does
the following. For a node q ∈ Gp, let tq denote the time slot when





+ 2. Using tq
values, node p creates ordered sets Sp,0, ..., Sp,k where Sp,i ⊂ Gp for
i = 0, ..., k where the elements of each Sp,i are chosen according to
the (k+1, O(log(k) (n)+k)) Bad Santa strategy. Then for i = 0, ..., k,
p does the following:
• Node p(x, y) listens to each node q ∈ Sp,i for k + 1 consecutive













. If at any point q receives a message mq
such that f(mq) equals the fmaj value of p, then p commits to
mq internally, breaks the for-loop and proceeds to Step 4.
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From the point of view of each correct node, the streams are arriving consec-
utively; there is no interleaving of the streams. The protocol is involved, and
to avoid possible confusion, we draw attention to the fact that nodes acting
as members of Ap sets broadcast for k+2 times, even though the correspond-
ing Bad Santa protocol uses k+1 streams. This is because of the extra delay
of one round incurred by the two-hop messages; we note that nodes in B′p
sets that facilitate these messages broadcast for k + 1 consecutive rounds.
The correctness of this protocol can be demonstrated in a similar fashion to
the preceding protocols; however, there is a difference in that now the proof
deals with all nodes in r rows rather than a single row. Figure 4.4 illustrates
how this protocol proceeds when r = 3 and k = 3. For completeness, we
establish Theorem 11; we again only consider movement along the positive
y-coordinates.
Proof. The proof is again by induction and, for simplicity, we assume tstart =
0 and we again assume that each node in the corridor has an x-coordinate
such that −r ≤ x ≤ r. We show 2t + 1 connectedness inside a single neigh-











Base Case: Each node in N(0, 0) commits to the correct message m imme-
diately upon hearing it directly from the dealer; that is, by round 0.
Induction Hypothesis: Rather than dealing with nodes in p ∈ N(a, b+ 1)−N(a, b),
our proof differs in that we address all nodes in in p ∈ N(a, b+ r)−N(a, b)
i.e. all nodes in the r rows above row b and for simplicity we will assume
b > 0 (we do not deal with the nodes in N(0, 0)) and that −r ≤ a ≤ r. In
particular, the induction hypothesis is as follows: if each node p′(x′, y′) in





























& Listen [12,15] Send [16,20]
Send [6,10]
Listen [1] Send [2,5]
(0,0)
(C)
Send [11,15] Send [11,15]
Listen [11] Send [12,15]Send [16,20]Listen [12,15]
Send [11,15]
Send [7,10]
Figure 4.4: A depiction of the (k+1, O(log(k) (n)+k)) Reliable Broadcast for
the Byzantine Fault Model protocol for r = 3 and k = 3. Times for broad-
casting and receiving are denoted by [a, b] which denotes rounds a through b
inclusive. (A) Shows how all nodes in rows 4, 5, and 6 commit; we focus on
nodes along the leftmost edge. Node p1 along the edge in row 4 can commit
by listening to all nodes in Gp = Ap∪B′p. In contrast, p3 in row 6 can sample
from only the top row in Ap, which consists of r + 1 nodes, and all of B
′
p,
which consists of r2 nodes; therefore, p3 can sample from 1+r+r
2 nodes. (B)
and (C) Depictions of the timing of broadcasting and receiving as nodes in
rows 7, 8, 9 and, subsequently, nodes in rows 10, 11, 12 commit, respectively.
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Induction Step: We show 2t+ 1 connectedness and simultaneously prove the
correctness of the timing for broadcasting and receiving. The node p(x, y) lies
in N(a, b+ r)−N(a, b) and can be considered to have location (a− r+ z, b+
r+ 1 + c) where 0 ≤ z ≤ r (the case for r+ 1 ≤ z ≤ 2r follows by symmetry)
and 0 ≤ c ≤ r − 1. We demonstrate that there exist at least 1 + r + r2
node-disjoint paths P1, ..., P1+r+r2 all lying within the same neighborhood
and that the synchronization prescribed by our protocol is correct. As we
mentioned previously, the sets Ap, B
′
p and Bp are defined slightly differently
than previously; they are defined below in our proof and Figure 4.5 depicts
these sets.
• One-Hop Paths: the set of nodes Ap = {q(x, y) | (a − r) ≤ x ≤
a and (b+ 1 + c) ≤ y ≤ (b+ r)} lie in N(a, b+ r+ 1). Therefore, node
p(a− r+ z, b+ r+ 1 + c) can receive broadcasts from nodes in at least
r − c ≥ 1 row(s) of Ap which amounts to at least r + 1 nodes.
Consider a correct node q(x′, y′) in the r rows b+ 1, ..., b+ r of N(a, b)
and recall p(x, y) is in some row b + r + 1, ..., b + 2r. The induction
hypothesis guarantees that q has committed by round (k+2)(by′−r−1
r
c+
1) = (k + 2)(by−r−1
r
c). Then, by the protocol, q broadcasts for k + 2
consecutive rounds; that is, from round (k + 2)(by−r−1
r
c) + 1 to round
(k+2)(by−r−1
r
c)+k+2, inclusive. Node p is scheduled to begin listening
in round (k+ 2)(by−r−1
r
c) + 2 and so p can receive a message from each
such q for k + 1 consecutive rounds. Therefore, p hears all one-hop
messages by round (k + 2)(by−r−1
r
c+ 1)
• Two-Hop Paths: consider the sets Bp = {q(x, y) | (a + 1) ≤ x ≤
(a+ r) and (b+ 1) ≤ y ≤ (b+ r)} and B′p = {q′(x, y) | (a− r+ z+ 1) ≤
x ≤ (a+ z) and (b+ r+ 1− c) ≤ y ≤ (b+ 2r)}. The nodes in Bp form
an r × r square within N(a, b) while the nodes in B′p, again an r × r
square, lie in the neighborhood N(a, b+ r + 1). Note that now the set
B′p is no longer necessarily obtained by shifting left by r units and up
by r units; now it is obtained by shifting left by r − z units and up by
r units. There is still a one-to-one mapping between the nodes in Bp
and the nodes in B′p; these are sister nodes. There are r
2 paths of the
form q → q′ → p.
From the point of view of p(x, y), consider a correct node q(x′, y′) ∈ Bp.














































Figure 4.5: The sets Api , B
′
pi
and Bpi for i = 1, 2, 3 and r = 3. (A) For the
node p1 with a y-coordinate such that y mod r = 1, the sets are defined the
same way. (B) Node p2 has an Ap2 set which consists only of the two top
rows of Ap1 . (C) Node p3 has an Ap3 set which consists only of the top row
of Ap1 .





protocol, its sister node q′ ∈ B′p listened at the first of these time slots;
hence, q′ can receive a message from q in round (k + 2)(by−r−1
r
c) +
1. If q′ received a correct m, then q′ would broadcast m starting in
round (k + 2)(by−r−1
r
c) + 2 for k + 1 consecutive rounds. Therefore, q′
broadcasts a correct message from round (k+ 2)(by−r−1
r
c) + 2 to round
(k + 2)(by−r−1
r
c) + k + 2 = (k + 2)(by−r−1
r
c+ 1) (inclusive). Node p is
scheduled to begin listening in round (k+ 2)(by−r−1
r
c) + 2 and so p can
receive a message from each such q′ ∈ B′p for k+ 1 consecutive rounds.
Therefore, p hears all two-hop messages by round (k + 2)(by−r−1
r
c+ 1)
Given our timing analysis above, we point out that, from p’s point of view,
the messages from 1-hop and 2-hop paths arrive in the same round for each
of the k+ 1 rounds starting at round (k+ 2)(by−r−1
r
c) + 2; therefore, we have
k + 1 streams necessary for using our multi-hop Bad Santa strategy.
We have shown that there are at least 1 + r + r2 node-disjoint paths
from N(a, b) to node p, all lying in in a single neighborhood N(a, b+ r+ 1).
Furthermore, we have shown that any correct node p(x, y) can hear all one-
hop and two-hop messages by round (k+2)(by−r−1
r
c+1). Node p can sample
these messages over k + 1 rounds and, since the O(log(k) (n) + k) Bad Santa
strategy is used for selecting Sp,i, node p is guaranteed to receive a correct
message. This completes the induction.
In terms of resource bounds, we can again consider the situations where
p must deal with (either broadcasting or receiving) a message: (1) p receives
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messages in order to commit, (2) p broadcasts it has committed, and (3) p
facilitates a two-hop message. We consider each case. To address (1), by
the Bad Santa protocol, p listens to O(log(k) n+ k) messages in expectation.
To address (2), note that p broadcasts that it has committed k + 2 = O(k)
times. To address (3), we note that p belongs to many B′q sets for different
nodes q; however, regardless of which B′q set, p only ever has at most two
sister nodes. Therefore, considering broadcast along the x and y coordinates,
the number of sister nodes is O(1); the number of broadcasts due to two-hop
paths messages is thus O(k). The same arguments regarding fingerprints as
given in the proof of Theorem 9 apply here which concludes the proof. This
leads each node being awake over O(log(k) n+ k) time slots in expectation in
Stage 2. Over both stages, each node sends O(n log2 |m| + k|m|) bits, and
listens to an expected O(n log2 |m|+ (log(k) n)|m|) bits.
4.4.7 Unknown Start Time and Source(s)
In our previous protocols, both the source of the message and the time the
message was sent out needed to be pre-established. Furthermore, our previous
protocol allowed a savings on the fraction of required awake time only in
Stage 2. The new protocol we present here assumes that every 2r + 1 by
2r + 1 square contains t < n
16+ε
faults. Specifically, we require that no more
than a 1/2 − ε fraction of the nodes are faulty nodes in any r/2 by r/2
square. The benefits of this protocol are that it is 1) more energy efficient
than using the protocol of [22]; 2) avoids the need to have the source and
sending time pre-specified; and 3) reduces the awake time over the entire
execution. Therefore, this algorithm is preferable when the circumstances of
the fault model permit.





square in the grid. Our al-
gorithm relies on correctly transmitting a message m from Qi−1 to Qi where
Qi−1 and Qi are disjoint and neighboring squares i.e. the squares are neigh-
bors abutting each other. Critical to our algorithm is an assignment of nodes
in Qi−1 to nodes in Qi. This assignment can be viewed as an undirected bi-
partite graph with the two disjoint sets of vertices being Qi−1 and Qi and the
assignment represented via edges. For p ∈ Qi−1 and q ∈ Qi, p listens to q and
q listens to p if and only if there is an edge between p and q in the bipartite
graph. This assignment is constructed such that all but a small fraction of
correct nodes in Qi receive a majority of correct messages from correct nodes
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in Qi−1 (and vice versa). This allows correct nodes in Qi to majority filter
on the messages they receive and decide upon the correct message. Thus, a









a message m and for any square Qi to which m is sent by the above protocol,
let G(Qi,m) be the set of correct nodes in Qi that receive m after majority
filtering over the accepted messages as described above. A result in [135]
establishes the following theorem which we state without proof:
Theorem 13. For any pair of squares Qi−1 and Qi, there is non-zero prob-
ability of an assignment between nodes in Qi−1 and nodes in Qi with the
following properties:
• the degree of each node is at most a constant C which is independent
of r,
• if |G(Qi−1,m)| ≥ (1/2 + ε/2)|Qi−1|, then |G(Qi,m)| ≥ (1/2 + ε/2)|Qi|.
We will refer to an assignment with the two properties stated in Theorem 13
as a robust assignment. Although a method of assignment is not specified,
Theorem 13 guarantees that a robust assignment must exist. We now con-
sider the problem of find such an assignment.
Corollary 2. A robust assignment between squares Qi−1 and Qi can be found
in time that is exponential in r2.
Proof. Consider any assignment between squares Qi−1 and Qi as a bipartite
graph G as described above. Both Qi−1 and Qi have constant size d =
r2
4
so the number of possible bipartite graphs is at most 2d × 2d = 22d. Note
that this is an upper bound on the number of different ways in which the
faulty nodes can be placed in G. We know by Theorem 13 that there is non-
zero probability that edges between Qi−1 and Qi satisfy the property that
a (3/4 − ε)-fraction of the nodes in Qi have a majority of correct neighbors
in Qi−1. Consider each of the at most 2
2d possible configurations of faulty
nodes. For each such configuration, check whether all correct nodes in Qi
have at least a (3/4−ε) fraction of correct neighbors in Qi−1. By Theorem 5,
such a configuration must exist and can be found by this exhaustive search
which requires examining at most 22d = 4(r
2/4) graphs.
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Therefore, for r = Θ(1), following the above procedure in Corollary 2 yields
a robust assignment in constant time. Alternatively, a random regular graph
will induce a desired assignment with probability at least 1− 1/rc for some
constant c > 0. Recall that each node is assigned to C neighbors where C is
independent of r. Therefore, for a sufficiently large value r = Θ(1), nodes are
listening to a small fraction of a square. Finally, we note that it is sufficient
to find one robust assignment and use it for all pairs Qi−1 and Qi.
Protocol Using Robust Assignment
We now describe and argue the correctness of a simple algorithm for reliable
broadcast which we call Alg. Alg operates in stages of η = r2/4 rounds.
We again assume the presence of a global broadcast schedule so that message
collisions do not occur. Over all rounds, each node that has committed to
a message will broadcast at its scheduled slot. At every ηth round, a node
enters into the listening state for one full round. That is, during this ηth





round. At the end of this round, if a node p has received an identical message
from a majority of nodes in its (2r + 1)× (2r + 1) square, p commits to this
message.
For all other η− 1 rounds in a stage, a node sends and listens as dictated
by a robust assignment and the broadcast schedule. That is, a node p listens
to node q 1) if and only if p and q are assigned to each other under the robust
assignment; and 2) when q is scheduled to broadcast. A robust assignment
can be found as stated in Corollary 2 prior to deploying the sensor network
and this assignment can be preprogrammed into the nodes and used for all
pairs of squares. Any node p may act as a source node. In this case, the
source node will broadcast its message to its r/2 × r/2 square in its time
slot in an ηth round when all nodes are awake; the message should include a
declaration that p is acting as a source. As in [21, 22, 24, 90], every node in
the source’s square commits to m and proceeds to broadcast m during their









square by sending and listening according to the
robust assignment in a deterministic fashion: a square sends to the squares
above and below and to the left and the right, in that order; Figure 4.6
illustrates this. Communication from one square to an adjacent square can
be accomplished with a single round used per direction. Note that if η is
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not divisible by 4, then we simply interrupt on the special ηth round, and
continue with the next direction afterwards. Therefore, a correct node will
know this order and listen to its adjacent squares using the corresponding
robust assignment in accordance with the broadcast schedule. As before,
we may assume that the partitioning of the network into squares and the
ordering and synchronization issues are dealt with through the nodes’ internal
programming; these details are outside the scope of this work. The exact
propagation of a message depends on the robust assignment used and the
behaviour of the faulty nodes; however, we can show correctness for the task
of reliable broadcast.
By Theorem 13, at least a (1/2 + ε/2) fraction of correct nodes in every
square will eventually receive identical messages from the majority of nodes
to which it has been assigned. At this point, such a correct node can commit
to a message and begin broadcasting, again according to its robust assign-
ment and scheduled time slots. Finally, we address the remaining fraction
of correct nodes in a r/2 × r/2 square that may not be able to commit to
a message. Recall that at every ηth time slot, all nodes are listening for the
entire round. Assuming that a (1/2 + ε/2)-fraction of the correct nodes in
the square have committed to the correct message, this allows the remaining
fraction of correct nodes in a square to majority filter on incoming messages
during this round and commit to the correct message.
In terms of costs, note that each node is always listening to at most C
time slots in each of η − 1 rounds and listening to r2/4 time slots in the ηth
round; a total cost of C(η − 1) + r2/4 over η rounds. Therefore, each node
sends O(|m|) bits per round and has an amortized cost of O(C) time slots
per round and an amortized cost of O(C|m|) bits per round. Since C is a
constant, this establishes our claims in Theorem 5.
4.4.8 Practical Considerations
We finish off this section by remarking on more practical considerations re-
garding our protocols. To start, we note that the grid model that we have
adopted for applying our Bad Santa protocols is fairly flexible. Empty loca-
tions in the grid may correspond to failed nodes or simply the absence of a
device altogether. The work in [22] generalizes results on reliable broadcast
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Figure 4.6: An illustration of the reliable broadcast protocol of Section 4.4.7.
(a) Some node in Qa acts as a source node to send a message to its square.
Transmission from Qa to (b) Qb above, (c) Qc below , (d) Qd to the left and
(e) Qe to the right, using a robust assignment.
connectivity; our results easily generalize to such a setting and we refer the
reader to [22] for more details. We also briefly mention that certain classes of
random graphs may be mapped to the grid model; the details depend on the
type of random graph utilized. For example, if nodes are placed uniformly
at random in the two-dimensional plane, we can partition the plane into a
grid and then map nodes to their nearest intersection point to achieve the
grid model. In general, so long as the number of faults in a neighborhood
does not exceed t < (r/2)(2r + 1), this mapping will work. We are simply
sketching this idea for the interested reader; clearly, the details of how many
nodes need to be dropped to guarantee at most t faults in any neighborhood
(with sufficient probability) and how the broadcast radius should be defined
are details that we leave to future work. We refer the interested reader to
work in [23] which deals with issues of probabilistic failures in the grid model
and a random network model. Next, we offer some discussion on the aspects
of the storage and processing overhead incurred by our algorithms, as well
as some exploration of the utility of our protocols in terms of bit complexity
savings.
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Storage and Processing Overhead
Recall that devices in the sensor network are considered to be resource con-
strained. Here, we briefly discuss the costs associated with our algorithms in
terms of processing and storage overhead, and we argue that these costs are
reasonable. Note that these are costs that must be paid, to an even larger
extent, in the original protocols of [21,22]. Furthermore, we argue that these
costs are negligible in comparison to the cost of sending/receiving; hence,
our algorithms do indeed achieve a energy savings.
In terms of storing data, consider our protocols where the send time and
location of the source is known. Each node must store information on the
current time slot, the slot when it can broadcast, its location relative to the
source, its set of neighbors in the broadcast region, and information on the
type of Bad Santa protocol being used (i.e. number of streams, the current
stream, which time slots it is listening to); all of these can be stored with a
small amount of overhead. The protocol for the case where we have Byzantine
faults also requires storage of fingerprints, which are small compared to an
actual message, and a hash function. The use of hash functions for such
resource-constrained environments has been tested in [170] and in [95] (on
the MICA series); it appears the storage costs are no obstacle. Therefore, the
main storage overhead in our algorithms appears to result from messages.
The length of these messages is likely application dependent and memory
sizes can differ with the device in question. In [36], the MICA2 devices are
stated to have 4 KB of memory. However, we note that current memory
sizes on these sensor network devices can be sizable. For instance, in [171],
the authors report that a flash-memory of 32 KB and the ability to add an
additional storage capacity (up to 1 GB) for the devices studied. Therefore,
memory size can be chosen for the application and corresponding message
sizes in question; regardless, we do not anticipate that our algorithms incur
an unreasonable amount of storage overhead over what is needed for storing
messages.
The main processing cost of our algorithms differs per case. For the
Byzantine fault-tolerant algorithm of Section 4.4.5, the main cost is likely
due to the use of the hash function. Recall that this operation must be
done fairly frequently in order for a node to commit to the correct message.
While our algorithm employs a hash function, we note that public key cryp-
tography (PKC) is not required by any of our algorithms. This distinction
103
is important since PKC has generally been considered to be expensive for
energy constrained nodes due to the need for sending, receiving, and storing
public keys and executing encrypt/decrypt operations [123]. More sophisti-
cated techniques are now available which require less energy; however, the
costs are still quite high. For instance, in [123], measurements using the
MICA2DOT unit demonstrate a cost of 2302.70 mWs (milliwatt seconds)
and 53.70 mWs for 2048-bit RSA signature generation and verification, re-
spectively. Elliptic Curve Crytography (ECC) is a popular alternative to
RSA since it has smaller key sizes. For 224-bit ECC, the same authors
measure costs with the MICA2DOT unit at 61.54 mWs and 121.98 mWs
for signature generation and verification, respectively. Both RSA-2048 and
ECC-224 are recommended by RSA Security as the new standard in order
to protect data past the year 2010 [155]. These costs should be compared to
the cost of broadcast on the Lucent IEEE 802.11 2Mbps WaveLAN PC Card
which is measured at 266 mWs. Therefore, it is not clear that an algorithm
could claim to save significant energy by employing public-key cryptographic
schemes.
On the other hand, hash functions for energy-constrained environments
have been considered in the literature and it appears the processing costs are
reasonable [170]. In particular, the SHA-1 hash function can be applied with
very little energy consumption; again with the MICA2DOT unit, the cost is
measured to be 5.9 µWs/byte is measured in [155]. Therefore, hashing a 1
KB message would incur 5.9 mWs; notably this is far less than the cost of
sending or receiving.
For the algorithm of Section 4.4.7, the most significant processing costs
would appear to arise from the need to majority filter on all incoming mes-
sages; however, such a comparison operation is certainly feasible in sensor
network devices. Finally, for the fail-stop case, the algorithm of Section 4.4.5
does not need to apply a hash function to messages and we do not antici-
pate significant processing costs here. In some cases, additional processing
overhead will come from comparing hashes and accessing a random number
generator; however, we anticipate that these additional processing overheads
will be small in comparison to the cost of storing and processing messages.
104
Saving on Bit Complexity
Recall that our Byzantine fault-tolerant reliable broadcast protocol of Sec-
tion 4.4.5 achieves asymptotically lower bit complexity through the use of
hashing. However, there is the question of when such savings would be seen
in practice. Packet sizes are discrete, and in many cases, the hash of a mes-
sage may require the same number of packets as sending the message itself. If
messages are small, then the bit complexity savings achieved by our protocol
will be consequently smaller. However, we note that if messages are sizable
then there is a benefit to the hashing technique.
In the face of large amounts of data collection and querying, data aggre-
gation techniques have been proposed to reduce the overall communication
costs since processing is generally less costly than sending data (see [59,160]
for more on this). Despite these techniques, there are applications for wire-
less networks that require transmission of large amounts of data even af-
ter processing. For instance, surveillance applications that require sending
significant amounts of data have been proposed involving image and video
data [40]. Therefore, there are indeed applications where large messages
might be transmitted and we anticipate more such situations will arise in
the future. Under such scenarios, we would expect our algorithms to save
substantially on bit complexity.
When considering large messages, there is also the issue of slot size to
consider. Modifying time division multiple access (TDMA) has been consid-
ered (see [74]) and it is possible that similar proposals could be used to allow
large messages to be sent within a single time slot without underutilizing
bandwidth. Alternatively, time slots could be reset by the dealer in order
to accomodate large future transmissions; the details of this would likely be






In this chapter, we examine a communication setting that involves a set of
multiple senders S and a set of multiple receivers R. As we will see, this set-
ting arises in the peer-to-peer (P2P) paradigm which is a popular approach to
providing large-scale decentralized services. However, the lack of admission
control in many such systems makes them vulnerable to malicious interfer-
ence [142,153]. This is a practical concern since large-scale P2P systems are
in existence today such as the Azureus DHT [49] and the KAD DHT [146],
each of which see more than one million users per day. In addition to file shar-
ing, there are proposals for using P2P systems to protect archived data [58],
mitigate the impact of computer worms [9] and re-implement the Domain
Name System [116]; such applications would likely benefit from increased
security.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, there are a number of results on P2P sys-
tems that can provably tolerate Byzantine faults [12–14,53,75,79,112,135].
To date, the majority of results pertain to distributed hash tables (DHTs).
A common technique in DHTs that tolerate adversarial faults is the use of
quorums which are sets of peers such that a minority of the members suffer
adversarial faults. A quorum replaces an individual peer as the atomic unit.
Adversarial behaviour can be overcome by majority action allowing for com-
munication between correct peers; we call this robust communication. Since
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critical operations such as data queries are performed in concert by members
of a quorum, robust communication must be efficient and this is the focus of
our work.
Before presenting our results, we lay the groundwork for the ideas in this
chapter. First, we elaborate on the relevance of Byzantine fault tolerance in
peer-to-peer systems in practice. Second, there have been a number of ad-
vances towards achieving such fault tolerance using quorums, and we present
an overview of the main ideas present in the literature.
5.1 Quorums and Robustness
A popular approach to dealing with Byzantine attacks in DHTs is to use
quorums [13, 53, 75, 112]. To reiterate, quorums are sets of peers with the
property that a majority of the peers in a quorum have not suffered Byzantine
faults. Typically, each quorum consists of Θ(log n) peers where n is the
number of peers in the network. Using quorums, it is possible to overcome
adversarial behaviour by treating each quorum as the atomic unit instead of
individual peers. If the Byzantine peers attempt to deviate from protocol,
this errant behaviour can be overwhelmed through majority action. For
instance, content may be stored in a distributed and redundant fashion over
members of a quorum such that the content cannot be polluted by a single
host peer. Poisoning attacks can be mitigated by having peers belonging to
the same quorum validate content before it is advertised. Furthermore, a
useful property of quorums is that those peers who violate protocol can be
ejected from their quorums which effectively removes them from the system.
Several protocols using quorums have been proposed; however, there is a
common theme in the way such quorums are utilized. A message m origi-
nating from a peer p traverses a sequence of quorums Q1, Q2, . . . , Q` until a
destination peer is reached. A typical example is a query for content where
the destination is a peer q holding a data item. Initially p notifies its own
quorum Q1 that it wishes to transmit m. Each peer in Q1 forwards m to
all peers in Q2. A peer in Q2 determines the correct message by majority
filtering on all incoming messages and, in turn, sends to all peers in the next
quorum. This forwarding process continues until the quorum Q` holding p
is reached. Assuming a majority of correct peers in each quorum, transmis-
sion of m is guaranteed. Unfortunately, this simple protocol is costly. If all
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quorums have size s and the path length is `, then the message complexity
is ` · s2. Typically, s = Θ(log n) and, as in Chord [148], ` = O(log n) which
gives a O(log3 n) message complexity which is likely prohibitively expensive
for practical values of n.
Note that this approach can fail if the adversary obtains a majority of
corrupted peers in any quorum. This can happen if an adaptive adversary
has its peers join and leave the network until a favourable placement is at-
tained. For instance, the adversary may target a quorum in the following
manner. The adversary adds a corrupted peer p into the system to see where
it is placed. If p lands within the target quorum, the adversary keeps the
peer active in the system; otherwise, p leaves. Over a number of join-leave
events the adversary may accumulate a large number of peers in the target
quorum, eventually obtaining a majority. Remedies to this challenging adap-
tive Byzantine adversary have been proposed and we discuss this further in
Section 5.2
To date, the previous best communication complexity for using quorums
was given by Saia and Young [135] who give a randomized protocol which
achieves O(log2 n) messages in expectation over a path of length O(log n).
While communication between two quorums incurs an expected constant
number of messages, the analysis in [135] yields a prohibitively large constant.
Furthermore, with probability 1 − o(1) some peers will incur ω(1) message
complexity (see Section 5.6). The protocol also employs a link architecture
between peers requiring the use of a Byzantine agreement protocol. Finally,
maintenance and asynchronicity issues remain unresolved.
Therefore, while results exist on the feasibility of robust communication,
work on the practicalities has lagged behind. This dearth presents an im-
pediment to the deployment of such systems and we seek to address this
outstanding problem.
5.2 Related Work
In this section, we expand on the introductory summarization of Byzantine
fault tolerance that was provided in Chapter 2. We begin by summarizing
a number of related applied results for achieving Byzantine fault tolerance.
We then give an overview of a number of theoretical results.
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State machine replication (SMR) is a standard method for implement-
ing highly fault-tolerant services [138]. Services are replicated over multiple
servers providing a high-integrity distributed system. While P2P systems do
not align perfectly with the SMR paradigm [138], the literature on Byzantine
fault-tolerant replication is relevant to our work. Early work by Reiter [128]
gave protocols for Byzantine agreement and atomic broadcast. Our first
protocol shares some common features with the multicast protocol of [128],
yet we differ significantly since in the P2P domain we must contend with
issues of scalability, churn, and spurious requests aimed at consuming re-
sources. More recently, Castro and Liskov [32] demonstrated efficient Byzan-
tine fault-tolerant SMR; however, this seems unsuitable for a P2P setting
due to scaling issues. Several other Byzantine fault-tolerant systems exist
such as SINTRA [30], FARSITE [2], the Query/Update protocol [1] and the
HQ system [38]; however, these protocols have not been shown to scale to the
P2P domain. More recent work on the FARSITE system allows for faulty
machines to be identified [48]. However, empirical work and details, in par-
ticular details on secure information retrieval and message passing, are not
provided in these works.
Two implemented large-scale Byzantine fault-tolerant storage architec-
tures are OceanStore [92] and Rosebud [132]. The latter scales up to tens of
thousands of nodes and handles changing membership. However, with only
a single Byzantine node per replication group, Rosebud incurs significant
overhead. In contrast, our protocols perform efficiently with 10% Byzantine
peers. Rosebud relies on a configuration service (CS) which tracks system
membership, ejects faulty nodes, and handles new nodes. The CS, imple-
mented over a set of nodes, introduces a potential bottleneck and a possible
point of attack; similarly, a “primary tier” of replicas is used in OceanStore.
In contrast, our protocol is completely decentralized and no special set of
nodes is required.
Both Rodrigues, Kouznetsov and Bhattacharjee [131] and Rodrigues,
Liskov and Shrira [133] give proposals for applying the SMR approach on
a large scale; the latter describes a P2P system. However, both works rely
on a CS and neither provides empirical results or discusses the details of
secure data retrieval and message passing. Wang et al. [157] design and im-
plement a routing scheme that tolerates Byzantine faults and yields good
performance. However, they require both a certificate authority (CA) and a
special set of nodes, called a neighborhood authority, similar to a CS.
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In summary, work on practical Byzantine fault-tolerance has focused on
ensuring consistency and availability of replicas in the SMR paradigm; as
noted in [131], this does not necessarily characterize the P2P domain. In
many cases, the reliance on a special set of nodes introduces a potential bot-
tleneck to the system; in contrast, our use of DKG and threshold cryptog-
raphy removes this bottleneck. Finally, both empirically validated systems
and proposals for larger-scale applications are either not aimed at, or do not
directly address, the issue of robust communication in a P2P environment.
There are several theoretical results on Byzantine fault-tolerant DHTs [13,
53, 75, 112]. These results make use of quorums, which are sets of Θ(log n)
peers such that a majority of the peers in a quorum are correct. Awerbuch
and Scheideler show how to tolerate a powerful adaptive adversary who at-
tempts to gain a majority of Byzantine peers in a quorum [12–14]. Saia
and Young [135] demonstrate more efficient robust communication but, as
discussed earlier, several issues remain unresolved.
Castro et al. [31], Halo [82], and Salsa [111] handle Byzantine faults by
routing along multiple diverse routes. The proposal in [31] requires a CA
whereas we do not rely on any trusted third party. In both [82] and [111],
the guarantees are unclear against an adversary who owns a large IP-address
space or targets identifiers over time as described in [13]. Such an adap-
tive adversary could potentially compromise the “knuckle” nodes in [82] or
the global contacts used in [111]; in contrast, defenses against an adaptive
adversary are known for quorum-based protocols [12–14].
There are several other works relating to issues of security in P2P net-
works. The ShadowWalker system [105] addresses the issue of anonymity
and routes securely using the notion of multiple “shadows” which are similar
to a quorum; however, our protocols differ significantly. The Brahms sys-
tem [28] allows for uniform sampling of peers despite a Byzantine adversary.
The Fireflies architecture [79] allows each peer to remain informed of live
members in the system despite Byzantine attacks; however, its applicability
likely extends only to single-hop overlays such as in work by Gupta et al. [70]
and secure routing in multi-hop networks is not treated.
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5.3 Our Contributions
We improve over all previously known results involving communication be-
tween quorums [13,53,112,135]. We summarize our main results below:
Theorem 14. In the computational setting, for an adversary that controls up
to an ε < 1/3-fraction of any quorum of size at most s, there are two protocols
for achieving robust communication of a message m to a set of peers D ⊆ Qi
for some quorum Qi over a path of length `. Our Robust Communication
Protocol I (RCP-I) has the following properties:
• The total message complexity (number of messages sent and received)
and the message complexity of the sending peer are each at most 2 · s+
4 · s · (`− 2) + |D|.
• The message complexity of every non-sending peer along the lookup path
is at most 4.
• The latency (number of roundtrip communication rounds) is at most
2 · (`− 2) + 2.
For our Robust Communication Protocol II (RCP-II):
• The expected total message complexity and the expected message com-
plexity of the sending peer are each at most 2 · s+ (`−2)
(1−ε)·c + (`−2) + |D|.
• The expected message complexity of a non-sending peer on the lookup
path is at most 2
(1−ε)·c·s .
• The expected latency is at most (`−2)
(1−ε)·c + 2.
Here, the constant c>0 is the probability that the response time of a correct
peer is at most ∆ (see Section 5.6.1 for more details).
Using the Chord-based construction of [53], the message complexity of
RCP-I is O(log2 n) and for RCP-II it is O(log n) in expectation. We tolerate
a large fraction of adversarial peers; strictly less than a 1/3-fraction compared
to the roughly 1/4-fraction in [135]. Our use of a distributed key generation
(DKG) scheme allows for security without a trusted party or costly updating
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of public/private keys outside of each quorum. This obviates the need for
a trusted third party. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first use of
DKG in a Byzantine-tolerant P2P setting.
Finally, we provide microbenchmark results involving two quorums using
PlanetLab. Our experimentation demonstrates that our protocols perform
well under significant levels of churn and faulty behaviour. In particular,
for a 105-node system with ` = 20, our results imply RCP-I and RCP-II
complete in under 4 seconds and 5 seconds, respectively.
5.4 The Network Model
Each peer p is assumed to have a unique identifier, pID, and a network address,
paddr. Byzantine peers are also referred to as faulty or adversarial ; all other
peers are called correct. A fraction of the correct peers may crash due to a
system failure or leave gracefully. We model such peers as having crashed.
We adopt an asynchronous communication model with unbounded mes-
sage delivery time. However, for liveness in DKG and in our second protocol,
we use a weak synchrony assumption by Castro and Liskov [33]. That is, let
delay(t) be the time between the moment t when a message is first sent and
the moment when it is received, and assume the sender keeps retransmitting
the message until it is received. We assume that delay(t) does not grow faster
than t indefinitely which, assuming that faults in the network are eventually
repaired, seems to be valid in practice.
Peers p and q are said to communicate directly if each has the other
in its routing table. The target of m is a set of peers D within a single
quorum; m may be a data item request and D may consist of a single peer
or multiple peers depending on how data is stored. Alternatively, m might
signify a update operation (such as a peer leaving the network), in which
case D could consist of multiple peers that need to be informed.
5.4.1 The Quorum Topology
There are several different approaches to how quorums are created and main-
tained [13, 112, 135]; we refer the reader to [53] for a detailed explanation.
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Despite these different approaches, we may view the setup of quorums as a
graph where nodes correspond to quorums and edges correspond to commu-
nication capability between quorums; we refer to this as the quorum topology.
Figure 5.1 illustrates how quorums can be linked in a DHT such as Chord.
We assume the following four simple invariants are true:
1. Goodness: each quorum has size Θ(s) for s = Ω(log n) and possesses
at most an ε-fraction of Byzantine peers for ε < 1/3.
2. Membership: every peer belongs to at least one quorum.
3. Intra-Quorum Communication: every peer can communicate directly
to all other members of its quorums.
4. Inter-Quorum Communication: if Qi and Qj share an edge in the quo-
rum topology, then p ∈ Qi may communicate directly with any member
of Qj and vice versa.
These four invariants are standard in the sense that previous work on quo-
rums in DHTs ensure they hold with probability nearly equal to 1. For
simplicity, we assume that these invariants hold with probability 1. How-
ever, many previous results make guarantees with high probability: 1− 1/nk
for any desired constant k > 0. In such cases, our results also hold with high
probability. For example, results for maintaining the goodness invariant in
DHTs are known [12–14]. For the membership invariant, there exist quorum
topologies where a peer may belong to several different quorums simultane-
ously [53, 112]. Finally, to the best of our knowledge, no implementation of
a quorum topology exists; this represents another gap between theory and
practice. A number of challenges remain in bridging this gap and such an
endeavor is outside the scope of this current work. However, the literature
suggests that, with the proper deployment, maintaining these invariants in
real-world DHTs is plausible.
Consider a peer p ∈ Qi. Peer p maintains a membership list of peers
which p believes belong to Qi. We note that peers will likely have different
views of the network and hence membership lists for Qi will likely differ for
two peers; however, such issues can be overcome (see [53]) and this does not
impact the use of eviction as a penalty for misbehaving peers. Throughout,
we will refer to the eviction of a peer p from a quorum. By this we mean that
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Figure 5.1: (Left) Three peers on a DHT ring where p links to u and v.
(Right) An example of a quorum topology in a DHT ring where p ∈ Qi,
u ∈ Qj and v ∈ Qh. Thick lines signify inter-quorum links.
a sufficient number of peers in Qi remove p from their respective membership
lists for Qi and stop responding to requests by p. An evicted peer cannot
perform any actions in the network and must rejoin the network. We assume
that rejoining is an expensive operation as discussed in Section 5.4.4.
5.4.2 Threshold Cryptography and Distributed Key
Generation
One way in which we achieve efficient communication is the use of threshold
signatures to authenticate the communication between quorums. The idea
behind an (η, t)-threshold scheme is to distribute a secret key among η parties
in order to remove any single point of failure. Any subset of more than t
parties can jointly reconstruct the secret key in the presence of a Byzantine
adversary who controls up to t parties.
Threshold Signatures: In an (η, t)-threshold signature scheme, a signing
(private) key k is distributed among η parties by a trusted dealer using a ver-
ifiable secret sharing protocol [51] or by a completely distributed approach
using a DKG protocol [118]. The distribution algorithm generates (1) a pri-
vate key shares ki for each party, (2) a verification (public) key K, and (3)
the associated public key shares K̂. Any subset of t+ 1 or more parties may
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sign a message m by using their private key shares to generate the signature
shares σi. Any party can combine these signature shares to form a message-
signature pair S = (m,σ) = [m]k that can be verified using the public key
K; however, this does not reveal k. We refer to a message-signature pair S
as a signature. It is also possible to verify σi using the public key shares
K̂. We assume that no computationally bounded adversary that corrupts
up to t parties can forge a signature S ′ = (m′, σ′) for a message m′. Fur-
ther, malicious behaviour by up to t parties cannot prevent generation of a
signature.
The threshold version [25] of the Boneh-Lynn-Shacham (BLS) signature
scheme [27] is particularly well suited to our setting since it does not require a
trusted dealer for key generation, and significant interaction between parties
is avoided. Furthermore, both the signature size and generation algorithm
are more efficient than other practical threshold signature schemes such as
the DSS [60] and RSA signature schemes [141]. Therefore, to authenticate
the communication between the quorums, we use the threshold BLS signature
scheme.
Distributed Key Generation (DKG): Since we cannot rely on a trusted
party in the P2P paradigm, we use a DKG scheme to generate the distributed
private key. An (η, t)-DKG protocol allows a set of η nodes to construct a
shared secret key k such that its shares ki are distributed over the nodes and
no set of fewer than t nodes may reconstruct the secret; no trusted dealer is
required. There is also an associated public key K and a set of public key
shares K̂ for verification.
The protocol in [85] is the first DKG for an asynchronous setting; there-
fore, it is uniquely suitable for deployment in a P2P network. Along with a
Byzantine adversary, this protocol also tolerates crash failures. For a quorum
of size s = η, with t Byzantine nodes and f correct nodes that can crash,
the DKG protocol requires that s ≥ 3t + 2f + 1. In our case, this security
threshold holds due to the goodness invariant in Section 5.4.1. The DKG
protocol allows for system dynamics without changing the system public key
K and this can be done efficiently by batching; details are given in Sec-
tion 5.7.2. Notably, the message complexity of a batch of peers (say set P )
all joining and/or all leaving the quorum is the same as for a single peer join-
ing/leaving the quorum, while the bit complexity increases only linearly with




A critical concern is that the adversary may launch spurious communica-
tions aimed at consuming resources; we refer to such behaviour as spam-
ming. For example, a malicious peer may initiate a number of data retrieval
requests [142, 153]. Here the situation is more dire since the impact of such
attacks is multiplied by the group action in a quorum-based system.
Ultimately, there is no perfect defence against an adversary with the
resources to initiate massive spamming attacks or denial-of-service (DoS)
attacks, and this is not our focus. In such circumstances, spamming amounts
to a denial-of-service (DoS) attack which forces correct peers to quit the
system; unfortunately, there appears to be no adequate remedy. On the
other hand, an extended cuckoo rule exists for maintaining the goodness
invariants against limited DoS attacks [14] and this result is compatible with
our proposal. Regardless, handling massive spamming or DoS attacks is a
challenging problem that falls beyond the scope of this current work. Rather
we show that our protocols do not afford the adversary an advantage in
launching such attacks. Our goal is to prevent the adversary from forcing
a peer to perform expensive operations with impunity. For any operation
initiated by a spammer p, this can be accomplished by either (A) placing
the bulk of the cost of executing said operation on p or (B) making the
detection of spamming inexpensive. As we will show in Section 5.5, our
protocol RCP-I in Section 5.5.1 employs principle (A) while our protocol
RCP-II in Section 5.6.1 employs principle (B).
In addition to cryptographic techniques, we assume a rule set to reduce
the impact of spamming attacks as introduced by Fiat et al. [53]. A rule set
defines acceptable behaviour in a quorum; for example, the number of data
lookup operations a peer may execute per duration of time, or tit-for-tat
behaviour for uploads/downloads. Such rules are known to everyone within
a quorum and can be implemented at the software level or simply agreed
upon by quorum members. As discussed in Section 5.1, requests from a peer
q who deviates from the rule set are ignored by the other members of its
quorum, effectively removing q from the system.
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5.4.4 Feasibility via Quorums, but Efficiency via Cryp-
tography
We now make explicit a crucial point regarding the feasibility versus the ef-
ficiency of robust communication. As we have discussed, in the presence of
Byzantine peers, no single peer can be trusted and quorums are employed
to overcome this trust deficit through majority action. Using the simple
protocol outlined in Section 5.1, the transmission of a message is guaran-
teed. Therefore, quorums allow for robust communication without the need
for cryptographic techniques. However, as we now discuss, cryptographic
techniques are important to achieving efficient robust communication.
A Problem of Spamming: Note that spamming attacks can pose a crit-
ical problem in a system that employs quorums. For example, a group of
Byzantine peers may pretend to be a quorum and initiate requests. There-
fore, simply obeying a request because it appears to come from a quorum
does not prevent spamming. To investigate the implications of spamming,
consider the case where peers act on any received request and call this the
passive scenario. In the passive scenario, a Byzantine peer p can contact any
quorum Qi by colluding with other faulty peers to obtain necessary routing
information. Members of Qi act on any request coming from p. Even if it
is possible to detect spurious requests at a global scale, each correct peer
would be required to maintain O(n) records to exclude faulty peers from the
system.
Therefore, the passive scenario is undesirable since spamming allows the
adversary to consume the resources of correct peers at little cost to itself. A
standard fix is that a quorum responds only to requests that are “proven” to
be legitimate. Yet, there is a cost to proving legitimacy; we explore this to
motivate our protocols. First, we expand on the utility of a quorum topology
in proving legitimacy. We then show how cryptographic techniques improve
the efficiency of this task.
Legitimacy and the Utility of the Quorum Topology: We now contrast
the passive scenario against another general scenario that we call the prove-
and-verify scenario which assumes that proofs and verifications are required
to initiate operations. We argue that the prove-and-verify scenario is superior
to the passive scenario and discuss how the quorum topology is used in
previous works to provide the framework for proving and verifying operations.
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P2P systems often lack admission control and, if forced to leave the sys-
tem, a Byzantine peer may simply rejoin the network with a new identity.
In the worst case, perpetual and rapid rejoin operations result in a DoS at-
tack. Therefore, we make the standard assumption that there is a cost for
joining the network. For example, monetary costs are suggested in [31] and
CAPTCHAs are suggested in [111]. Let τ denote the rate at which p can is-
sue spurious requests before being forced to rejoin the system. In the passive
scenario, a Byzantine peer p can contact any quorum Qi by colluding with
other faulty peers to obtain necessary routing information and so τ is large
due to the abundance of potential targets.
In contrast, in the prove-and-verify system the members of Qi must verify
p’s proof before acting. Proof and verification may take different forms.
For instance, constructions exist where two peers communicate only if their
respective quorums are linked [53, 112]; that is, the quorum topology itself
acts as proof. Verification occurs by having a quorum Qi act on p’s request
only if each peer in Qi receives messages from a majority in Qp. Here τ is
greatly reduced. Furthermore, correct peers are not required to maintain
records on misbehaving peers. However, while the prove-and-verify scenario
is far more robust to spamming, there are shortcomings to this actual method
of proof and verification and we discuss this next.
Efficiency in the Prove-and-Verify Scenario: We argue two things:
(1) the form of proof discussed above is restrictive and (2) verification is
expensive. First, the proof is restrictive since for Qi and Qj to communicate
without sending through intermediary quorums, they must maintain links
to one another; such maintenance is costly. Second, the verification process
is expensive because when communication occurs from Qi to Qj, a correct
peer q ∈ Qj must know to which peers in Qi it must listen; this incurs more
maintenance costs. These are two significant problems with existing schemes.
Cryptography allows us to improve asymptotically on the message com-
plexity of verification. Under our protocols, each quorum has a public and
private key established using DKG. Communication can occur between any
two quorums that know and can verify each other’s public key. Therefore,
the form of proof is not as restricted by the quorum topology and we exploit
this in RCP-II. Furthermore, verification is cheaper, using O(s) messages in
RCP-I or O(1) expected messages in RCP-II. Of course, overhead is incurred
by using cryptography. Message sizes increase by an additional number of
bits dependent on the security guarantees, and keys shares, but not the key
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itself, must be updated when membership changes. However, our experi-
mental results in Section 5.7 show that this overhead is tolerable since the
computation costs are significantly smaller than the network latency. Hence,
cryptography provides a more efficient and flexible implementation of the
prove-and-verify scenario.
5.5 Robust Communication Protocols
We propose two robust communication protocols: RCP-I and RCP-II. Here
we outline a general scheme in Figure 5.2 that is later refined to give our
two protocols. Consider a sending peer p who wishes to send a message
m to peer p′. We assume m is associated with a key value which yields
information necessary for distributed routing; that is, the next peer to which
m should be forwarded is always known. Peer p notifies its quorum Q1
that it is performing robust communication and receives Proof(Q1). Peer
p sends this to Q2 as proof that p’s actions are legitimate; the form of this
proof is discussed later. Depending on the scheme, one or more members
of Q2 examines the proof and, upon verifying it, sends to p: (1) routing
information for Q3 and (2) Proof(Q2), that will convince Q3 that p’s actions
are legitimate. This continues iteratively until p contacts the quorum holding
p′ and m is delivered. We employ the following concepts:
Quorum Public/Private Keys: Each quorum Qi is associated with a (dis-
tributed) public/private key pair (KQi , kQi); however, there are two crucial
differences between how such a key pair is utilized here in comparison to
traditional implementations. First, only those quorums linked to Qi in the
quorum topology, and not everyone in the network, need to know KQi . Sec-
ond, (KQi , kQi) is created using the DKG protocol and K̂Qi is the associated
set of public key shares.
Individual Public/Private Key Shares: Each peer p ∈ Qi possesses a
private key share (kQi)p of kQi produced using DKG. Unlike the quorum
public/private key pair of Qi which must be known to all quorums to which
Qi is linked in the quorum topology, only the members of Qi need to know the
public key shares K̂Qi , which plays an important role in allowing members
of Qi to verify that the signature share sent to peer p is valid.
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Figure 5.2: Our general robust communication scheme. At step i = 1, ..., `−
1, peer p presents proof, Proof(Qi), that quorum Qi sanctions p’s action,
and receives new proof from Qi+1 in addition to routing information for the
next hop. At the final step `, peer p sends Proof(Q`−1) and m.
5.5.1 Robust Communication Protocol I
We now illustrate RCP-I for a peer p who wishes to send a message m. The
path m takes through quorums is denoted by Q1, ..., Q`. We assume that
p ∈ Q1 and the target of the message is a set of peers D ⊆ Q`.
Overview: We outline RCP-I; the pseudocode is given in Figure 5.3. Ini-
tially, the correct peers of Q1 must acquiesce to p’s request. Peer p begins
by sending [pID|paddr|key|ts1] to all peers in its quorum Q1. The value key
corresponds to the intended destination of m and ts1 is a time stamp. The
message m can also be sent, and its hash can be added inside the signature
below; however, for simplicity, we assume m is sent only in the last step.
Each correct peer q ∈ Q1 then consults the rule set and sends its signature
share to p if p is not in violation of the rule set to within some bound to com-
pensate for clock drift. Peer p interpolates these signature shares to generate
the signature: S1 ← [pID|paddr|key|ts1]kQ1 .
In each intermediate step i = 2, ..., `−1, p sends its most recent signature
Si−1 for p’s request and a new time stamp tsi to each peer q ∈ Qi along
the lookup path. Since Qi is linked to Qi−1 in the quorum topology, each
q knows the public key KQi−1 to verify Si−1. If Si−1 is verified and tsi is
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RCP-I: Sending Peer p
Initial Step:
1: p ∈ Q1 sends the following request to all peers in Q1: [pID|paddr|key|ts1]
2: p interpolates all received signature shares to form: SQ1 ←
[pID|paddr|key|ts1]kQ1
Intermediate Steps:
3: for i = 2 to `− 1 do
4: p sends SQi−1 and tsi to every peer in Qi and requests a signature
SQi , public key KQi+1 and routing information for Qi+1.
5: p interpolates received signature shares to form SQi ←
[pID|paddr|key|tsi]kQi .
6: p verifies if SQi is valid using KQi .
7: if (SQi is invalid) then
8: p sends signature shares to each peer in Qi.
Final Step:
9: p sends S`−1 to D ⊆ Q` along with m.
RCP-I: Receiving Peer q ∈ Qi
Initial Step:
1: if (q ∈ Q1 receives a request by p) then
2: q checks that a request by p does not violate the rule set. If the
request is legitimate, q sends its signature share to p.
Intermediate Steps:
3: if (q receives SQi−1 and tsi from p) then
4: q verifies a SQi−1 using KQi−1 and validates tsi; if successful, q sends
its signature share, KQi+1 , and routing information for Qi+1 to p.
5: if (q receives signature shares from p) then
6: q verifies all shares using public key shares and informs p of invalid
shares.
Figure 5.3: Pseudocode for RCP-I
valid, q sends back its signature share for the request message, KQi+1 and
the routing information. Peer p collects the shares to form Si and majority
filters on the routing information for Qi+1. Finally, for Q`, p sends m along
with S`−1 to peers in the set D.
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Share Corruption Attack: Note the following attack: a set of Byzantine
peersB ( Qi send invalid shares to p and, therefore, p will fail to construct Si.
We refer to this attack as the share corruption attack. Here, the individual
public/private key shares play a crucial role. To obtain Si, p sends the
received shares to each peer in Qi using one message per peer. For a share
sent to p by a peer in Qi, each correct peer in Qi verifies the share using
K̂Qi . All valid shares are then sent back to p who creates Si. Note that
the shares are not recomputed; hence, the adversary can only perform this
attack once per step. Also, while peers in Qi may identify the peers which p
alleges sent an incorrect share, punitive action is limited, since p itself may
be lying about these transactions.
Lemma 24. RCP-I guarantees that m is transmitted to a target set of peers
D ⊆ Qi for some quorum Qi over a path of length ` with the following
properties:
• Both the total message complexity and the message complexity of the
sending peer is each at most 2 · s+ 4 · s · (`− 2) + |D|.
• Each forwarding peer has message complexity at most 4 messages.
• The latency is at most 2 · (`− 2) + 2.
Proof. First, we prove correctness. We show that if p is correct and has not
violated the rule set, at each step i of the protocol p either (1) receives a
valid signature and routing information for the next step or (2) terminates
the protocol by delivering m to all members of D; correctness follows directly.
Our proof is by induction on i:
Base Case: Consider the initial step i = 1 where p communicates with the
peers in its quorum Qp = Q1 about sending the message m. If p is correct
and has not violated the rule set, upon receiving [pID|paddr |key|ts1] all correct
peers will send their shares to p. Therefore, p is guaranteed to form S by
the goodness invariant. Peer p can then check whether S is valid and, if so,
sets S to be S1. Otherwise, p must overcome the share corruption attack.
Since p belongs to Q1, peer p knows the individual public key shares of each
peer in Q1 and can therefore detect which shares are invalid and construct
S1. Finally, p already has the routing information for Q2; therefore, the base
case holds.
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Inductive Hypothesis: Assume that up to step i < `, p has obtained the
correct signatures and routing information.
Inductive Step: At step i + 1, peer p sends Si to Qi+1. By the inductive
hypothesis, this signature is valid and p possesses the routing information
for Qi+1. If i < `− 1, and no corrupted share attack occurs, then p’s request
for Si+1 and the routing information for Qi+2 will be satisfied due to the
goodness invariant. Otherwise, p must overcome the corrupted share attack
by sending all signed shares to all other peers in Qi+1. Each correct peer
in Qi+1 can detect and inform p which peers sent an invalid share. Due
to the goodness invariant, peer p can majority filter on these responses to
determine the invalid shares and then construct Si+1. If i = `−1, p possesses
the routing information for Q` to deliver m to all members of D ⊆ Qi and
the protocol terminates successfully. In either case, the induction holds.
We now analyze the costs of our protocol. In the first step, even in the
event that a share corruption attack occurs, at most one round-trip round
of communication occurs (between p and Q1 since p holds K̂Q1). For steps
i = 2, ..., ` − 1, if a share corruption attack occurs, at most two round-trip
rounds of message exchange occur: (1) p sends to Qi and Qi sends back to
p and (2) p transmits shares to Qi who then send the correct shares back to
p. Adding the last step, the latency is 2 · (` − 2) + 2. In terms of message
complexity, in the first round, peer p must send a request to and receive a
response from each peer in Q1; this totals at most 2s messages. For steps
i = 2, ..., `−1 peer p must both send a request to and receive a response from
each peer in a quorum; if a corruption attack occurs, p must send another
message to each peer in a quorum (with all signed shares collected together)
and receive back a response. Therefore, this incurs at most 4 · s messages.
In the last step p sends to all members of D. Hence, the message complexity
is at most 4 · s · (`− 2) + |D|+ 2s. For every other involved peer q /∈ D, q’s
message complexity is at most 4; clearly, peers in D receive one message.
Spamming Attacks: The sending peer p experiences more cost than other
participating peers. In part, this is due to the iterative nature of the protocol;
however, largely this is because p must send and receive O(s) messages per
step. In contrast, other participating peers need only send and receive a
constant number of messages over the execution of the protocol.
Peer p may misbehave in other ways. For instance, p may repeatedly
contact its quorum to initiate robust communication; however, eventually
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all correct peers will ignore p. Similarly, using a correct signature, p may
repeatedly ask q in another quorum for proof and/or routing information;
however, time stamps limit such replay attacks. In conclusion, such actions
cannot cause correct peers to perform expensive operations.
5.6 Determinism is an Improvement
We conclude our discussion of RCP-I by showing that, under the previous
protocol of Saia and Young [135], some correct nodes will likely still incur
non-constant message complexity; the determinism of RCP-I avoids such
imbalances. To be fair, we note that in [135] the worst-case complexity is
still relatively small for realistic values of n, but we include this analysis for
completeness.
Theorem 15. Consider the first lookup scheme in [135]. In each hop, with






complexity. Over Θ(log n) hops, with probability 1−o(1), Θ(log n) peers each






Proof. Consider a message being passed from quorum L to quorum R. The
scheme of [135] works as follows. Let B denote a set of lnn bins. Each peer
in R is mapped to C bins in B uniformly at random. Then each peer in L is
mapped to a single bin in B uniformly at random. A peer in R listens only
to those peers that get mapped to the same bin as it does. Our first goal
is to show that, with probability 1 − o(1), there exists some bin to which
Ω(ln lnn/ ln ln lnn) peers in R get mapped. We proceed by adapting the
balls-and-bins argument of [106]. Assuming the Poisson distribution, let pk












The probability that no bin has at least k balls is at most (1 − pk)lnn ≤
e−pk·lnn. We wish to now show that 1
(lnn)2
> e−pk·lnn as this implies that,












by Equation 5.1), this is equivalent to proving: k · lnC + ln lnn > ln 2 +
ln ln lnn+ ln(k!) +C. Substituting k = ln lnn
ln ln lnn






· lnC + ln lnn. For the right side, we use Stirling’s
approximation for x! =
√
2πx · (x/e)x · (1 + O(1/x)) ≤ 2
√
2πx · (x/e)x for
sufficiently large x. Then: ln(k!) ≤ ln(2
√
2πk · (k/e)k) ≤ ln(
√
8πk) + k ln(k)
for sufficiently large k. Then the right side of the inequality is at most
ln 2 + ln ln lnn+ ln
(√
8 · π · ln lnn
ln ln lnn
)
+ ln lnn+C. Therefore, for sufficiently
large n, the inequality 1
(lnn)2
> e−pk·lnn holds. Now, by the results in [106]
relating tail bounds of the Poisson and binomial distributions, the result
holds for the binomial distribution up to a constant factor.





peers mapped to it
under the scheme in [135]. We now consider the number of peers that get
mapped from L to an overloaded bin over ` = Θ(log n) steps of the message
passing protocol in [135]. Let Xi be the indicator random variable that
has value 1 if in step i of the protocol, at least one overloaded bin exists
(which is 1 − o(1) by the above argument) and at least one peer in L is
mapped to an overloaded bin; otherwise, Xi is zero. Then Pr[Xi = 0] ≤
o(1) + (1− 1/ lnn)C lnn ≤ o(1) + e−C for each step i = 1, ..., `. Therefore,
Pr[Xi = 1] ≥ 1 − o(1) − e−C = Θ(1). Let X =
∑`
i Xi, then by linearity of
expectation E[X] = Θ(log n). Since the Xis are independent and i.i.d., by
standard Chernoff bounds: Pr[X < (1 − δ) · E[X]] < e−Θ(logn) = n−Θ(1) =
o(1). Therefore, with probability at least 1− o(1), over Θ(log n) steps of the






5.6.1 Robust Communication Protocol II
RCP-II is a randomized algorithm yielding a small expected message com-
plexity for both the sending peer and forwarding peers. In exchange, join
and leave operations incur additional cost in comparison to RCP-I; we discuss
this in Section 5.6.2.
RCP-II utilizes signed routing table information. As a concrete example,
we assume a Chord-like DHT although other DHT designs can be accomo-
dated. For a peer u ∈ Qi, each entry of its routing table has the form
[Qj, pID, p
′
ID, KQj , ts]. Here p ∈ Qj and p′ ∈ Qj−1 where (1) Qi links to Qj
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and Qj−1 in the quorum topology, (2) Qj−1 immediately precedes Qj clock-
wise in the identifier space and (3) p and p′ are respectively located clockwise
of all other peers in Qj and Qj−1. KQj is the quorum public key of Qj, and
ts is a time stamp for when this entry was created. Note that any point
in the identifier space falls between unique points pID and p
′
ID. Given this
property, and that entries are signed by a quorum, any attempt by a mali-
cious peer along the lookup path to return incorrect routing information can
be detected. RT Qj denotes the routing table information for all peers in Qj.
[KQj]kQi is the quorum public key of Qj signed using the private quorum
key of Qi; recall neighbors in the quorum topology know each others’ public
keys. [RT Qj ]kQi is the routing information signed with the private key of Qi;
entries of the routing table are signed separately. Routing table information
is time stamped and re-signed periodically when DKG is executed.
Overview: We sketch RCP-II here. For simplicity, we temporarily assume
that peers act correctly; our pseudocode in Figure 5.4 is complete for when
peers fail to respond to requests by p. Initially, each correct peer in Q1
receives [pID|paddr|key|ts] from p. The time stamp ts is chosen by p and peers
in Q1 will acquiesce to the value if it agrees with the rule set to within some
bound to compensate for clock drift. If the request does not violate the
rule set, then the information is signed allowing p to form M1 = [pID|paddr|
key|ts]kQ1 .
In the second step of the protocol, p knows the membership of Q2 and
selects a peer q2 ∈ Q2 uniformly at random (u.a.r.) without replacement.
Peer p then sends M1 to q2. Assuming q2 is correct, it verifies M1 using
KQ1 and checks that the ts is valid; the duration for which a time stamp
is valid would be specified by the rule set. Once verified, q2 sends p the
information [KQ1]kQ2 , [RT Q3 ]kQ2 and [KQ3]kQ2 . Peer p knows KQ2 since
Q1 links to Q2 and verifies [KQ1]kQ2 , [RT Q3 ]kQ2 and [KQ3]kQ2 , and checks
that the time stamp on the routing information is valid. If so, p constructs
M2 = [M1|[KQ1]kQ2 ]. Here [KQ1]kQ2 will allow some peer in Q3 to verify KQ1
and M1, while the signed verified KQ3 will allow p to check the response from
that peer in Q3.
This process repeats with minor changes for the remaining steps. Using
RT Q3 from the previous step, p selects a peer q3 randomly from Q3 and
sends M2. Since Q3 is linked with Q2 in the quorum topology, q3 knows KQ2,
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which it uses to verify [KQ1]kQ2 ; this allows q3 to verify M1 signed with kQ1.
Peer q3 then confirms that ts is valid and sends [KQ2]kQ3 , [RT Q4 ]kQ3 and
[KQ4]kQ3 to p. Peer p has a verified public key KQ3 from the previous step
and uses it to verify [KQ2]kQ3 , [RT Q4 ]kQ3 , and [KQ4]kQ3 . Then p constructs
M3 = [M2|[KQ2]kQ3 ] = [M1|[KQ1]kQ2|[KQ2]kQ3 ]. This process continues until
m is delivered. Group membership and signed routing information is agreed
upon through the use of the DKG protocol. Figure 5.4 gives the pseudocode
for RCP-II. Every peer contacted by p verifies a chain of certificates, which
can be converted into a single signature using the concept of aggregate sig-
natures [26].
Peer p may choose a Byzantine peer that does not respond. In that case,
after an appropriate time interval, p will select an additional peer in the quo-
rum. Let X be a random variable denoting the time required for a correct
peer to respond. We make a weak assumption that Pr[X ≤ ∆] ≥ c where
∆ is any duration of time and c > 0 is any constant probability. This does
not circumscribe a particular distribution for response times; any distribu-
tion suffices, including the Poisson, exponential, and gamma distributions
previously used to characterize round trip time (RTT) over the Internet. In
practice, peer p would set its own ∆ by sampling the network using methods
for estimating RTT [78]. Since at most a constant fraction of peers are Byzan-
tine, taking the median from a sufficiently large sample will determine ∆ and
p will receive a response from any of the previously selected peers — this is
in accordance with the weak synchrony assumption stated in Section 5.4.
Lemma 25. RCP-II guarantees that m is transmitted to a target set of peers
D ⊆ Qi for some quorum Qi over a path of length ` with the following
properties:
• Both the total message complexity and the message complexity of the
sending peer is each at most 2 · s+ (`−2)
(1−ε)·c + (`− 2) + |D|.
• Each forwarding peer has expected message complexity at most 2
(1−ε)·c·s .
• The expected latency is at most (`−2)
(1−ε)·c + 2.
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RCP-II: Sending Peer p
Initial Step:
1: p sends the following to each peer q ∈ Q1: [pID|paddr|key|ts]
2: p gathers all responses and constructs:
M1 ← [pID|paddr|key|ts]kQ1
Intermediate Steps:
3: for i = 2 to `− 1 do
4: while (p does not have Mi and has waited time ∆ since previous
selection) do
5: p sends Mi−1 to q ∈ Qi selected u.a.r. without replacement.
6: if ([KQi−1 ]kQi , [RT Qi+1 ]kQi and [KQi+1]kQi are received from any
peer in Qi previously selected) then
7: p uses KQi to verify KQi+1, RT Qi+1 and KQi−1.
8: if (KQi+1, RT Qi+1 and KQi−1 are all verified) then
9: Mi ← [Mi−1|[KQi−1 ]kQi ]
Final Step:
10: p sends M`−1 to D ⊆ Q` along with m.
RCP-II: Receiving Peer q
Initial Step:
1: if (q ∈ Q1 recives [pID|paddr|key|ts] from p ∈ Q1) then
2: q checks that p’s request is legitimate and, if so, sends its signature
share.
Intermediate Steps:
3: if (q ∈ Qi receives Mi−1 from p) then
4: for j = i− 1 downto 1 do
5: q uses KQj to verify KQj−1.
6: Peer q uses KQ1 to verify M1.
7: if verification is successful then
8: q sends [KQi−1 ]kQi , [RT Qi+1 ]kQi and [KQi+1]kQi to p.
Figure 5.4: Pseudocode for RCP-II
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Proof. First we prove the correctness of our protocol and, as before, we
show that if p is correct and has not violated the rule set, at each step i
of the protocol p either (1) establishes a valid Mi and receives the routing
information for the next hop or (2) terminates the protocol by delivering m
to all members of D. Our proof is by induction on i.
Base Case: Consider the initial step i = 1 where p communicates with the
peers in its quorum Qp = Q1 about sending the message m. If p is correct
and has not violated the rule set, upon receiving [pID|paddr| key|ts] all correct
peers will send their shares to p. Therefore, p is guaranteed to obtain M1 by
the majority invariant. Peer p already has the routing information for Q2;
therefore, the base case holds.
Inductive Hypothesis: Assume that at step i < `, p has obtained a correct
Mi and routing information for Qi+1.
Inductive Step: First assume that i = ` − 1. Then, by the induction
hypothesis, peer p possesses M`−1 and the necessary routing information to
send this signature and message m to D ⊆ Qi+1; thus the protocol terminates
correctly. Otherwise, assume i < `− 1; we consider step i+ 1. Peer p sends
Mi to a peer q ∈ Qi+1 selected uniformly at random without replacement.
By the inductive hypothesis, the contents of Mi are valid and p possesses
the necessary routing information. If q is a Byzantine peer, then p’s request
can fail and p can detect an invalid response using KQi+1 obtained from the
previous step. It is also possible that q is a correct but slow node and does
not respond in a predefined time period. In this case, p re-issues its request
to another randomly selected peer in Qi+1; eventually, one of selected correct
peers will respond with [KQi ]kQi+1 , [RT Qi+2 ]kQi+1 and [KQi+2]kQi+1 to p. Peer
p will verify this information and create a valid Mi+1. Therefore, at this
point p possesses a correct Mi+1 and routing information for Qi+2; therefore,
the induction holds.
Since RCP-II is a randomized algorithm, our costs are given in expectation.
We assume the following: let Xi be a random variable denoting the time
required for the ith correct peer (note we condition on correctness) selected
u.a.r without replacement by p to respond to p’s request. We assume that
Pr[Xi ≤ ∆] = c where c > 0 is some constant probability.
We now calculate loose upper bounds of the expected resource costs. In
the first step, in communicating with Q1, peer p handles at most 2·s messages
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and the round-trip latency is 1. Then for each step i = 2, ..., `− 1, let Yi be
the random variable with value 1 if the ith peer is both correct and responds
within time ∆; 0 otherwise. Then Pr[Yi = 1] ≤ (1− ε) · c; for simplicity, set
ρ = (1−ε)·c to be this probability of success. Let Y =
∑s
i=1 Yi. The expected













Therefore E[Y ] ≤ 1
(1−ε)·c and including the last step, the expected latency is
at most `−2
(1−ε)·c + 2. The `
th step requires D messages and one hop. In terms
of expected message complexity, since each step requires at most 2 messages
and the last step requires |D| messages, we can give a crude upper bound of
2s+ 2
(1−ε)·c · (`− 2) + |D|. However, note that once p hears back from a node,
any message from any other previously selected nodes in the current step can
be easily ignored/filtered. Therefore, per step, p handles 1
(1−ε)·c +1 messages.
We can now give a more accurate upper bound of 2s+ `−2
(1−ε)·c + (`− 2) + |D|.
Finally, while latency is measured in the number of communication rounds,
the expected duration of time required for each intermediate round is ∆
(1−ε)·c .
In terms of the expected message complexity of a forwarding peer q /∈ D
in a quorum along the lookup path, a correct peer chosen by p receives one
message and sends one message. The probability that q is chosen is at most
1/((1 − ε) · s); therefore the expected message complexity for q is at most
2/((1− ε) · s).
While latency is measured in communication rounds, the time for exe-
cuting RCP-II depends on ∆ and we discuss this briefly. Accounting for the
response time incurred in the intermediate steps, p waits for at most time
∆
(1−ε)·c per step in expectation as shown in Lemma 25. Since peer p will have
knowledge of the response time distribution, p may optimize performance by
selecting ∆ so that ∆
c
is minimized. Note that, for simplicity, our pseudocode
for RCP-II does not address the case where none of the peers respond to p
within ∆ time. In this case, p should simply continue waiting until it receives
a response.
Spamming Attacks: Due to the iterative nature of RCP-II, p sends more
messages than other participating peers, but not to the degree seen in RCP-
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I. Rather than make it expensive for p to perform robust communication,
RCP-II uses two properties to deter spamming: (1) it is inexpensive for a
peer to detect spam and (2) the congestion suffered by a peer is low since
the number of messages is not magnified by the use of quorums.
To address our first point, p may launch as many robust communication
operations as the rule set allows; p may even try to circumvent the rule set by
directly sending to a correct peer q; however, it is inexpensive for q to verify
that the proof being sent is invalid. The operation terminates at that point
since q will not reply. In contrast to the passive scenario of Section 5.4.4, q
need not keep a history to judge the legitimacy of a request; it simply verifies
the accompanying certificate.
Our second point, and a key difference between RCP-I and RCP-II, is
that with RCP-II an operation incurs only expected O(`) messages which
compares favourably to a system without a quorum topology. Therefore, the
congestion caused by such requests is not significantly magnified by the use
of quorums which was a key concern regarding spamming.
Adversarial peers may misbehave in other ways with many of the same
consequences and remedies as discussed in RCP-I. Even with a generous
upper bound on the expiration of ts, the congestion p can cause with a
replay attack is again limited since only p can use the certificate. A notable
attack, unique to RCP-II, occurs when a faulty peer gives p stale routing table
information. Since entries are signed and time stamped, we are guaranteed
that in the fairly recent past, the location indicated by the stale information
was indeed correct. This fact, coupled with the standard assumption that
ID collisions do not occur, guarantees that the adversary cannot engineer a
situation where requests are forwarded to a faulty peer. Consequently, the
impact of this attack is limited. The search path may be slightly lengthened
by forwarding to an older location. Alternatively, stale information may point
to a peer that no longer exists or is not the correct recipient, which forces p to
backtrack one hop. These cases are handled easily, but for ease of exposition,
they are not treated in our pseudocode in Figure 5.4. Routing integrity is
not compromised and, since routing tables can be signed periodically every
several minutes without significant CPU cost (see Section 5.7), the impact
of such an attack is negligible.
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5.6.2 The Join Protocols and Membership Updates
For the sake of being self-contained, we describe how a peer would join our
system. This first involves a discussion of a result by Awerbuch and Schei-
deler [13] which allows a DHT to be robust even if the number of join and
leave events is polynomial in the size of the network n. More precisely, within
a window of time, the adversary may opt to insert a Byzantine peer (assum-
ing the total number of Byzantine peers in the system does not exceed the
allotted amount) or remove a Byzantine peer from the system. An adversary
may attempt to gain a majority of Byzantine peers in a targeted quorum Q
by having one of its peers q′ join the system. If q′’s location in the DHT does
not allow it to become part of Q, then the adversary removes q′ and has it
rejoin for another attempt. By repeating this process with several peers, the
adversary can eventually obtain a majority in Q, at which point the secu-
rity of the system is compromised. The protocol for defending against such
attacks is the cuckoo rule developed by Awerbuch and Scheideler [13]. We
assume the identifier space of the DHT is normalized to be [0,1). For any
interval I ⊂ [0, 1), the cuckoo rule maintains two invariants. The first is the
balancing invariant which guarantees that I contains Θ(|I| · n) peers. The
second is the majority invariant which guarantees the majority of peers in
I are correct. The authors show that for |I| = Θ(log (n)/n) both invariants
can be maintained with high probability over nc join and leave operations,
where c is a constant that can be tuned according to the parameters of the
protocol. It follows that the peers in I can form a quorum.
It is important to understand the resource costs of the cuckoo rule which
functions as follows. The ring [0, 1) is assumed to be broken into disjoint
segments of constant length k/n for some constant k. Each segment is called
a k-region and Rk(x) denotes the unique k-region containing x. When a peer
p joins the network, it is assigned a random identifier x ∈ [0, 1) and placed in
this location on the ring. All nodes in Rk(x) are evicted from their locations
and placed into new locations chosen uniformly and independently at random
from [0, 1). Figure 5.5 illustrates these operations.
The node placements required by the cuckoo rule can be executed by hav-
ing quorums use robust communication in order to inform each other about
the arrival of the evicted nodes at their new locations. Once a quorum Qi
knows about the presence of a recently evicted node q, all correct members of
Qi update their membership lists, share IP addresses, and aid q in setting up
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Figure 5.5: An illustration of the cuckoo rule. (Left) Peer p is placed in
its random location x. All peers in the k-region, Rk(x) denoted by dashed
lines, are assigned random locations in [0, 1). (Right) After the cuckoo rule
is executed, peer p is the only peer in Rk(x).
any required links (i.e. such as finger links in Chord). A detailed discussion
of how this can be done is presented in [53]. Furthermore, the issue of effi-
ciently generating random numbers for use with the cuckoo rule is addressed
by Awerbuch and Scheideler [12]. We also note that resilience to a more
challenging attack, where the adversary is able to force correct peers to leave
the system temporarily, is addressed by an extension of the cuckoo rule given
by Awerbuch and Scheideler [14]; it also seems possible to implement this
rule in concert with our communication protocols. We finish our discussion
of a join protocol by discussing the steps necessary for maintaining DKG and
the consequent cost of membership changes:
RCP-I: Consider a quorum Qi to which a new peer is added. The member-
ship update protocol of DKG [85] is executed to redistribute the shares of
the public/private quorum key pair over all members of Qi. In the process,
the individual public/private key shares are also updated. Notably, no other
quorums are affected by this process as the quorum key pair remains the same
and the individual key shares need only be known to members of Qi. When
a peer leaves Qi, the departure can be treated as a crash and so long as
the number of crashes does not exceed the crash limit f , the DKG (share
renewal) protocol need not be executed. We use this to associate the system
churn rate to DKG session time. Note that the adversary may crash some of
its t nodes, and in principle, the system can handle t+ f node leaves. How-
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ever, we cannot associate these additional t crashes with the system churn
due to the inherent arbitrary nature of Byzantine peers.
RCP-II: When a peer q joins Qi, the DKG protocol needs to be executed
as in the case of RCP-I; however, there are additional costs due to the need
to update and re-sign the routing table information. In particular, not only
do the peers in Qi need to update and have signed their routing table infor-
mation to reflect the addition of q, all quorums to which Qi is linked under
the quorum topology also need to update and re-sign their routing table
information; note that this does not require any revocation since the public
key does not change. Therefore, a join event under this scheme does affect
other quorums. When a peer leaves Qi, DKG may be required as in the case
of RCP-I. However, routing table information for Qi and the quorums to
which it links must again update and re-sign their routing table information.
Therefore, while RCP-II reduces message complexity, the cost of join/leave
operations is higher in comparison to RCP-I.
5.7 Microbenchmarks and Performance
We examine the performance of DKG and our two protocols through mi-
crobenchmarks executed on the PlanetLab platform [122]. Based on our ex-
perimental results and known churn rates, we propose parameters for DHTs
using our protocols.
5.7.1 Implementation and Microbenchmarks
The DKG protocol is a crucial component of our protocols since it is required
to initiate a threshold signature system in a quorum and to securely manage
membership changes. Here, a C++ implementation [86] is used to measure
the performance of DKG. The experimental measurements reported in Ta-
ble 5.1 and those regarding the threshold BLS signatures were executed on
PlanetLab. While this author had input into certain design aspects of the
DKG experiment that yielded the values in Table 5.1, the implementation
of the BLS signatures and the execution of the DKG experiments were per-
formed by Dr. Aniket Kate; these results are presented in more detail in [169].
In this thesis, we use the results of these experiments to derive back-of-the-
envelope calculations with respect to the performance of our protocols.
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Distributed Key Generation: We test the DKG implementation for quo-
rum sizes s = 10, 15, 20, 25, 30 and present median completion times and
median CPU usage in Table 5.1 along with 95% one-sided confidence inter-
vals. We describe our experimental setup in the context of [64, 93]. Our
experiments are terminating and conducted via the method of independent
replications. A single replication consists of s individual observations each
corresponding to the time required for a participating peer in the quorum to
complete the DKG protocol; there are 10 replications for each s value. For
each s value, the PlanetLab machines used are chosen from around the world
with roughly 64% located in North America, 20% located in Asia and the
remaining 16% located in Europe. Using independent replications, an unbi-
ased sample point estimator for variance is calculated and used to obtain our
one-sided confidence intervals using the t-distribution.
The median completion periods vary from roughly 10 seconds for s = 10
to roughly 69 seconds for s = 30. Notably, the bulk of this latency is due to
network delay whereas the required CPU time is far smaller than the com-
pletion periods. In the next subsection, we examine the feasibility of these
completion periods. Our DKG experiments are set up so that correctness is
guaranteed so long as at most 30% of the peers may crash and 10% of the
peers may be Byzantine. While we can tolerate any fraction of Byzantine
peers less than 1/3, we use these numbers since in many practical scenarios
we expect the fraction of Byzantine faults to be less than 10% and modest
compared to the fraction of crash failures. In each of our replications, the
pseudorandom values are generated using the well-known Number Theory
Library (NTL) and Pairing-Based Cryptography (PBC) library.
RCP-I and RCP-II: For our RCP-I and RCP-II experiments, we set s = 30,
t = 3, and f = 10. We conduct terminating experiments again via the
method of independent replications where each of the 5 replications consists
of 30 observations. In RCP-I, a node requires an average of 0.14±0.0075 sec-
onds (95% one-sided confidence interval) to obtain a threshold signature from
a quorum, if all of the obtained signature shares are correct. The average
execution time increases to 0.23 ± 0.015 seconds (95% one-sided confidence
interval) in the case of a share corruption attack. Extrapolating to a path
length `, an operation should take between 0.14·`±0.0075·` or 0.23·`±0.015·`
seconds on average. For a DHT with 105 nodes, the average total time for
RCP-I is then 2.8± 0.15 to 4.6± 0.3 seconds with ` = 20.
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Table 5.1: Median values of DKG completion time and CPU time per node for
various s values.
s t f Time (seconds) CPU Seconds/Node
10 1 3 8.59 ± 2.50 1.31 ± 0.13
15 2 4 15.88 ± 12.72 2.11 ± 0.14
20 2 6 26.38 ± 0.89 2.37 ± 0.19
25 3 7 46.55 ± 5.27 6.12 ± 0.54
30 3 10 61.82 ± 4.31 5.46 ± 0.49
In RCP-II, a node takes 0.042± 0.014 seconds (95% one-sided confidence
interval) on average to obtain the required signed public keys and the signed
routing information from a correct peer. A single signature verification takes
negligible time; however, for completeness we report the average value of
0.0045 ± 0.0028 seconds (95% one-sided confidence interval). The median
latency value over all pairs of PlanetLab nodes is roughly 0.08 seconds [42];
that is, ∆ = 0.08 seconds for c = 0.5. With a chain of signed public keys of
length `, the total communication time is 0.14 ± 0.0075 + (0.042 ± 0.014) ·
(`− 1) + ∆·(`−2)
c·(1−ε) + (0.0045± 0.0028) ·
`(`−1)
2
which for 10% Byzantine peers, is
4.94± 1.60 seconds in expectation for ` = 20. To a first approximation, the
execution times of our protocols seem quite reasonable.
System Load: We address the issue of system load under the assumption
that signature verification is the most significant computational operation.
We make back-of-the-envelope calculations to obtain the expected order of
magnitude for our performance figures. For RCP-I, from the above discus-
sion, each signature verification takes 0.0045±0.0028 seconds; thus, the total
CPU time required per execution is (0.0045± 0.0028) · ` · (1 + s+ s2); this in-
cludes the costs due to share corruption attacks. For ` = 20 and s = 30, this
value is 74.48 ± 52.14 CPU seconds, spread out over 600 nodes. Therefore,
the number of executions of RCP-I that can be started per second on average
when n = 105 is roughly 103; note this rate value is for the entire system.
Now, if no share corruption attacks occur, the total CPU time required per
execution becomes (0.0045±0.0028) ·` ·(1+s) which, for the same parameter
values, is 2.5 ± 1.76 CPU seconds. This implies that 4 · 104 executions can
be started per second on average in the entire system. For RCP-II, the total






Table 5.2: The expected number of seconds before a quorum experiences a
membership change (rQ).
s 10 15 20 25 30
nQ 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
rQ 526 351 175 350 234 117 263 132 88 210 140 70 175 87 58
which, for the same parameters and ε = 1/10 is 1.040±0.65 CPU seconds on
average. Therefore, approximately 105 executions can be started per second
on average in the entire system.
5.7.2 Analysis and Discussion
As mentioned in Section 5.4.1, important questions remain with regards to
translating theoretical results to a practical setting. In particular, two quan-
tities of interest are the size of quorums, s, and the number of quorums to
which each peer belongs, nQ. Unfortunately, pinning down these quantities
is non-trivial. Only asymptotic analysis is present in the literature. Fur-
thermore, it is not a simple case of substituting hard numbers because s
depends on a number of parameters: (1) the exact guarantees being made,
(2) algorithms for quorum maintenance, (3) the tools of analysis (i.e. form
of Chernoff bounds used) and many more. Evaluating these parameters is
outside the scope of this work. Instead, we assume a range of values for s and
nQ. As our protocols appear to be the most efficient to date, the following
results illuminate what currently seems possible in practice.
System Churn and DKG: We now return to the issue of system churn
which was discussed earlier in Section 5.5. A common metric for measuring
the degree of churn is session time: the time between when a node joins the
network and when it departs [129]. As discussed in Section 5.4.4, we make
the standard assumption that the cost of joining the network is large enough
so as to prevent the adversary from substantially increasing the rate of churn
through rapid rejoin operations.
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Part I - An Argument for Batching: Investigations have yielded differ-
ing measurements for median session times. The Kazaa system was found to
have a median session time of 144 seconds [68]. In the Gnutella and Napster
networks, the median session time was measured to be approximately 60 min-
utes [136]. In the KAD DHT, 155 minutes was the measured median [146]. A
study of the Skype P2P network yielded a median session time of 5.5 hours
for super-peers [65]. Here, we temporarily assume a median session time
of 60 minutes and a standard Poisson model of peer arrivals/departures as
in [98,129]. To calculate churn rate, r (number of arrivals/departures per sec-
ond), based on the median session time tmed (in seconds), we use the formula
of [129]: r = (n · ln 2)/tmed. For n = 105 and tmed = 3600 seconds, r ≈ 19.
Assuming that join and departure events occur independently of each other,
Table 5.2 gives the expected number of seconds, rQ, at which point a quorum
will undergo a membership change when each peer belongs to nQ quorums.
Our choice of nQ ≤ 3 is based upon the reasonable assumption that overlap
occurs only with neighboring quorums in the ID space.
In several cases, the rQ values are less than or fairly close to the corre-
sponding median DKG completion times in Table 5.1. Therefore, a quorum
may not be able to execute DKG often enough to accommodate each mem-
bership change. However, join operations can be queued and performed in
batches. Executing DKG for a batch of joins does not increase the mes-
sage complexity and message size increases only linearly in the batch size
(see [85]). Therefore, batching can mitigate the effects of churn and it seems
plausible that peers would tolerate some delay in joining in exchange for
security.
Part II - Batching and the Security Threshold: Batching join events
improves performance; however, many peers might depart a quorum before
a new batch is added, thus violating the security threshold. Hence, we are
interested in the median session time value required such that this is not
likely to occur. Based on Table 5.1 for s = 20 and nQ = 1, DKG completes
within roughly 26 seconds. The number of departures a quorum can suffer
while not exceeding the crash limit is f = 6. If Byzantine peers depart, more
crashes are tolerable; however, identifying such events is impossible, so we
assume the worst case of f = 6. Assuming DKG executes every rDKG = 1200
seconds, we seek the median session time such that at most 6 peers depart
the system within 1226 seconds. With n/s = 5000 quorums in the system,
each experiencing 6 departures within 1226 seconds, the system churn rate is
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Table 5.3: Median session times (in hours) derived from values for s, nQ and
rDKG (in hours).
s 10 15 20
rDKG 0.17 0.25 0.33
nQ 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
tmed 0.39 0.78 1.17 0.67 1.33 2.00 0.79 1.57 2.36
25 30
0.42 0.50
1 2 3 1 2 3
1.07 2.15 3.22 1.08 2.16 3.24
roughly r = 25. This gives tmed = 2832 or, equivalently, 47 minutes. There-
fore, with this tmed, we expect the system to remain secure, and a quorum
only spends 26/1226 = 2.1% of the time executing DKG. We note that this
is not a completely rigorous argument as we are considering median session
times. However, since churn is Poisson distributed, the probability of exceed-
ing 6 departures within 1226 seconds quickly decreases. In order to obtain
more rigorous guarantees on security, it seems likely that larger quorum sizes
are necessary; regardless, our calculations provide a first-approximation of
the fraction of time a quorum spends executing the DKG protocol.
We can decrease the required median session times by decreasing rDKG;
however, the percentage of time spent on DKG increases. Such tuning would
depend on the desired system performance, the application, s, and nQ. Ta-
ble 5.3 gives session time calculations for other values of s, rDKG and nQ.
Required session times increase with s. Notably, for s = 30 and nQ = 1, tmed
does not far exceed the 60 minutes in [136]. As nQ increases, the required
session times grow linearly. However, our maximum of 3.24 hours is still
less than tmed measured for super-peers in the Skype network [65]. We ten-
tatively conclude that our protocols can be deployed in applications where





In this thesis, we have presented attack-resistant algorithms for achieving
resource-efficient communication in both wired and wireless networks. Our
algorithms achieve improvements over the previous best known results. We
conclude this thesis by briefly summarizing our main contributions and pos-
ing some open problems as possible avenues for future work.
Our first major result addressed a simple single-hop communication sce-
nario involving a single sender, a single receiver, and an adversary that can
interfere with the shared communication channel. Our results demonstrate
that an adversary is required to expend an asymptotically greater amount of
resources than that spent by a correct sender and receiver. We then extended
this work to demonstrate the utility of our results in mitigating attacks in
WSNs when a jamming adversary is present, and in the wired client-server
model when an application level DoS attack occurs. In terms of future work,
there are several interesting questions that remain open. Is our result on
favourable communication the best possible? It would be valuable to obtain
a lower bound on the 3-Player Scenario. It also seems that our approach
would prove useful for gossiping and epidemic protocols where the propaga-
tion of a message in the early stages is critical to its dissemination throughout
the network; the investigation of such applications is a topic for future work.
With regards to WSNs, we designed new algorithms for addressing the
problem of reducing energy consumption when Byzantine faults are present.
To this end, we considered a second single-hop communication scenario in-
volving multiple (possibly faulty) senders and a single receiver. Our abstrac-
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tion of this problem is a novel data streaming problem which we call the
Bad Santa problem. We have shown how our results on this problem can be
applied to the problem of reliable broadcast in WSNs in a grid network. Our
algorithms for reliable broadcast on a grid consume significantly less power
than any other algorithms for this problem of which we are aware. Several
open problems remain including: Can we close the gap between the upper
and lower-bound for the multi-round Bad Santa problem? Can we achieve
more energy efficiency for the optimal number of Byzantine faults? Can we
tolerate more faults for the fail-stop model and still be energy efficient? Can
we tolerate more faults in the unknown source and message time scenario?
Can we generalize our techniques to other topologies? Are there other ap-
plications for the Bad Santa problem both in and outside the domain of
WSNs?
In the domain of peer-to-peer networks, we have provided two new robust
communication protocols that leverage cryptographic techniques to improve
asymptotically on the message complexity of previous results. Our experi-
mental work suggests that our protocols are practical for a number of ap-
plication scenarios. In terms of future work, the performance of a complete
system is an important open question — the quorum topology chosen is cru-
cial and optimizing this in practice requires further study. While we assume
that peer arrivals and departures obey a Poisson distribution, the actual dis-
tribution may be different. This has implications for our arguments involving
execution of the DKG protocol and batching, and more experimental work
would be valuable. The cuckoo rule deserves further attention since it likely
requires substantial overhead. Optimizing its performance and reconciling it
with our batching mechanism for peer joins is important. Finally, while we
focus on DHTs, our results may apply to other P2P designs and more general
settings where groups of machines, some with untrustworthy members, must
communicate; it would be of interest to identify such applications.
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Appendix
The following two lemmas are relevant to the lower bounds in Chapter 4.
Lemma 15. Ω(
√
n) expected queries are necessary in the single stream case.
Proof. In the following, let Õ denote that logarithmic factors are ignored.
We follow Yao’s min-max method [166] to prove lower bounds on any ran-
domized algorithm that errs with probability no greater than λ = 1/2Õ(
√
n):
We describe an input distribution and show that any deterministic algo-
rithm that errs with tolerance (average error) less than 2λ = 1/2Õ(
√
n) on
this input distribution requires Ω(
√
n) queries on average for this distribu-
tion. By [166], this implies that the complexity of any randomized algorithm




n). Let [a, b] denote the bits in
position a, a+ 1, ..., b− 1, b of the stream. The distribution is as follows:
CASE 1. With probability 1/2,
√
n uniformly distributed random bits in
[1, n/2] are set to 1 and the remaining bits in that interval are 0, [n/2 +
1, n/2 +
√
n] are all set to 0, and the remaining bits are 1.
CASE 2.x: For x= 0, ...,
√
n − 1, with probability 1/(2
√
n), [1, ..., n/2] con-
tains a uniformly distributed random set of x 0’s and the rest are 1’s; [n/2 +
1, n/2 +
√
n] contains a uniformly distributed random set of x 1’s and the
rest are 0’s; and the remaining bits in the stream are 0.
Analysis: Let A be a deterministic algorithm which errs with average proba-
bility less than 2λ. Note that A is completely specified by a list L of indices
of bits to query while it has not yet discovered a 1, since it stops as soon
as it sees a 1. Let x be the number of queries in the list that lie in [1, n/2].
For a constant fraction of inputs in CASE 1, A will not find a 1 in [1, n/2]
within
√
n queries. Hence either x ≥
√
n or A must find a 1 with high prob-
ability in [n/2 + 1, n]. Now suppose x <
√




n − x bit positions in [n/2 + 1, n/2 +
√
n]. To show
this, assume this is untrue. Then A will err on the input in CASE 2.x in
which all the x positions queried in [1, n/2] and the
√
n−x positions queried
in [n/2 + 1, n/2 +
√










≥ 2λ in the distribution. Therefore, the algorithm
errs with probability at least 2λ; this is a contradiction. We conclude that
any algorithm erring with probability less than 2λ must either have x ≥
√
n
or queries greater than
√
n− x bits of [n/2 + 1, n/2 +
√
n].
Now we show that any such deterministic algorithm incurs an average cost
of Ω(
√
n) on the CASE 1 strings in this distribution. If x ≥
√
n then for
a constant fraction of strings in CASE 1, the algorithm will ask at least√
n queries in [1, n/2] without finding a 1. If x <
√
n, then with constant
probability the algorithm will incur a cost of x in [1, ..n/2] and go on to
incur a cost of
√
n− x in [n/2 + 1, n/2 +
√
n] since all the values there are 0.
Therefore, the distributional complexity with error 2λ is Ω(
√
n). It follows
from [166] that the randomized complexity with error λ is Ω(
√
n).
Lemma 18. Ω(log(i+2) n) expected queries are required for a randomized
algorithm that errs with probability less than λ = (ln(i) n)−ε on one stream of
length n. In particular, when i = 0, Ω(log log n) expected queries are required
for a randomized algorithm with error less than 1/nε, for any constant ε > 0.
Proof. We apply Yao’s min-max method [166] and consider the distribution
in which with probability 1/3, one of the I1 = [1, n/3], I2 = [n/3 + 1, 2n/3],
and I3 = [2n/3 + 1, n] intervals is all 0’s, and the other two each contain
exactly n/4 1’s with the 1’s distributed uniformly at random. Let L denote
the list of queries of a deterministic algorithm, and let xi be the number
of queries in L ∩ Ii. The probability that the algorithm fails to find a 1


























−ε)xi > ( 1
e7/4
)xi = e−7xi/4 when xi = o(n) for sufficiently large
n. Let Ii and Ij be the intervals that are not all 0’s. Then the probability
of failing to find a 1 in either Ii and Ij is > e
−7(xi+xj)/4 for sufficiently large
n when xi + xj = o(n). Hence the probability of not finding a 1 over all
intervals is > (1/3)e−7(xi+xj)/4 > 2λ if xi +xj < (3/7)ε lg
(i+1) n. We conclude
that a deterministic algorithm with average error less than 2λ can have at
most one xi, i = 1, 2, 3 such that xi < (3/14)ε lg
(i+1) n.
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Now we examine the cost of such an algorithm. Suppose x1 ≥ (3ε/14)
(ln(i+2) n) then with probability 1/3 I1 is all 0’s and the cost incurred is x1,
for an average cost of (ε/14)(ln(i+2) n). Now suppose x1 < (3ε/14) ln
(i+2) n.
From above, we know x2 > (3ε/14) ln
(i+1) n). Then with probability 1/3, I2
is all 0’s and with probability > e−7x1/4 > (ln(i+1) n)−3ε/8, the algorithm does
not find a 1 in I1 and incurs a cost of (3ε/14) lg
(i+1) n in I2 for an average
cost of at least (ε/14)(ln(i+1) n)1−3ε/8. Hence the average cost of any such de-
terministic algorithm is at least min{(ε/14)(ln(i+2) n), (ε/14)(lg(i+1) n)1−3ε/8}
= Ω(ln(i+2) n). By Yao’s min-max method [166], any randomized algorithm
with error λ is bounded below by 1/2 the average cost of a deterministic
algorithm with average error 2λ on any distribution. The lemma now fol-
lows.
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